TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a three-component model of organizational commitment, which integrates emotional attachment, identification with, and involvement in the organization, and the normative component refers to employees' feelings of obligation to remain with the organization.
Abstract: Organizational commitment has been conceptualized and measured in various ways. The two studies reported here were conducted to test aspects of a three-component model of commitment which integrates these various conceptualizations. The affective component of organizational commitment, proposed by the model, refers to employees' emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in, the organization. The continuance component refers to commitment based on the costs that employees associate with leaving the organization. Finally, the normative component refers to employees' feelings of obligation to remain with the organization. In Study 1, scales were developed to measure these components. Relationships among the components of commitment and with variables considered their antecedents were examined in Study 2. Results of a canonical correlation analysis suggested that, as predicted by the model, the affective and continuance components of organizational commitment are empirically distinguishable constructs with different correlates. The affective and normative components, although distinguishable, appear to be somewhat related. The importance of differentiating the components of commitment, both in research and practice, is discussed.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine three aspects of the stakeholder theory and critique and integrate important contributions to the literature related to each, concluding that the three aspects are mutually supportive and that the normative base of the theory-which includes the modern theory of property rights-is fundamental.
Abstract: ?The stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified in the management literature on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity. These three aspects of the theory, although interrelated, are quite distinct; they involve different types of evidence and argument and have different implications. In this article, we examine these three aspects of the theory and critique and integrate important contributions to the literature related to each. We conclude that the three aspects of stakeholder theory are mutually supportive and that the normative base of the theory-which includes the modern theory of property rights-is fundamental. If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members, that they are . . . trustees for an institution [with multiple constituents] rather than attorneys for the stockholders.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that norms do have a substantial impact on human action; however, the impact can only be properly recognized when researchers (a) separate two types of norms that at times act antagonistically in a situation, and (b) focus Ss' attention principally on the type of norm being studied.
Abstract: Past research has generated mixed support among social scientists for the utility of social norms in accounting for human behavior. We argue that norms do have a substantial impact on human action; however, the impact can only be properly recognized when researchers (a) separate 2 types of norms that at times act antagonistically in a situation—injunctive norms (what most others approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (what most others do)—and (b) focus Ss' attention principally on the type of norm being studied. In 5 natural settings, focusing Ss on either the descriptive norms or the injunctive norms regarding littering caused the Ss* littering decisions to change only in accord with the dictates of the then more salient type of norm.
TL;DR: The quantitative method of neuropsychological assessment involves standardized tests that are scored quantitatively and compared with normative data.
Abstract: Abstract In its extreme form, the quantitative method of assessment involves the standardized use of a set group, or battery, of tests. These tests are scored quantitatively, and the resulting data are compared with normative data from a group of non-brain-damaged people, preferably matched to the patient in regard to important variables such as age, sex, socioeconomic group, culture, and years of formal education. To establish whether a patient’s scores are typical of the scores of other people with similar disorders, comparisons with the scores of groups of patients with similar disorders or lesions in a similar area of the brain can sometimes be made. The advantage of the quantitative method is that the assessment can be conducted by a trained technician (psychometrist) who does not necessarily need to understand the concepts underlying the tests or their interpretation; a computer can score the tests and even interpret them according to the most likely pathology based on the best fit with normative and research data. The Halstead-Reitan Battery (Halstead 1947; Reitan and Davison 1974) is designed to be used in this way.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap, including performance errors, computational limitations, the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and a different construal of the task by the subject.
Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.