TL;DR: The relation between the two approaches to formal Interactive Epistemology, in which knowledge is embodied in sentences constructed according to certain syntactic rules, is examined, showing that they are in a sense equivalent.
Abstract: Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or “player.” One is interested not only in each person's knowledge about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge about the others' knowledge. This paper examines two parallel approaches to the subject. The first is the semantic approach, in which knowledge is represented by a space Ω of states of the world, together with partitions ℐi of Ω for each player i; the atom of ℐi containing a given state ω of the world represents i's knowledge at that state – the set of those other states that i cannot distinguish from ω. The second is the syntactic approach, in which knowledge is embodied in sentences constructed according to certain syntactic rules. This paper examines the relation between the two approaches, and shows that they are in a sense equivalent. In game theory and economics, the semantic approach has heretofore been most prevalent. A question that often arises in this connection is whether, in what sense, and why the space Ω and the partitions ℐi can be taken as given and commonly known by the players. An answer to this question is provided by the syntactic approach.
TL;DR: An overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in the book, Epistemic Luck, is offered and some of the ways in which the strategy of anti- Luck epistemologists can be developed in new directions are sketched.
Abstract: In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
TL;DR: The debate over Foundationalism and Coherentism as discussed by the authors has been studied extensively in the last few decades in the field of Epistemic Justification and Reliablism.
Abstract: 1. Knowledge and Justification. 2. Epistemology and Philosophical Analysis. 3. A Priori Knowledge. 4. The Concept of Epistemic Justification. 5. Foundationalism. 6. Coherentism. 7. The Debate over Foundationalism and Coherentism. 8. Reliablism. 9. Naturalistic and Nonnaturalistic Epistemology. 10. Skepticism and the Possibility of Epistemology.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how ideas from complexity have challenged the "spatial epistemology" of representation and explore possibilities for an alternative "temporal" understanding of knowledge in its relationship to reality.
Abstract: In modern, Western societies the purpose of schooling is to ensure that school‐goers acquire knowledge of pre‐existing practices, events, entities and so on. The knowledge that is learned is then tested to see if the learner has acquired a correct or adequate understanding of it. For this reason, it can be argued that schooling is organised around a representational epistemology: one which holds that knowledge is an accurate representation of something that is separate from knowledge itself. Since the object of knowledge is assumed to exist separately from the knowledge itself, this epistemology can also be considered ‘spatial.’ In this paper we show how ideas from complexity have challenged the ‘spatial epistemology’ of representation and we explore possibilities for an alternative ‘temporal’ understanding of knowledge in its relationship to reality. In addition to complexity, our alternative takes its inspiration from Deweyan ‘transactional realism’ and deconstruction. We suggest that ‘knowledge’ and ‘r...
TL;DR: In the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: ... With those who identify happiness [faring happily or well] with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life. Ibid., Bk I, sec. 8.