Topic
Padding oracle attack
About: Padding oracle attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 59 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1656 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Various ways to perform an efficient side channel attack are shown and potential applications, extensions to other padding schemes and various ways to fix the problem are discussed.
Abstract: In many standards, e.g. SSL/TLS, IPSEC, WTLS, messages are first pre-formatted, then encrypted in CBC mode with a block cipher. Decryption needs to check if the format is valid. Validity of the format is easily leaked from communication protocols in a chosen ciphertext attack since the receiver usually sends an acknowledgment or an error message. This is a side channel. In this paper we show various ways to perform an efficient side channel attack. We discuss potential applications, extensions to other padding schemes and various ways to fix the problem.
339 citations
2 May 2002
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss potential applications, extensions to other padding schemes, and various ways to fix the problem of side channel leakage from communication protocols in chosen ciphertext attacks since the receiver usually sends an acknowledgment or an error message.
Abstract: In many standards, e.g. SSL/TLS, IPSEC, WTLS, messages are first pre-formatted, then encrypted in CBC mode with a block cipher. Decryption needs to check if the format is valid. Validity of the format is easily leaked from communication protocols in a chosen ciphertext attack since the receiver usually sends an acknowledgment or an error message. This is a side channel.In this paper we show various ways to perform an efficient side channel attack. We discuss potential applications, extensions to other padding schemes and various ways to fix the problem.
282 citations
19 Aug 2001
TL;DR: It is shown that for the Rabin and RSA trapdoor functions a much simpler padding scheme is sufficient for chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model and that only one round of a Feistel network is sufficient.
Abstract: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) is a technique for converting the RSA trapdoor permutation into a chosen cipher-text secure system in the random oracle model. OAEP padding can be viewed as two rounds of a Feistel network. We show that for the Rabin and RSA trapdoor functions a much simpler padding scheme is sufficient for chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model. We show that only one round of a Feistel network is sufficient. The proof of security uses the algebraic properties of the RSA and Rabin functions.
159 citations
17 Aug 2003
TL;DR: This work demonstrates attacks which use decryption failures to recover the private key and outlines one candidate padding scheme, which prevents an attacker from directly controlling any part of the input to the encryption primitive.
Abstract: NTRUEncrypt is unusual among public-key cryptosystems in that, with standard parameters, validly generated ciphertexts can fail to decrypt. This affects the provable security properties of a cryptosystem, as it limits the ability to build a simulator in the random oracle model without knowledge of the private key. We demonstrate attacks which use decryption failures to recover the private key. Such attacks work for all standard parameter sets, and one of them applies to any padding. The appropriate countermeasure is to change the parameter sets and possibly the decryption process so that decryption failures are vanishingly unlikely, and to adopt a padding scheme that prevents an attacker from directly controlling any part of the input to the encryption primitive. We outline one such candidate padding scheme.
152 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that OAEP padding can be viewed as two rounds of a Feistel network and that for the Rabin and RSA trapdoor functions a much simpler padding scheme is sufficient for chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model.
Abstract: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) is a technique for converting the RSA trapdoor permutation into a chosen ciphertext secure system in the random oracle model. OAEP padding can be viewed as two rounds of a Feistel network. We show that for the Rabin and RSA trapdoor functions a much simpler padding scheme is sufficient for chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model. We show that only one round of a Feistel network is sufficient. The proof of security uses the algebraic properties of the RSA and Rabin functions.
148 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 1 |
| 2019 | 1 |
| 2018 | 3 |
| 2017 | 2 |
| 2016 | 3 |
| 2015 | 6 |