TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a sustained descriptive and normative analysis of the "unwilling or unable" test and argue that the use of these factors would improve the quality of state decision-making in important substantive and procedural ways, while simultaneously illustrating the lack of guidance about what inquiries a victim state must undertake when assessing whether another state is unwilling or unable to address a particular threat.
Abstract: Non-state actors, including terrorist groups, regularly launch attacks against states, often from external bases. When a victim state seeks to respond with force to those attacks, it must decide whether to use force on the territory of another state with which it may not be in conflict. International law traditionally requires the victim state to assess whether the territorial state is “unwilling or unable” to suppress the threat itself. Only if the territorial state is unwilling or unable to do so may the victim state lawfully use force. Yet there has been virtually no discussion, either by states or scholars, of what that test requires. The test's lack of content undercuts its legitimacy and suggests that it is not currently imposing effective limits on the use of force by states at a time when trans-national armed violence is pervasive. This Article provides the first sustained descriptive and normative analysis of the test. Descriptively, it explains how the “unwilling or unable” test arises in international law as part of a state's inquiry into whether it is necessary to use force in response to an armed attack. It identifies the test's deep roots in neutrality law, while simultaneously illustrating the lack of guidance about what inquiries a victim state must undertake when assessing whether another state is “unwilling or unable” to address a particular threat. Normatively, the Article plumbs two centuries of state practice to propose a core set of substantive and procedural factors that should inform the “unwilling or unable” inquiry. It then applies those factors to a real-world example – Colombia's use of force in Ecuador in 2008 against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – to explore how the use of these factors would affect the involved states' decision-making and the evaluation by other states of the action's legality. The Article argues that the use of these factors would improve the quality of state decision-making surrounding the use of force in important substantive and procedural ways.
TL;DR: In this article, a re-examination of the notion of sovereignty as traditionally understood is presented, where the power or importance of physical territory does not disappear but rather becomes subsumed under ongoing political contestation over the symbolic meanings of physical space more generally.
Abstract: This article engages the ongoing theoretical debates in IR through a re-examination of sovereignty as traditionally understood. Despite a growing theoretical turn in IR towards more general investigations of institutions, much uncertainty and ambiguity as to how to best incorporate new issues and actors which transcend traditional state-centred politics remains. How can IR theory sufficiently take into account ‘other’ political actors which are neither NGOs nor states and cannot easily be categorized according to traditional dichotomies? Rather than concluding that sovereignty is in a state of demise, this political inquiry deconstructs and abstracts sovereignty from its Westphalian limitations. Instead, sovereignty is relocated from bounded state territories to the process of collective political identity and institution construction. Throughout this process, the power or importance of physical territory does not disappear but rather becomes subsumed under ongoing political contestation over the symbolic meanings of physical space more generally.
TL;DR: In this paper, Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert discuss the legal status of non-state actors in international law and the role of nonstate actors as law-takers or law-makers.
Abstract: Contents: Foreword, Bob Reinalda Preface Introduction: non-state actors: international law's problematic case, Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert Part 1: Multinational enterprises as actors in international law: creating 'soft law' obligations and 'hard law' rights, Peter Muchlinski The impact of non-state actors on the international law regime of corporate social responsibility: blessing or curse?, Leyla Davarnejad. Part 2: Imposing international duties on non-state actors and the legitimacy of international law, Cedric Ryngaert Non-state actors and the international rule of law: revisiting the 'realist theory' of international legal personality, Janne E. Nijman Observations on the desirability of an enhanced international legal status of the non-state actor, Noemi Gal-Or. Part 3: Understanding non-state actors in the contemporary world society: transcending the international, mainstreaming the transnational, or bringing the participants back in?, Math Noortmann International law-making by non-state actors: changing the model or putting the phenomenon into perspective?, Jean d'Aspremont Non-state actors: law-takers or law-makers? Is that the question?, Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert Index.
TL;DR: In this paper, the permissibility of use of force in self-defense in response to non-state actor armed attacks and the U.S. use of drones in Pakistan for such purposes is discussed.
Abstract: This article addresses the permissibility of use of force in self-defense in response to non-state actor armed attacks and the permissibility of U.S. use of drones in Pakistan for such purposes. Contrary to some writers, when directed merely against the non-state actors, responsive force is not engaged in against the foreign state as such or as an attack “on” or “against” its territory. Responsive measures of self-defense in a foreign state would not necessarily create a state of war between the responding state and the foreign state or between the responding state and the non-state actors, and whether or not an armed conflict exits to which the laws of war apply would be tested under normal criteria with respect to the existence of an international or non-international armed conflict. It is understandable, therefore, that a self-defense paradigm can be different than a war paradigm and both are different than a mere law enforcement paradigm. Permissibility of use of drones in Pakistan also depends on inquiry into many features of context and appropriate application of principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality.
TL;DR: In this article, a number of alternative mechanisms have been developed to better monitor respect of humanitarian norms during internal armed conflicts and verify allegations of violations, including the Deed of Commitment, an innovative instrument developed by the Swiss-based non-governmental organization Geneva Call.
Abstract: Armed non-state actors are involved in most armed conflicts today, yet international law provides few mechanisms to ensure that they comply with humanitarian norms applicable to them. In particular, monitoring and verification mechanisms that address the conduct of armed non-state actors rarely appear in multilateral treaties, and, even when they do, are weak and not applied in practice. Over the past few years, a number of alternative mechanisms have been developed to better monitor respect of humanitarian norms during internal armed conflicts and verify allegations of violations. This article examines the strength of these various mechanisms and then focuses on the Deed of Commitment, an innovative instrument developed by the Swiss-based non-governmental organization Geneva Call, to hold armed non-state actors accountable. Experience with the Deed of Commitment on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines shows that these alternative mechanisms can be effective in ensuring better compliance with at least some humanitarian norms.