TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined current post-explosion nuclear forensics from unclassified literature and found the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value.
Abstract: Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the nuclear weapons scientific and policymaking community. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime, or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. Developing a nuclear fingerprint database is also discussed. While useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.
TL;DR: In this article, the United States should adopt a broadly scoped operationally ambiguous declaratory policy in the context of a comprehensive strategic doctrine to prevent nuclear terrorism, as well as the wide range of possible nuclear terrorism scenarios.
TL;DR: Nuclear forensics is the investigation and analysis of the source of nuclear materials for nuclear attribution including trafficking and illegal possession and enrichment of natural materials as mentioned in this paper, including radionuclide theft, illegal trafficking and possession, loss of nuclear weapons, and poisonings.
Abstract: Nuclear forensics is the investigation and analysis of the source of nuclear materials for nuclear attribution including trafficking and illegal possession and enrichment of natural materials. Nuclear forensics cases include radionuclide theft, illegal trafficking and possession, loss of nuclear weapons, and poisonings. To prepare forensic chemists to handle materials in these cases and law enforcement to thwart these threats, nuclear forensics courses are offered at United States colleges and universities. In this paper, I report upon the field of nuclear forensics including history and cases, ongoing threats that underscore the need for education, courses offered and topics covered internship and training opportunities, and expert witness testimony in nuclear forensics. A robust reference list of peer-reviews papers, websites, books and book chapters that can be used in such a course is included.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a case study of the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in the former Soviet republic of Ukraine, where the U.S. Department of Energy, NA-242 GIPP (Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention) and CBM (Confidence Building Measures) programs are being supported.
Abstract: Globally, the production, transport and storage of nuclear materials have led to serious concerns over illegal trafficking of such materials. Ukraine stands at one of the geographical crossroads of such activities, and contains the largest uranium ore reserves in Europe. Moreover, Ukraine retains significant waste from Soviet-era uranium production and enrichment activities, as well as radioactive materials accumulated from the Chernobyl catastrophe. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL), with support through NA-242, has initiated multiple cooperative efforts within Ukraine, engaging some of the best Ukrainian scientists and institutions in nuclear forensic science. Nuclear forensics serves as a vehicle for scientific collaborations between the Ukrainian and United States governments, strengthening the response and core capabilities of Ukraine, who is also taking an active role as the regional leader in nuclear forensics, and additionally contributing to further engagements between respective governments. These collaborations are being supported through the Department of Energy, NA-242 GIPP (Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention) and CBM (Confidence Building Measures) programs, and serve to enhance nuclear forensics capabilities for Ukraine and neighboring countries, as well as in the United States. INTRODUCTION Ukraine stands at a geographical and geopolitical crossroads for illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, possessing the largest uranium ore reserves in Europe, as well as retaining significant waste from Soviet-era uranium production and enrichment activities, and radioactive materials accumulated from the Chernobyl catastrophe. Additionally, Ukraine supports a large uranium mining industry founded on a diverse set of geological settings and employing multiple uranium mining technologies, from open-pit to leach field mining. According to the illicit trafficking database maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1,2], over the past two decades, more than one thousand cases have been confirmed by States Points of Contact, about 25% of which involved nuclear materials. Interdictions on nuclear materials, including samples consistent with origins in the former Soviet Union [3], suggests a real threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in Ukraine, and highlights the need for the development of a nuclear forensics infrastructure including analytical methods, technologies and material databases. Most research regarding the identification of specific characteristics of uranium ore and related materials for addressing nuclear forensics was, until recently, considered classified by the Ukrainian and previous governments. Nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution [4]. The goal of nuclear analysis is to identify forensic indicators in interdicted nuclear and radiological samples or the surrounding