Abstract: This article assesses the corporate governance-related antecedents of nomination committee adoption, and the impact of nomination committees’ existence and their composition on board independence and board demographic diversity. We conducted a longitudinal study of board composition amongst 210 Swiss public companies from January 2001 through December 2003, a period during which the Swiss (Stock) Exchange (SWX) introduced new corporate governance-related disclosure guidelines. We find firms with nomination committees are more likely to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors, but not more likely to have a higher number of female board members. Further, the existence of nomination committees is associated with a higher degree of nationality diversity but is not related to board educational diversity. We also find that nomination committee composition matters in the nomination of independent and foreign, but not of female directors. Our results suggest that understanding different board roles and composition require a multi-theoretical approach, and that agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group effectiveness theory help to explain different aspects of board composition and effectiveness. Finally, the article discusses the concept of diversity and appropriate ways to study diversity in a boardroom context.

Abstract: I. Introduction II. Primed for Partisanship Sources of Partisan Polarization Partisan Polarization in Congress Polarization and Electoral Change Is Polarization Confined to Activists? Religion and Partisanship Economic Inequality and the Ideological Fragmentation of the Mass Media Conclusion III. To the White House Through Florida One of Us The Campaigns The Vote Florida Conclusion IV. The First Two Years: Before and After 9/11 The Bush Agenda Tactics After September 11 The 2002 Election God's Instrument V. Going to War in Iraq The Case for War Saddam and 9/11 The Public's Response Bringing Congress on Board Popular Support for a Discretionary War VI. Illusion, Disillusion, and Faith in the President after "Mission Accomplished" Revising the Case for War The Iraq Rally The Widening Partisan Divide on Iraq Belief in the War's Premises The President's Credibility The Religious Factor Multivariate Analyses Conclusion VII. The 2004 Elections: Mobilized Bases, Reinforced Divisions The Democratic Nomination An Avalanche of Money The War in the Campaigns Opinion Leadership Rational Ignorance? Mobilizing Voters The Vote The Congress Aftermath VIII. President of Half the People A Mandate? The Campaign to Revamp Social Security Why the Campaign Failed The Bipartisan Consensus Other Issues The Terri Schaivo Case The Iraq War, Again Unwavering Christian Conservatives Conclusion IX. Conclusions and Speculations Does Bush Care? Competing Realities The News Media Hurricane Katrina After Bush X. A Postscript on 2006 Going Public Again on the War The Tactical Component The Democrats' Response Intentional Polarization The 2006 Midterm Elections The Vote A Change of Course? A Uniter at Last?

Abstract: Labor courts play an important role in determining the effective level of labor market regulation in Germany, but their application of law may not be even-handed. Based on a simple theoretical model and a new panel data set, we identify a nomination bias in labor court activity - that is, court activity varies systematically with the political leaning of the government that has appointed judges. In an extension, we find a significant positive relation between labor court activity and unemployment, even after controlling for the endogeneity of court activity. The results have potentially important policy implications regarding the independence of the judiciary and labor market reforms.

Abstract: Chapter 1 Assessing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Part 2 Part I: The Political Parties Post-BCRA Chapter 3 Party Finance in the Wake of BCRA: An Overview Chapter 4 The Parties' Congressional Campaign Committees in 2004 Chapter 5 State and Local Political Parties Part 6 Part II: Interest Groups and Advocacy Organizations Chapter 7 BCRA and the 527 Groups Chapter 8 Interest Groups and Advocacy Organizations After BCRA Part 9 Part III: Air Wars and Ground Wars Chapter 10 Much More of the Same: Television Advertising Pre- and Post- BCRA Chapter 11 Stepping Out of the Shadows? Ground-War Activity in 2004 Part 12 Part IV: Candidates and Elections Chapter 13 The First Congressional Elections After BCRA Chapter 14 Self-Financed Candidates and the "Millionaires' Amendment" Chapter 15 A Public Funding System in Jeopardy: Lessons from the Presidential Nomination Contest of 2004

Abstract: Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Something to Prove: The Florida Presidential Campaign of 2004 Chapter 3 The Impact of BCRA on the Presidential Nomination Process: The 2004 Iowa Caucuses Chapter 4 Taking It to the Streets: The Iowa Presidential Campaign of 2004 Chapter 6 The Candidates Depart But the Dance Goes On: The 2004 Presidential Race in Missouri Chapter 7 The Battle for Ohio: The 2004 Presidential Campaign Chapter 7 The Battle for Five Electoral Votes: The New Mexico Presidential Campaign of 2004 Chapter 8 The Morning After: The Lingering Effects of a Night Spent Dancing

Abstract: With three controversial nominations to the Supreme Court just behind us, and the prospect of more in the near future, this is an opportune time to place the politics of Supreme Court appointments in broader perspective. Ultimately, what presidents care about is getting their nominees on the Court, and therefore this article manuscript focuses on those cases in which the Senate rejected the Supreme Court nomination of the president. The article examines what has accounted for these failed nominations and how the politics of appointment have changed over time. In addition to shedding light on our historical experience with Supreme Court appointments, it concludes that recent decades mark a reversal of earlier tendencies. The Senate is now far more focused on ideological disagreements and jurisprudential issues than it has traditionally been, and as a consequence nominations face far greater risks now during divided government than during unified government (the opposite pattern once prevailed). The central lesson of the defeat of Robert Bork is that it matters who controls the Senate, and thus it is neither surprising nor predictive that Roberts and Alito were able to be confirmed in a Republican Senate.

Abstract: Preface Introduction: The American Vice Presidency Reconsidered Afterthought? The Pre-Modern Vice Presidency Where They've Been and What They've Done: The Background and Experience of VIce Presidential Candidates Securing the Second Slot: The Vice Presidential Nomination The Road to Number One Observatory Circle: The Campaign What Do They Do? Vice Presidents in Office What Next? Life After Near-Greatness Endnotes Selected Bibliography

Abstract: Before you drift to sleep upon your cot, think back on all the tales that you remember.... That once there was a fleeting wisp.... Don't let it be forgot that once there was a spot for one brief shining moment that was known as Camelot. --Lyrics from the 1960 Broadway musical Camelot Despite the volume of ink and sound bite noise generated in discussions of the "Catholic vote" during the 2004 presidential campaign, there is but one simple empirical lesson that the election results reinforced: on the long scale of modern U.S. electoral history the Catholic vote, much like the legend of Camelot, was a "fleeting wisp" most evident with the election of John E Kennedy in 1960. (1) However, it ceased to be a cohesive bloc more than forty years ago and, as a group, Catholic voters have not always been the consistent "swing vote" group that they are often portrayed to be. The election of John E Kennedy was truly an extraordinary and liberating event for U.S. Catholics (Dolan 1992, 422). As Crews (1993) notes, "An invisible barrier had been shattered. Across the nation, Catholics sensed that they had finally achieved unquestioned first-class status as loyal citizens" (p. 139). After enduring more than 170 years of political anti-Catholicism in various forms and degrees, (2) eight in ten Catholic voters supported Kennedy at the ballot box in 1960. At the time, Converse et al. (1961) noted "the vote polarized along religious lines in a degree which we have not seen in the course of previous sample survey studies" (p. 273). Slightly more than 118,000 votes separated Kennedy from Nixon nationally and it would have been a daunting challenge for him to win with anything less than 80 percent of the Catholic vote. Converse et al. (1961) estimate that Kennedy's vote among Catholics was 17 percentage points higher than what an average non-Catholic candidate could have expected (p. 275). As John F. Kerry's candidacy began to take shape in late 2003, it was an open question as to how Catholics might react if he were to be the first Catholic since Kennedy to win one of the two major parties' nominations. Few expected that Kerry would be able to attract eight in ten Catholic voters, yet most would not have bet that he might lose the Catholic vote. This article puts that latter result--which will likely always be in question--into context by first introducing existing theory and evidence and then proceeding to comparisons of the Catholic vote in 1960, 2000, and 2004. The U.S. Presidency and the "Catholic Vote" Although John E Kennedy's election is often considered a breakthrough moment overcoming a long tradition of overt political anti-Catholicism, it is a misconception that Catholics were somehow systematically kept out of U.S. government, even as it began and the Catholic population was very small. (3) In 1790, just 1 percent of the U.S. population was Catholic and as of 1840 it was still only 4 percent (Prendergast 1999, 2). Yet, things began to change in the 1850s as waves of immigration began from many predominantly Catholic countries (4)--first from Europe and then followed by Latin America as well as Asia and Africa in the twentieth century (ongoing)--which would result in Catholics never again being less than 10 percent of the U.S. population. Although Kennedy was the first Catholic to win, he was of course not the first to run. Al Smith was the first, getting the Democratic party's nomination in 1928 when Catholics still made up less than 20 percent of the population. Smith's Catholicism was the central issue of that campaign and similar to how Catholics would support Kennedy three decades later, he benefited from a huge Catholic turnout. Although Prendergast (1999) estimates Catholics made up only a third of Smith's votes, he concludes that "in no presidential election, before or since, have Catholics been so close to unanimity in their choice of a candidate" (p. 96). …

Abstract: Selection and nomination of constitutional justices – American model of judicial review in post-communist countries – Tensions between parliamentary supremacy and excessive activism of Constitutional Courts – Possibility of reappointment and the independence of justices – Lack of cooperation between President and Senate in the Czech Republic – Politicization of judicial nomination and democracy.

Abstract: Chapter 1 Introduction and General Overview Chapter 2 Elections with Strong Incumbents: 1984 to 1996 Chapter 3 Elections with Weak Incumbents: 1980 and 1992 Chapter 4 Elections with Surrogate Incumbents: 1988 to 2000 Chapter 5 The 2004 Election: Nomination Campaigns Chapter 6 The 2004 Election: The Bush Campaign Chapter 7 The 2004 Election: The Kerry Campaign Chapter 8 Summary and Interpretations

Abstract: This paper examines changing patterns in the politics of judicial selection in the United States Central to the discussion is that judicial selection in the US has always had a strong political element Recent changes in the politics of judicial selection reflect a shift from the politics of patronage to the politics of policy Part of the analysis updates research on the relationship between partisanship and voting in judicial elections Partisanship has always been strong in states using partisan systems, and that has not changed Some states that use nonpartisan elections have seen an increase in the partisanship of voting patterns while other states have not seen such an increase The two states using a mixed partisan (nomination)/nonpartisan (election) system have seen an increase in partisanship, particularly in the post-1990s period The paper concludes with a discussion of alternative selection systems but emphasizes that no system would eliminate politics, only shift the nature of the politics

Abstract: Although the selection of Supreme Court nominees is of tremendous importance to all presidents, the amount of time it takes presidents to select nominees varies dramatically across nominations. We argue that the timing of nominations is a function of the political constraints the president faces. We examine all Supreme Court nominations since 1882 and find that divided government, a newly-elected president, a nominee's personal characteristics, and Senate rule changes increase the length of the nomination stage. Nomination decisions are abbreviated as the Senate nears the end of session and as the presidency's institutional capacity has increased over time.

Abstract: This thesis investigates States Parties' implementation of the 1972 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Its objectives are two-fold. The first of these is the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the evolution of the values for which cultural heritage sites have been nominated for World Heritage status in relation to the decisions of the World Heritage Committee across different categories of cultural heritage. The second objective is the examination of States Parties' representations of the past and the nation, of human and cultural diversity, of economic value, and of authenticity and conservation by means of an evaluation of sampled nomination dossiers of cultural heritage sites for inclusion on the World Heritage List. The thesis methodology is based on intensive archival work of UNESCO documents as well as value-led analyses of one hundred and six purposefully sampled nomination dossiers. ATLAS. ti, a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software program, was used for the quantitative and qualitative analyses and interpretation of the sampled data set. The end result has been to identify how States Parties have understood the notion of outstanding universal value which is the key and central concept of the World Heritage Convention. It has also been to highlight the problems in States Parties' implementation of the World Heritage Convention and in the requested format of nomination dossiers. This has led to practical changes to official discourses on World Heritage and suggestions for procedural improvements. These changes and suggestions should help States Parties to identify better the values for which sites are being nominated for World Heritage status and improve their long-term conservation and management.

Abstract: The process of appointing Supreme Court Justices has undergone changes over two centuries, but its most basic feature -- the sharing of power between the President and Senate -- has remained unchanged. To receive a lifetime appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Table 1 of this report lists and describes actions taken by the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the President on all Supreme Court nominations, from 1789 to the present. The table provides the name of each person nominated to the Court and the name of the President making the nomination. It also tracks the dates of formal actions taken, and time elapsing between these actions, by the Senate or Senate Judiciary Committee on each nomination, starting with the date that the Senate received the nomination from the President.

Abstract: With three controversial nominations to the Supreme Court just behind us, and the prospect of more in the near future, this is an opportune time to place the politics of Supreme Court appointments in broader perspective. Ultimately, what presidents care about is getting their nominees on the Court, and therefore this article manuscript focuses on those cases in which the Senate rejected the Supreme Court nomination of the president. The article examines what has accounted for these failed nominations and how the politics of appointment have changed over time. In addition to shedding light on our historical experience with Supreme Court appointments, it concludes that recent decades mark a reversal of earlier tendencies. The Senate is now far more focused on ideological disagreements and jurisprudential issues than it has traditionally been, and as a consequence nominations face far greater risks now during divided government than during unified government (the opposite pattern once prevailed). The central lesson of the defeat of Robert Bork is that it matters who controls the Senate, and thus it is neither surprising nor predictive that Roberts and Alito were able to be confirmed in a Republican Senate.

Abstract: The Religious Test Clause of the United States Constitution states that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." Although it is the only place in the main text of the Constitution that mentions religion, it has been habitually ignored - until now. In the past several years, a spate of lower federal court nominations and two Supreme Court nominations - the successful nomination of Chief Justice John Roberts and the abortive nomination of Harriet Miers - have occasioned public debate over whether the Religious Test Clause forbids Presidents and/or Senators from supporting, opposing, or even questioning nominees on the basis of religion. More broadly, these events have been the occasion for discussions about whether and how religion may be raised in the public debate surrounding judicial nominees. Because the Roberts and Miers nominations present neat mirror images of each other, with religion used as a disqualification in one nomination and a qualification in the other, it is an opportune moment to assess what the Religious Test Clause has to say about these cases, and about the use of religion in the federal judicial nomination process more generally. This article, a contribution to a Symposium on "Religion, Division, and the Constitution," is the first to fully examine these questions. After discussing the invocation of the Religious Test Clause in the recent nomination controversies, it looks carefully at the text and history of the Religious Test Clause. It argues that the Religious Test Clause precludes Congress or the President from imposing a formal test oath on would-be federal office-holders that would require them to avow or disavow, under oath, allegiance to a particular faith or set of religious doctrines. And that is all it does. A President may select nominees on the basis of their faith if he chooses; a Senator may question a nominee on his or her faith or religiously derived beliefs, or support or oppose a nominee on that basis. Thus, those public officials, public figures, and commentators who argued during the recent nomination process that the Religious Test Clause barred certain actions or inquiries were wrong. I argue that this conclusion is not only descriptively accurate; it is also normatively sound. There are many plausible reasons why a President or Senator might validly inquire into the faith, or religiously derived beliefs, of a nominee. To silence such inquiries because of the dangers of intermixing religion and politics ultimately disserves the broader principle that religion ought to be a fully welcome part of discussion in the public sphere. In addition, the broad reading of the Religious Test Clause, by constitutionalizing an area of politics, unduly limits the scope of popular responsibility for the political process. The best remedy for abuses of religion in the judicial nomination process lies in the realm of ordinary politics, and not in the Constitution. Although the Constitution thus provides few if any barriers to the use and abuse of religion and religious rhetoric in the federal judicial nomination process, nothing prevents us from attempting to craft evaluative criteria that might lead to more fruitful uses of religion in public debate, and to guide our understanding of how well or poorly religion has been used in the public debate surrounding judicial nominations. The article thus offers several principles of "constitutional etiquette" that might guide our understanding of the sound use of religion in this context, and measures the recent nomination controversies against these standards. It concludes that even with these criteria in place, the invocation of religion in judicial nominations, as elsewhere, may lead to more rather than less division in our national politics. But the price is well worth paying, if our public discussions become richer and deeper as a result.

Abstract: This research attempts to tackle two of the principle questions prominent in the literature on candidate selection; namely how to classify candidate selection methods and how to explain change in candidate selection methods adopted. In other words, this is a detailed analysis of how and why Taiwanese candidate selection procedures have been adjusted since the late 1980s. A seven-point scale has been adopted to measure the degree of democratisation in candidate selection, in which 1 equals the most open democratic nomination system, while 7 equals a nomination method dictated by the party leader. The pendulum of Taiwan's inner party democracy has swung sharply in both directions since 1989. Although the KMT and DPP have both reached their most democratic procedures for selecting legislative candidates, there have been instances of a return to authoritarian nomination methods in all major parties, and strong resistance from party leaders to delegating greater nominating power to ordinary party members or supporters. It is argued that there have been two critical forces governing the direction of change; the internal variable of factional balance of power, and the external variable of election results. Party factions and leaders have not promoted more inclusive nomination methods out of ideological motivations. Instead nomination methods have been democratized or centralized when the dominant leader or faction has viewed such changes as promoting their own interests and power. In addition, parties have altered nominations me thods either in response to poor election results or with a view to improving future election prospects.

Abstract: Ukraine declared its independence from Communist Russia in 1991.... This fall, elections were held that were fraudulent. More than 200,000 citizens took to the cold streets in their orange scarves. Their leader--sick, disfigured and in great pain for daring to seek freedom--stood with them. The case went to their Supreme Court, just like our 2000 election. In both cases, the courts ruled and the people followed the rulings.... Ukraine now has a democratically elected leader for the first time in more than 60 years. (1) INTRODUCTION In 2004, the Ukrainian Supreme Court followed the steps of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore (2) when it decided to lead the country toward the resolution of the election crisis. (3) The Court's ruling in the Yuschenko decision resonated world-wide, resulting in a victory for democracy and a bright future for American-Ukrainian relations. Yet, a major aspect of this decision has gone unnoticed: the Ukrainian Supreme Court used this case to exercise its power of judicial review. As the United States Supreme Court did in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison, (4) the Ukrainian Court claimed the authority to say "what the law is" (5) for the first time. The United States has played a key role in this revolution by helping to shape the Ukrainian democracy. But the language barriers made it difficult for most legal scholars to closely analyze this significant legal development. This Note, therefore, provides procedural background to the Yushchenko case and explains how the Court's decision was influenced by the United States. Part I discusses the status of Ukrainian electoral law prior to the events of 2004. Part II elaborates on the framework of the Yushchenko case, explaining the jurisdictional issues, the structure of the Ukrainian judicial system, and the procedural history. Part III demonstrates how American leaders foresaw the problematic election, and what steps were taken to remedy the situation. Finally, Part IV considers the potential consequences of the Yushchenko decision both for the Ukrainian judiciary and for the country's prospects of joining the European Union. I. ELECTIONS BACKGROUND The Ukrainian President is elected by popular vote for a five-year term. (6) The election process is similar to that of the United States. (7) For example, Ukrainian citizens who are eighteen or older have the right to vote. (8) Unlike the polls in the United States, however, Ukrainian polling stations are supervised by official observers, whose duty is to ensure a fair outcome of the elections. (9) After the votes are cast, regional protocols are prepared and delivered to the Central Election Commission (CEC), which then compiles the results and announces the winner. (10) Presidential elections in Ukraine consist of two rounds. (11) In theory, a candidate who secures more than fifty-one percent of the votes could win based on the first round alone. (12) However, this never happens in practice. No single candidate, including incumbents, has ever won the first round by absolute majority. (13) Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) houses a number of political parties, each endorsing its own candidate, (14) and additional candidates run independently. (15) This system results in the nomination of more than twenty candidates, which makes securing outright majority virtually impossible. (16) Thus, the top two candidates advance to the second round. (17) Thereafter, the winner is determined by a simple majority vote. (18) In the first round of the 2004 presidential elections, candidates Victor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych received the two highest percentages of votes, though both fell short of obtaining the needed majority. (19) Yushchenko, a pro-Western Democrat who ran independently, promised to take steps toward securing Ukraine's membership in the European Union and improving its relations with the United States. (20) Yanukovich, nominated by the Party of Regions, promised to reestablish close ties with Russia. …

Abstract: American politics often is regarded as a male institution. From the perspective of representation, this view is difficult to deny. Since the founding of our country, 98% of our congressional representatives and 100% of the major party candidates for president have been men; female representation in Congress did not surpass 10% until 1993 and still constitutes only 16% (Center for American Women and Politics [CAWP], 2006a). Therefore, when scholars explore the construct of the ideal presidential candidate it is reasonable to assume that this construct might be grounded in and favor a male image. Although ideal presidential candidate image traits appear to be consistent over time (Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1984, 1986; Trent, Short-Thompson, Mongeau, Nusz, & Trent, 2001), the research on which this finding is based examines contests featuring only viable male candidates. As they become recognized as viable contenders for our country's highest executive post, therefore, the questions arise: Can women portray the ideal presidential candidate? Will their strategic choices in projecting this image differ fundamentally from men? Just before the new millennium, the Republican presidential primaries presented an opportunity to explore these questions. Elizabeth Dole's campaign for the Republican presidential nomination marked the first time that a woman was considered to be a viable presidential candidate (Heith, 2001; Heldman, Carroll, & Olson, 2005; Seelye, 1999). By taking her place on the national stage among a lineup of male Republican hopefuls early in the primary season, Dole challenged the polity to take a female candidate seriously. Research clearly documents that news media coverage of Dole's campaign was less favorable and more gendered than coverage of her competitors (Heldman et al., 2005). When she controlled the discourse-as in her public addresses-however, did Dole present the image of a viable presidential candidate to voters? Might Dole's communication strategies inform the campaigns of future female presidential contenders? This study seeks to understand whether and how gender shapes candidates' strategies in creating a presidential image. It analyzes image development in the speeches of Republican presidential candidates, Elizabeth Dole and George W. Bush, during the 1999 Iowa straw poll. Through the lens of a presidential candidate prototype, this study compares the candidates' image building strategies and thus the influence of gender on these strategies. WOMEN AS POLITICAL CANDIDATES Understanding whether and how gender interacts with the ideal presidential candidate prototype is important as women assume more visible roles as elected leaders in government. Women are emerging onto the national stage as serious and viable candidates in presidential primaries. Although Elizabeth Dole is considered "the first woman to be perceived as a serious Presidential prospect" (Seelye, 1999, p. A1), she is not the first woman to run for President of the United States. In 1872, Victoria Claflin Woodhull ran against incumbent, Ulysses S. Grant, and editor, Horace Greeley, on the Equal Rights Party ticket (CAWP, 2006b). In 1964, Senator Margaret Chase Smith became the first woman to seek a major party nomination, receiving votes in five state primaries and 27 first-ballot votes at the Republican national convention, after which she withdrew (CAWP, 2006b). In 1972, Shirley Anita Chisholm became the first African American woman to run for president and the first woman to seek the Democratic nomination (CAWP, 2006b). She was on the party's ballot in 12 states (CAWP, 2006b). Through 2004, 6 women have run for president as minor party candidates and 15 have sought a major party's nomination. Now, eight years after Dole's effort, Hillary Rodham Clinton is seeking the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination and, to date, has exceeded Dole in fundraising, polling numbers, and time in the primary trenches. …

Abstract: Labor courts play an important role in determining the effective level of labor market regulation in Germany, but their application of law may not be even-handed Based on a simple theoretical model and a new panel data set, we identify a nomination bias in labor court activity - that is, court activity varies systematically with the political leaning of the government that has appointed judges In an extension, we find a significant positive relation between labor court activity and unemployment, even after controlling for the endogeneity of court activity The results have potentially important policy implications regarding the independence of the judiciary and labor market reforms

Abstract: n February 2, 2005, newly elected Florida Senator, and former Housing and Urban Development Secretary, Mel Martinez, a Cuban-American immigrant, "shattered a 216-year tradition of the U.S. Senate ... when he used the ceremonial occasion of his first floor speech to speak three sentences in Spanish."' This event represents the first time a language other than English was entered in the Congressional Record. He did so in support of Mexican-American Alberto Gonzales' nomination to the post of Attorney General. Martinez was rhetorically addressing his remarks to immigrants, whom he described as having come to America to seek a better life. He described Gonzales as "uno de nosotros," or "one of us." This event is notable for more than simply the use of a language other than English on the floor of the U.S. Senate. First, Martinez's use of Spanish is just the latest example of the growing comfort across a variety of political stripes and segments of American society with the use of Spanish in public and official environments. After all, President George W. Bush delivered a weekly radio address in Spanish, itself a precedent-shattering moment. Second, the apparent expression of social identity-"nosotros"with Mr. Gonzalez, a Mexican-American, is emblematic of a slowly emerging pan-ethnic identity among Latinos across a variety of national origin groups. Finally, what is perhaps most remarkable is that both the speaker and the subject of his comments represent the right of the American political spectrum. This event perfectly illustrates the circumstances described, and decried, in Samuel Huntington's latest book, Who Are We? In his latest effort, Huntington lays out an argument regarding the nature and origin of American national identity. America, he suggests, is an AngloProtestant society, at least culturally, and it is the values and customs of this culture that are uniquely responsible for American greatness. But this identity is seriously threatened, he argues, by the large-scale immigration from Latin America-and especially Mexico-that has characterized the last three decades. Latino immigrants, he contends, do not share salient aspects of this Anglo-Protestant culture and, unlike generations of immigrants before them, seem disinterested in acquiring them. While newly articulated, the core claims of Huntington's argument are actually quite familiar. Elements of the intellectual contentions can be found within a longer line of thought which includes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Disuniting ofAmerica; Peter Skerry's Mexican Americans: An Ambivalent Minority; Nathan Glazer's We areAllMulticulturalists Now; and Patrick J. Buchanan's The Death of the West, among countless others. Certainly, there are important points of departure that distinguish each of these works from Huntington's, as well as from each other, but each reflects one or more aspects of the national angst that has historically been engendered by the twin issues of immigration and assimilation. These arguments and fears find political expression in the outspoken comments of Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO), the passage of antiimmigrant initiatives in California and Arizona, Englishonly laws and initiatives in a variety of states, as well as the public advocacy of groups like U.S. English and the Federation for American Immigration Reform. The American experience, of course, is not entirely unique. Contentious debate over immigration, occasionally accompanied by violence, has emerged in several parts of the European Union, Australia, Canada, Israel, and elsewhere. Whether it is changes to asylum and nationality laws in Germany, banning of head-scarves for Muslim school-girls in France, or riots at the gates to the Spanish North African enclaves of Cueta and Melilla by North Africans seeking to migrate to Europe, the movement of culturally, racially, or religiously distinct peoples across international boundaries, and the implications of these to the national character and identity of the receiving society, continues to be the subject of ongoing political contestation. Moreover, the relatively poor fit globally between international boundaries and culturally homogenous populations has repeatedly raised questions about the ability of culturally and linguistically heterogeneous populations to hang together as functional and successful polities. The American experience, however, is at least somewhat different in that the United States was never an "organic" nation, at least not in the way that Western Europeans would recognize. Even in the earliest stages of non-indigenous settlement of North America, there was

Abstract: On May 23, 2005, a bipartisan group of fourteen senators (known as the Gang of Fourteen) (1) signed an agreement that ended an escalating battle between the Republican and Democratic parties in the Senate. Still in operation, the compromise ensured the votes of three stalled nominations (2) while preserving the right of all senators to filibuster judicial candidates. (3) The Gang of Fourteen also sought to minimize future conflict by sanctioning filibusters only in "extraordinary circumstances" (U.S. Senate 2005). With the immediate controversy resolved, the Senate proceeded to vote on, and confirm, three of the filibustered nominations (Hulse 2005, A14). Recent debate centering on what type of extraordinary circumstances would trigger a filibuster (Babington 2006, A5) has raised concerns over how the two branches can better work together in the appointment process. The Gang of Fourteen contends that the advice and consent clause is the source of the solution. They say the advice component requires a president to consult with the Senate, which "may well serve to reduce the rancor that unfortunately accompanies the advice and consent process in the Senate" (U.S. Senate 2005). In a previous article, I looked at the requirements of the Senate in taking up-or-down votes on a president's judicial nominees (Sollenberger 2004). Finding no constitutional or historical rational for mandatory votes, I now turn my attention to the period before a nomination is formally submitted to the Senate. This stage, which I call the prenomination process, has been a source of continued friction between the two branches. In recent years, the conflict over filibusters has produced calls for greater congressional involvement in the consideration of appointments. This article looks at how much interaction between the branches is warranted at this stage. It seeks to understand how the prenomination process should and does operate. My intent is to demonstrate that there are theoretical, historical, and institutional justifications for a president consulting members of Congress. It is important to understand that the prenomination process is not, and probably never will be, the subject of litigation and thus can never receive declarative judgment from the courts. This problem reveals the difficulty of trying to interpret this aspect of the advice and consent clause. Unfortunately, much of the general study of the Constitution focuses on case law, particularly Supreme Court opinions, to determine how constitutional clauses function. Many scholars regard the Supreme Court as the determinative and final decision-making authority on constitutional questions. The source of this attitude is the 1803 statement by Chief Justice John Marshall: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." (4) This was and still is a faulty point of view. The president and Congress have a substantial impact on how various constitutional provisions are exercised. In fact, when determining the proper practice of making a nomination, the executive and legislative branches have the only say. Interpreting the Advice and Consent Clause As neither the president nor Congress can rely on the Supreme Court to tell them how the prenomination process functions, they must turn to other sources. Looking at the strict letter of the Constitution, there is no clear evidence that the advice and consent clause is meant to include or exclude lawmakers in nomination decisions. Article II, section 2, provides that the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law." The text clearly points to an executive-centered role in nominating, but does it permit congressional involvement? …

Abstract: A dataset containing demographic, gifted nomination status, and gifted identification status for all elementary school students in the state of Georgia (N = 705,074) was examined. The results indicated that automatic and teacher referrals were much more valuable than other referral sources. Asian and White students were much more likely to be nominated than Black or Hispanic students. Students receiving free or reduced-price lunches were much less likely to be nominated than students paying for their own lunches. The results suggest that inequalities in nomination, rather than assessment, may be the primary source of the underrepresentation of minority and low-SES students in gifted programs.

Abstract: The European Union Civil Service Tribunal, the first judicial panel to be attached to the Court of First Instance under the reforms agreed at Nice, recently heard its first case. Its establishment is significant for two reasons. First, it will make a much needed reduction in the case load of the CFI. Second, it is innovative in its approach to the appointment of judges, for the first time in the European judicial structure moving away from the traditional approach of Member State nomination to direct application and consideration of applications by a Selection Committee.

Abstract: Many conservative commentators view the legal profession as a Blue State—as a captive of the Democratic Party and political liberalism.1 They assert that most lawyers vote for Democratic presidential candidates.2 They attack the American Bar Association for supporting abortion rights and equal rights for lesbians and gays and argue that it gives preferred treatment to Democratic nominees to the federal courts.3 Many opposed the nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court on the ground that she lacks “‘the spine and steel necessary to resist the pressures that constantly bend the American legal system toward the left.’”4 They create law schools

Abstract: In this paper we explore the relationship between candidate attack messages and news coverage during the earliest stages of the presidential nomination process. How effective are attack messages in...