Nuclear explosive

Abstract: The fate and transport of radionuclides away from nuclear test centers is driven by the release potential of the host matrix under saturated or partially saturated conditions. The objective of the present investigation is to return data on the composition, crystallinity and texture of residual nuclear explosion melt debris as it affects the potential mobility of constituent radionuclide species. Drill-back cores were collected from six underground nuclear events sponsored by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Results indicate that nuclear explosive debris in all cases consists of diverse mixtures of glass, silicates and subordinate oxides. Both crystalline and vitreous debris exhibits measurable radioactivity. The volatile species are likely surface deposited on the abundant fracture surfaces created in the crystalline matrices while the refractory species are volume incorporated in the melt glass itself. All of the samples contain the fission products Ru, Sb, Cs, Ce and Eu. Comparison of the major element composition of glasses incorporated in the nuclear explosive melt debris and natural volcanic glass from the Nevada Test Site indicates little variation. Iron, contributed by the device, is enriched in the explosive glasses. Depletion of sodium in the explosive glasses may involve a loss of alkalis but is more likely an analytical artifact. Single event data indicates the explosive glass and natural glass may be directly compared. Higher concentrations of alkalis, alkaline earths and alumina indicate the presence of feldspathic minerals. For the purposes of characterization, natural volcanic glass compositions mimic that produced by underground nuclear explosions.

Abstract: On May 11 and 13, 1998, India tested five nuclear weapons in the Rajasthan desert. By the end of the month, Pakistan had followed suit, claiming to have detonated six nuclear devices–five to match New Delhi’s tests and one in response to India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosive test–at an underground facility in the Chagai Hills. With these tests, the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi loudly announced to the world community, and especially to each other, that they both held the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to any attack. What will be the strategic effects of these nuclear weapons developments? Will the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia bring stability to the region or lead to nuclear war? There are many scholars and defense analysts–some in the U.S. and many more in India and Pakistan–who argue that the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia will significantly reduce, or even eliminate, the risk of future wars between India and Pakistan.1 Following the logic of

Abstract: Today a third generation of nuclear weapons is technologically feasible. By altering the shape of the nuclear explosive and manipulating other design features, weapons could be built that generate and direct beams of radiation or streams of metallic pellets or droplets at such targets as missile-launch facilities on the ground, missiles in the air and satellites in space. These weapons would be as removed from current nuclear weapons in terms of military effectiveness as a rifle is technologically distant from gunpowder. It would be logical for a weapon designer to build on the legacy of the first- and second-generation nuclear weapons, all of which transform mass into an abundance of energy that is then uniformly dissipated in a roughly spherical pattern. Such a new generation of nuclear weapons might selectively enhance or suppress certain types of energy from the vast energy source provided by a nuclear explosion. Moreover, the lethal effects of a selected energy carrier (such as electromagnetic radiation, subatomic particles or expelled material) might be increased by distorting its normal pattern of emission into a highly asymmetrical one - in essence concentrating the energy in a certain direction. Indeed, nuclear weapons that deliver 1000 or more times themore » energy per unit area on a target than does a conventional nuclear weapon are entirely plausible. 9 figures.« less

Abstract: With the publication of Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards by Willrich and Taylor, significant attention has been focused by the media and the public on the possibility of fissile materials being stolen by a terrorist organization and diverted to the actual building, or the threat of building, of a nuclear explosive device. The implication has been created that one or several relatively inexperienced individuals could obtain the materials necessary and fabricate a low-yield nuclear explosive. This article examines these contentions in some detail. The safeguards and use-denial methods presently used in the nuclear fuel cycle are considered and the difficulties they present in obtaining significant amounts of strategic nuclear materials are examined. The characteristics of reactor-grade plutonium are discussed, and the difficulties associated with the assembly of an efficient nuclear explosive device are outlined.