TL;DR: The paper demonstrates the effectiveness of information leakage as a measure of cipher security by relating information leakage to linear cryptanalysis and by determining a lower bound on the amount of data required in an attack from an upper bound on information leakage.
Abstract: We examine the information leakage between sets of plaintext and ciphertext bits in symmetric-key block ciphers. The paper demonstrates the effectiveness of information leakage as a measure of cipher security by relating information leakage to linear cryptanalysis and by determining a lower bound on the amount of data required in an attack from an upper bound on information leakage. As well, a model is developed which is used to estimate the upper bound on the information leakage of a general Feistel (1975) block cipher. For a cipher that fits the model well, the results of the analysis can be used as a measure in determining the number of rounds required for security against attacks based on information leakage. It is conjectured that the CAST-128 cipher fits the model well and using the model it is predicted that information leaked from 20 or fewer plaintext bits is small enough to make an attack on CAST-128 infeasible.
TL;DR: In this article, a plaintext code which is a secrecy object according to chaos block encryption and then enciphers it using chaos stream encryption is transmitted through communication line. But, each of the nodes that received the cipher code synchronously restores the received cipher code according to chaotic stream encryption.
Abstract: Each of plural CPUs enciphers a plaintext code which is a secrecy object according to chaos block encryption and then enciphers it according to chaos stream encryption. Then, it transmits an obtained cipher code through communication line. On the other hand, each of plural CPUs that received the cipher code synchronously restores the received cipher code according to chaos stream encryption and then restores according to chaos block encryption thereby to obtain an original plaintext code.
TL;DR: In this article, the security of the WAKE stream cipher is investigated and two chosen plaintext attacks on this cipher are presented, and the complexities of these attacks can be estimated as 10 and 10.
Abstract: Stream ciphers are an important class of encryption algorithms, which are widely used in practice. In this paper the security of the WAKE stream cipher is investigated. We present two chosen plaintext attacks on this cipher. The complexities of these attacks can be estimated as 10 and 10.
TL;DR: The security of the stream cipher Vesta-2M is investigated and a cryptanalytic algorithm is developed for a known plaintext attack where only a small segment of plaintext is assumed to be known.
Abstract: In this paper the security of the stream cipher Vesta-2M is investigated. Cryptanalytic algorithm is developed for a known plaintext attack where only a small segment of plaintext is assumed to be known. The complexity the attack is estimated the time of searching through the square root of all possible initial states.