Abstract: This article studies the interplay of U.S. primary and general elections. I examine how the nomination of an extremist changes general-election outcomes and legislative behavior in the U.S. House, 1980 - 2010, using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections. When an extremist - as measured by primary-election campaign receipt patterns - wins a "coin-flip" election over a more moderate candidate, the party's general-election vote share decreases by approximately 9 -13 percentage points, and the probability that the party wins the seat decreases by 35 - 54 percentage points. This electoral penalty is so large that nominating the more extreme primary candidate causes the district's subsequent roll-call representation to reverse, becoming more liberal when an extreme Republican is nominated and more conservative when an extreme Democrat is nominated. Overall, the findings show how general-election voters act as a moderating filter in response to primary nominations.

Abstract: The nominating committee (NC) of the board identifies and nominates individuals for board service, thus establishing the board's composition. Despite this important role, relatively little is known about the NC process, including NC members' actions and thought processes. Based on interviews of 20 U.S. public company NC members, including 16 chairs, we focus on two primary questions: (1) what is the extent of influence that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has over committee processes, and (2) to what extent are committee processes formalized (i.e., framed and acted upon in a mechanistic way)? We find that there is continuing recognition of CEO influence in the director nomination process, the level of which varies widely by company. Also, there is considerable variability in the formalization of the director nomination process (e.g., some NCs use search firms and a matrix/grid approach to assessing director skill sets across the board, while others do not). Finally, we find that many interviewees have professional or personal ties to the CEO and that nearly all of the NCs focus on �chemistry� and comfort in the director nomination process, where the often-stated goal is to enhance the board's ability to function effectively and to reduce risk in the director nomination process. The overall message of the interviews perhaps is best captured by one interviewee, who described a �strange little dance.� Throughout the interviews, we find evidence that the NC must �dance� through a complex decision landscape.

Abstract: In this article, we analyse the impact of intra-party procedures of candidate selection for national elections on the representativeness of parties towards their voters. With regard to candidate selection we distinguish between two dimensions: inclusion and centralization. While the first identifies the type of selectorate for candidate nominations (members, delegates or committees), the second captures the territorial unit in which the nomination is decided (local, regional or national). Based on data for 53 parties in 9 Western European countries for the period 1970 to 1990, the analysis points to the relevance of the inclusion dimension. Parties in which party elites decide the nomination of candidates show slightly higher degrees of representation than parties with more inclusive selectorates. We conduct our analysis separately for two frequently used but theoretically different concepts of representation: cross-sectional representation (at one point in time) and dynamic representation (over time). Ou...

Abstract: Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal�agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states� influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal�agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) over a 15-year period. We present a view of an Appellate Body appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence Appellate Body members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the Appellate Body nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial Appellate Body decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of Appellate Body candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although our empirical study is specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Abstract: Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Abstract: President Barack Obama's reelection prospects looked shaky in early 2012. His approval rating in January was just 47%; the economic recovery from the Great Recession was erratic and uncertain; and his signature legislative accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act, was receiving mixed public acceptance. Believing that he would be unable to win by running on his first-term record, many political pundits suggested that Obama would win reelection only by turning the election discourse away from a narrow, retrospective focus on his performance and toward a debate over the acceptability of his opponent's claim to the presidency. When Mitt Romney secured the Republican nomination, many pundits felt that he was a flawed candidate who could easily be portrayed in an unfavorable light and thus would be particularly susceptible to this strategy. Despite widespread concern about the economy and notwithstanding the great policy differences between Obama and Romney, many political commentators saw the election result as depending on the personal characteristics of the candidates. It was not just a question of which direction voters wanted the ship of state to sail; it was also a question of whom the voters wanted as the captain of the ship. For President Obama, pundits considered whether his personal likability, combined with Romney's personal deficiencies, would be enough to overcome the weak economy. According to New York Times columnist David Brooks, Obama's leadership style, which Brooks described as "hypercompetitive, restrained, not given to self-doubt, rarely self-indulgent," was keeping him competitive for a second term despite circumstances that normally make leaders look weak, thus sealing their electoral fates (Brooks 2012). If Obama's personal strengths were undermined by the weak economy, the media identified Romney as the president's mirror image: a candidate whose personal liabilities diminished his party's supposedly golden opportunity to defeat an incumbent president. Another Times columnist, Maureen Dowd, wrote that a key distinction between the candidates, "one that will probably decide this presidential race, is this: Barack Obama is able to convey an impression of likability to voters." Dowd argued that the Obama versus Romney election matched two introverts, but that a "graceful introvert beats an awkward one every time" (Dowd 2012b). Political commentators identified several deficiencies in Romney's character. Timothy Egan wrote that focus groups perceived Romney as "a tin man, a shell, an empty suit, vacuous" (Egan 2010). Dowd saw Romney as having "meager social and political agility" and being "banally handsome with an empty look" (Dowd 2012a). Other commentators used the term "robot" or "android" to describe Romney. Besides lacking in warmth and likability, Romney also was widely portrayed as unable to understand or empathize with the problems of ordinary people. Two Washington Post journalists wrote that "Romney must--MUST--close the empathy gap to win this fall" (Cilliza and Blake 2012). Moreover, some pundits believed that Romney had difficulty communicating an aura of strong leadership, which is essential to the office. In August 2012, Newsweek reprised its controversial 1987 cover story about then Vice President George H. W. Bush titled "The Wimp Factor," only this time Romney was the subject. The article claimed that in the pantheon of Republican presidential tough guys, Romney fell well short of the likes of Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and even the latter's once impugned father who, "looks like Dirty Harry Callahan compared to Romney, who spent his war (Vietnam) in--ready?--Paris. Where he learned . . . French" (Tomasky 2012, 24; emphasis in original). While the media consensus was that Obama had an advantage over Romney on character traits, the president was not without his faults, according to several columnists. Dowd described both candidates as "cold, deliberative fish, self-regarding elitists, with . …

Abstract: This article examines a variety of reliability issues as related to limited nomination sociometric measures. Peer nomination data were collected from 77 sixth grade classrooms. Results showed that, although some single-item peer nomination measures were relatively reliable, many single-item peer nomination measures using limited nominations were quite unreliable. Overt aggression nomination items were the only set of single-item measures where mean classroom reliability estimates were.75 or greater. Combining multiple items led to substantially better reliability, as combining the two least reliable items for a category into a single measure made the composite more reliable than the most reliable single measure. Having more nominators in the sample also increased reliability. The limited nomination items overall tended to be less reliable than similar unlimited nomination items from other studies. The authors end with recommendations for obtaining the most reliable peer nomination data possible from a study.

Abstract: Among a group of selfish agents, we consider nomination correspondences that determine who should get a prize on the basis of each agent’s nomination. Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica 81:173–196, 2013) show that (i) there is no nomination function that satisfies the axioms of impartiality, positive unanimity, and negative unanimity, and (ii) any impartial nomination function that satisfies the axiom of anonymous ballots is constant (and thus violates positive unanimity). In this article, we show that $$(\mathrm {i})^\prime $$ there exists a nomination correspondence, named plurality with runners-up, that satisfies impartiality, positive unanimity, and negative unanimity, and $$(\mathrm {ii})^\prime $$ any impartial nomination correspondence that satisfies anonymous ballots is not necessarily constant, but violates positive unanimity.

Abstract: Political parties are considered to be vital elements of political life in modern democracies, and whether in democratic regimes they maintain democratic mechanisms within their own organizations and structures has been an intriguing topic. The most important issue is which factors influence the internal democracy in parties. This article examines the relationship between functioning of democracy in parties and party leadership, candidate selection mechanisms, membership systems, policy formulation systems and communication channels. In addition to the commonly used indicators of intra-party democracy in three areas – the leader’s power and control, nomination process and determining policy preferences – this article deals with the process of membership recruitment and membership rights. It analyses the factors that influence intra-party democracy in Turkey focusing on the multiparty period after 1946 by giving examples from the political parties and previous research results.

Abstract: Although the selection of Supreme Court nominees is of tremendous importance, the amount of time it takes presidents to select nominees varies dramatically across nominations. We argue that the timing of nominations is a function of the political constraints the president faces, and we focus in particular on partisan or ideological disagreement between the president and the Senate. We test our argument using all Supreme Court nominations since 1882, and find that disagreement increases this duration. In addition, we control for a variety of other factors that can affect timing. We find that a newly elected president, a nominee's personal characteristics, and Senate rule changes also increase the length of the nomination stage. On the other hand, this stage becomes shorter as the Senate nears the end of each session and as the presidency's institutional capacity has increased over time.

Abstract: More women MPs than ever before were elected to the lower house of the national parliament of India in the 2009 general election. Yet, the increase in women's presence in the Lok Sabha cannot necessarily be attributed to the increased willingness of political parties to field more women candidates, despite rhetorical party political support for increasing women's participation in political institutions. This article analyses party political nomination of women as candidates in the 2009 election, and finds significant variations in levels of nomination across parties and across India's states. The article also examines in detail the nomination of female candidates by the two largest political parties, the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, both of which support proposals for introducing reserved seats for women in national and state legislatures. The findings reject the proposition that parties only nominate women in unwinnable seats, but finds support for the proposition that p...

Abstract: What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.

Abstract: Today, it seems, politics is all about seeming authentic. --Paul Krugman (2007) Public perceptions regarding presidential candidates' personality traits play important roles in shaping vote choice (Markus 1982; Popkin 1991; Rahn et ah, 1990). Though a range of traits can matter, some popular accounts (e.g., Daum 2011; Goldberg 2008) and scholarly works (Edwards 2009; Jamieson and Waldman 2003; Liebes 2001; Louden and McCauliff 2004; Parry-Giles 2001) point to authenticity--or the lack thereof--as a key trait by which citizens judge political candidates. For example, commentators have speculated that President Ronald Reagan's perceived authenticity helped him gain votes from citizens who disagreed with him ideologically (Rosenbloom 2011). On the opposite side of the coin, observers have suggested that an "authenticity gap" damaged 2012 Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney's campaign (e.g., Balz 2012; Cillizza and Blake 2011; Fields 2012; Gerson 2012). Conventional wisdom also holds that candidates should strive to present authentic messages that resonate with their own political image (e.g., Beinart 2012; Kaplan 2012; Louden and McCauliff 2004). Thus, understanding when and why citizens perceive presidential candidates and their messages as (in)authentic may help explain voter decisions. Yet little research has systematically investigated such perceptions (Louden and McCauliff 2004). This article draws on several new data sources specifically designed to do so. First, it uses data from a pilot Internet survey to develop the first direct survey measures for perceptions of candidate authenticity. Second, it uses data from a telephone survey conducted in May-June 2012 to analyze the role of political predispositions (political trust, external political efficacy, political interest, partisanship, and ideology) and media use (particularly television news use) in predicting respondents' perceptions of authenticity regarding three targets: political candidates in general, Barack Obama (who was running for reelection as president at the time of the survey), and Romney (who had effectively secured the Republican nomination at that point). Finally, it uses data from a question-wording experiment embedded in the same telephone survey to test how perceptions regarding the authenticity of a presidential candidate's message varied across its source (Obama or Romney) and substance (working for "the middle class" or "job creators"). Taken collectively, the findings shed new light on the nature and origins of perceptions regarding authenticity in the 2012 presidential campaign. Furthermore, they provide an empirical foundation for future research on the ways in which information about candidates may influence such perceptions as well as the potential role of authenticity perceptions in shaping how voters respond to campaign communication and, ultimately, make vote choices. Authenticity and Political Campaigns Many journalists, pundits, and even politicians argue that authenticity plays an important role in presidential campaigns, but they do not always agree among themselves on what the concept means. Some suggest that it has become "a code word for chimerical perceptions of simple American values and a simple, even rural middle-class American life," conveyed through signifiers such as casual attire, plain language, and even bowling prowess (Daum 2011). Others argue that it is "really just a label put on self-validation," under which "[p]rinciples and policy details take a back seat to the need to say 'there, there--I understand' to the voters" (Goldberg 2008). Still others suggest that the term has gradually lost any meaning through its frequent and varied use (Rosenbloom 2011). Scholarly efforts to develop a clearer theoretical definition of authenticity in the context of political campaigns have focused on how candidates present themselves to the public as well as the processes by which they work to construct perceptions of authenticity. …

Abstract: The September 2013 elections in the regions of Russia resulted in victories of the major pro-government party, United Russia, in 16 regional legislative elections, and brought success to incumbent chief executives in eight gubernatorial elections. However, the apparent recovery of United Russia from the trauma of the 2011 national legislative elections stemmed not so much from its increased popularity in the electorate, but rather from its ability to engage in manipulative vote-splitting strategies against the opposition. The rules of candidate nomination in gubernatorial elections were so restrictive that most of these elections could not be characterized as truly competitive.

Abstract: Among the novel events and frequently discussed features of the 2012 presidential election, none is more obvious or, perhaps, more relevant to the state of the US democracy than the ubiquity of money Money has long played a role in presidential campaigns, but scholars frequently disagree over its effects Political observers also hold a range of perspectives on the normative value of campaign expenditures between believing that money is a form of expression, and thus should be welcomed and protected in campaigns, to believing that money corrupts campaigns and representatives by favoring the wealthy at the expense of those with less Related debates about money's effects on campaigns and political representation in the United States continued throughout 2012 following major reconfigurations in its campaign finance laws These changes made it possible for citizens to spend unlimited sums of money on campaigns through independent expenditure-only committees, better known as Super Political Action Committees (Super PACs), and made the 2012 presidential campaign the first to experience unlimited outside spending via Super PACs The emergence of Super PACs within the 2012 presidential campaign thus prompts a reexploration of our understanding of the key factors of campaign dynamics and fundamental concerns about the role of money in campaigns We analyze the role of Super PACs in the campaign for the 2012 Republican Presidential nomination Super PACs contributed throughout the campaign, but their presence was particularly pointed during the nomination contest, where the demands for money are high but candidates are constrained in their ability to raise funds Indeed, Super PACs repeatedly outspent Republican candidates and dominated the broadcast airwaves with their advertisements Yet, as newcomers to the campaign, questions abound of what Super PACs actually do Are they active in the invisible primary, perhaps playing an important role in winnowing down the field before voters get a chance to weigh in? Do they disproportionately serve the interests of front-runners? Or, do they keep afloat less organized challengers who otherwise would not be able to compete? We respond to these questions with a comprehensive description of Super PAC spending over time and across space, with careful attention to the direction of the outside groups' messages, for or against candidates In addition to questions of how Super PACs affected the behavior of candidates in the 2012 nomination contest, we also evaluate the legal and arguably more pertinent question, "Are they 'independent?'" A frequent criticism of Super PACs is that their independence from the campaigns is a ruse, as one might expect given that former campaign staff and trusted candidate advisors often work for Super PACs (see, eg, Confessore 2011) To that end, we focus our efforts on testing whether Super PACs appear to be coordinating their expenditure behavior with candidates and how We outline and test for two possible forms of coordination First, campaigns and Super PACs might coordinate their expenditures to complement each other by spending in the same places at the same time, bombarding the airwaves with consistent messages Alternatively, they might prefer a strategy of substitution whereby PACs and campaigns focus on different locales in which they might be more successful We test for these two possible forms of coordination by performing a longitudinal analysis that tests the dynamic relationship between candidates and Super PAC spending In what follows we begin by presenting an overview of the new campaign finance landscape since Citizens United v Federal Election Commission (FEC) (2010) and discussing the possible implications of the entrance of Super PACs within the party nomination process We divide the remainder of the article into answering the two sets of aforementioned questions pertaining to the behavior and nature of Super PACs, respectively …

Abstract: One important pre-requisite for the functioning of supervisory boards is the selection of adequate members. Accordingly, corporate governance codes recommend the professionalisation of the board selection process through the establishment of nomination committees. These committees should carry out two principal tasks: 1) drawing up appropriate requirement profiles; 2) rationally structuring the selection process. Analysing in-depth interviews with 27 nomination committees’ members of twelve German supervisory boards, we show that not all nomination committees fulfil these tasks satisfactorily; sometimes they merely act symbolically and rationalise decisions already taken by CEOs or main shareholders ex-post. Overall we succeed in identifying three prototypical nomination committees – active, consultative, and box-ticking – and show their impact on the board selection process.

Abstract: The upsurge of democracy during the third and fourth waves democratic epochs has led to a “proliferation of alternative conceptual forms…involving democracy ‘with adjectives’” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997:430). Clientele democracy, though similar with neopatrimonial democracy, is distinguished in both concept and substance. At the heart of the development of different democracy are the nature and character of political parties. The character of political parties in turn is highly influenced by the pattern of party funding, which accordingly determines the system of candidate selection and nomination and the overall organisation of political parties. This paper argues that political parties as conditio sine qua non to modern democracy significantly contribute to the development of “clientele” democracy in Nigeria. This is evident in the nature of political party funding and candidate selection (both for party offices and general elections). In this context, this paper examines the various aspects of political party funding and strategies for candidate selection in Nigeria. The paper contends that the system of party funding and candidates’ selection in the country are re-constructing a new form of democracy that can arguably be called “clientele” democracy, in which godfatherism is the defining political technique of political party activities. The godfathers, in addition to serving as major party funders, also fully control their political terrain, through which they control both parties and the electorates. The paper argues that this practice is undermining political party institutionalisation in Nigeria. Key words: Clientelism, democracy, political parties, party funding, candidate selection.

Abstract: This dissertation explores the rules which govern the direct primary in the states. Operating within the framework of responsible party nomination, I explore primary rules in the states across their 100-year history, and examine arguments regarding the adoption of the primary and correlates of its use. First, this project introduces the traditional classification system of primaries, which is based on ballot choice. Drawing on state statute and other official sources, I examine rules in order to create a more comprehensive measure. Examining the motivations of progressive reformers in the west and party officials in the east, I examine how rules are shaped based on the motivation for their adoption, and show that these relationships continue to persist today. Finally, I examine correlates of primary rules by investigating primary competition and candidate extremism. I show that there is little evidence for these relationships, and, using the example of the recent Tea Party movement, suggest that restrictiveness may inhibit the success of insurgent party factions. To conclude, the final chapter discusses recent developments and their potential to impact the way we view the primary. Specifically, that recent political developments may prompt an increased interest in the direct primary, leading to change or innovation in the way primaries are structured.

Abstract: This paper discusses the concept of nomination under life insurance and family takaful law. Then it examines the debate of Islamic scholars over the status of nominee under family takaful contract. After it, it puts forward its own view.

Abstract: This article examines the political partisanship of the English language and the vernacular mainstream media during the campaign period of the 13th general election in Malaysia. The newspapers examined are Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian, Sinar Harian, New Straits Times, The Star, China Press, Sin Chew Jit Poh, Nam Naidu and Nanban. The period of study is from 20 April 2013 (nomination day) until 5 May 2013 (polling day). The findings show that almost all the mainstream media were biased towards the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional, except for Sinar Harian. Chinese newspapers—China Press and Sin Chew Jit Poh—provided a slightly more balanced coverage of the government and opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat. The bias towards political parties in the ruling coalition is attributed to the ownership of mainstreams newspapers by political interests closely aligned with the current government. This has undermined the credibility of mainstream media in which circulation numbers have been declining in recent years.

Abstract: Leading approaches in the literature on women's representation have studied the effects of gender quotas in their interaction with the national electoral system. Two aspects of Mexican law have been understudied thus far, but provide important insights for understanding the degree to which quotas empower women in politics. First, quota enforcement at the subnational level depends on state-level laws, which in some cases dictate partial or no enforcement at all. Second, the joint ticket system has created a two-nominee system in which two elected figures run; the first occupies the seat (propietario) while the second is elected as a substitute (suplente). Quotas in some states may apply only to suplentes, resulting in women's entrapment in substitute and powerless positions. The analysis is based on new aggregated dataset on the nomination and election of women in a sample of 12 states' elections covering the period of 1998 to 2010.

Abstract: Presidents employ a number of institutional powers in their quest to influence public policy. Of these, the ability to fill vacancies to the federal judiciary is perhaps the most influential. Federal judges are imbued with lifetime tenure, and, as such, they can represent a like-minded president long after that president retires. Given the importance of federal judgeships, it is not surprising that opposition party senators use their advice and consent power to scrutinize and obstruct some of their nominations. Senators can employ anonymous holds to block judicial nominations from the chamber floor (New York Times 2010), they can filibuster to prevent nominees from receiving up or down votes, and they can discretely block or delay a judicial nomination by returning a negative "blue slip" to the Judiciary Committee chair. Political observers have argued the increasing use of obstructive tactics has had profound implications for the judiciary's ability to handle its caseload. For example, placing the blame on minority party Republicans, Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) argued that the Senate has laggardly confirmed Obama's nominees--that it was much slower than it was under President Bush (Leahy 2013). This criticism was not confined to Democrats. In his 2012 year-end report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice Roberts argued that it was vital that the president and Congress provide for the "appointment of an adequate number of judges to keep current on pending cases" (Roberts 2012). In June of 2012, the president of the American Bar Association (ABA) wrote a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) expressing "grave concern for the longstanding number of judicial vacancies on Article III courts" (Robinson 2012). Finally, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) argued that senators should only block "unqualified" nominees, as opposed to those they disagreed with on philosophical grounds (Podgers 2012). (1) Senator Graham's statement highlights an important issue for scholars who study the nomination process. In an era marked by high political polarization, how does a nominee's perceived qualifications influence individual senators? To answer this question, we first focus on the conditions under which senators block or delay the president's judicial nominations through the blue slip process. We argue that senators who are ideologically distant from presidents are more likely to employ negative blue slips. Perhaps more importantly, though, we discover that this proclivity is exacerbated when the nominee is perceived as less qualified. That is, in the past, when the ideological distance between home state senators and the president was less severe, presidents could use legal credentials to prop up district court and circuit court nominees who shared his views. Today, in a Senate marked by high polarization and few moderates, the president cannot. Qualifications only appear to mitigate the negative effect of ideology among district court nominees and not among the more powerful circuit courts of appeals. This finding represents a shift in nomination politics and shows that nominations for circuit court positions have become more contentious. While the limited time period of available data constrains our ability to make broad generalizations, we are nevertheless led to believe that senators will continue to oppose nominees on the basis of their ideological positions--regardless of qualifications. In what follows, we theorize conditions under which senators might return negative blue slips (or refuse to return them at all) for judicial nominations and thereby obstruct the president's judicial nominations. While the blue slip process is certainly not the only way to block a nomination, we choose to focus on it for three reasons. First, the largely anonymous nature of Senate procedure makes data difficult to come by--and we were able to capture an important snapshot of data on blue slips. …

Abstract: In 1910 Gustav Warneck received nominations and support for both the Nobel Peace Prize and the Nobel Prize for Literature. His boosters, mostly from Germany but also from elsewhere in Europe, later speculated that Warneck's failure to secure an award was because his dual nomination prevented enough support for either prize. Instead, they went to the Bureau international permanent de la Paix (Permanent International Peace Bureau) and to German poet and author Paul Johann Ludwig Heyse. The laudatory merits of the Permanent International Peace Bureau and Heyse aside, what had made Warneck worthy in the minds of so many for a Nobel Prize?

Abstract: The party system in Malawi has been characterised by instability and fragmentation since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1993. In part this instability is rooted in the legal framework regulating political parties as organisations and the functions that parties perform in a democracy. The article outlines the constitutional and legal framework of political parties. But more important is how regulation of functions such as candidate nomination, campaigning and representation in parliament interacts with the structure of the political system, leading to party system instability. Moreover, the effect of regulation of political parties and their activities is strongly influenced by ‘selective’ application of the formal regulations and weak party organisations. Formal rules meant to strengthen political parties have therefore not functioned as intended.

Abstract: In 2012, only the GOP had a contested primary. As of March 2012 none of the four candidates remaining in the race (Newt Gingrich, Ron Paul, Mitt Romney, and Rick Santorum) had secured enough delegates to claim the nomination, indicating that this primary season would drag on (McCain clinched the 2008 Republican nomination on March 4, 2008). This protracted primary meant that the Republicans had to devote most of their efforts to their immediate opponents, rather than concentrating on President Barack Obama. Obama did not have to worry about attacks from his own party. This study applies Benoit’s functional theory to 143 primary television spots from this campaign. This sample of ads broke with tradition by attacking as much as they acclaimed. The topic of utterance was split about evenly between policy and character.

Abstract: Of all the preconditions to realising universal suffrage of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive in 2017, the most challenging is getting two-thirds of the 70 legislators to agree on a reform proposal. On 31 August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress made this challenge even more difficult by imposing restrictive and controlling conditions on the nomination process. The decision sparked unprecedented protests and acts of civil disobedience on the streets of Hong Kong in September and October 2014. Legislators have until the middle of 2015 to determine whether they can agree with the central and local governments on a single reform proposal. This paper assesses the arguments for and against reform, within the constraints of the Standing Committee’s decision. It argues in favour of reform so long as there are sufficient reassurances and measures to regain the trust of the Hong Kong people. The complete reform proposal will need to have sufficient safeguards and counter-balances to ensure that the central government does not control both the nomination and election results. All stakeholders need to take positive steps to make for more favourable reform conditions.