Abstract: Most observers of presidential nominations contend that the McGovern-Fraser Committee and other reforms of the early 1970s made the nomination process more democratic and open (Ranney 1975, 1977; Kirkpatrick 1978; Ceaser 1982; Polsby 1983; Lengle 1981; Shafer 1983; Crotty 1984). More candidates now compete in more primaries for the votes of more party members than during the prereform era (Asher 1984, 194). Most of these candidates, however, are not viable options for primary voters, and few have a realistic chance of winning a primary, much less the nomination. Indeed, since 1980 the front-runner in January has won the presidential nomination of one of the major political parties (Dodenhoff and Goldstein 1998, 170; Mayer 1996b; for an alternate view, see Buell 1996). Is the postreform presidential nomination process as open as is commonly claimed? This article argues that the contemporary presidential nomination system contains a paradox in which primary voters select among a larger number of candidates, yet which candidates have a realistic chance of winning the nomination is largely determined during the preprimary season. Presidential nominations prior to 1972 involved little democratic input, since most delegates to the national nominating conventions were selected in caucuses dominated by party organizations. The conventional wisdom is that party bosses mediated the presidential nominations (Key 1964). That changed after the reforms of the early 1970s, as most convention delegates came to be selected in binding primaries (with varying degrees of participatory eligibility). Primary elections provided democratic procedural legitimization of the major political parties' presidential nominees. But if decisions made prior to the primaries structure the candidates' odds of winning in the primaries, then primary voters may in effect be selecting from a stacked deck. Thus, presidential nominations are more mediated than is commonly recognized. Party elites, campaign contributors, interest groups, and the media all play crucial mediating roles in the postreform presidential nominating process by conferring or denying the resources candidates need to compete for primary voters' support. The various reforms of the early 1970s initially opened the presidential nominating process to lesser known and outsider candidates, but this openness was transient. The shift to open and binding primaries and the proliferation of candidate-centered campaigns to compete in those primaries changed the resources and strategies needed by candidates seeking a major party's presidential nomination. In the prereform era, a candidate's chances of becoming the nominee hinged on his or her ability to secure commitments from party bosses who would select delegates to the national convention. In the postreform era, candidates must appeal to large numbers of potential primary voters. Initially, the requirements of candidate-centered campaigns were sufficiently low to enable more presidential aspirants to compete, outside of party networks, for the support of potential primary voters. Over the past twenty years, however, the rising costs of candidate-centered campaigns, front loading, and more scrutinizing media coverage have combined to diminish the opportunities of dark-horse candidates seeking the presidential nomination of one of the major political parties. Poorly funded candidates are relatively less able to compete for primary votes as the costs of nominating campaigns have risen. Front loading of the primary schedule increased the importance of money raised prior to the primaries, since candidates lack the time to raise sufficient sums during the primary season. More critical news coverage makes it difficult for candidates to substitute the exposure of free media coverage for paid media advertising. Lesser known and outsider candidates can run, but their odds of winning the nomination have declined since the 1970s. The number and viability of candidates are important elements of democratic elections. …

Abstract: izens of their country and the world. This episode illustrates continuity as well as change in Chilean women's dealings with international organizations. On the one hand, Labarca's nomination represented the culmination of decades-long involvement in the international arena. Given Chile's geographical isolation, Chilean feminists were remarkably active in international women's affairs, especially in

Abstract: This article applies the functional theory of campaign rhetoric to nominating convention keynote speeches. Because an election is a choice between competing candidates, campaign discourse inherently involves acclaiming (praising) the candidate and party, attacking the opposing candidate and party, and defending against such attacks from the opposition. We apply this perspective to Republican and Democratic nomination convention keynote speeches from 1960-1996. The speeches are replete with acclaims (51%) and attacks (48%). However, defenses are quite rare (1%), probably because there is no immediately prior provoking attack and because keynote speakers do not want the opposition to dictate the grounds of their speeches. Republicans and keynoters from the incumbent party acclaim more than they attack, while Democrats and keynoters from the challenger party attack more than they acclaim. These speakers address both policy considerations (56%) and character of the candidates and parties (44%) but devote more...

Abstract: Candidate attrition is a central dynamic element of the post-reform presidential nomination process. Candidates withdraw from the contest as their resources dwindle or as they fall significantly behind the front runner in voter support. This article tests six measures of delegate strength to judge at what stage in the campaign the front runner's lead is sufficient to conclude that the nomination race is over. Since 1988, candidates in both parties have quickly left the race once the front runner has established such a lead.

Abstract: Previous research demonstrated the possibility of forecasting presidential nominations by using the results of public opinion polls and Federal Election Commission records regarding the money presi...

Abstract: Ever since its beginning, organized dalit politics under the leadership of Dr B. R. Ambedkar had been consistently moving away from the Indian National Congress and the Gandhian politics of integration. It was drifting towards an assertion of separate political identity of its own, which in the end was enshrined formally in the new constitution of the All India Scheduled Caste Federation, established in 1942. A textual discursive representation of this sense of alienation may be found in Ambedkar's book, What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables, published in 1945. Yet, within two years, in July 1947, we find Ambedkar accepting Congress nomination for a seat in the Constituent Assembly. A few months later he was inducted into the first Nehru Cabinet of free India, ostensibly on the basis of a recommendation from Gandhi himself. In January 1950, speaking at a general public meeting in Bombay, organized by the All India Scheduled Castes Federation, he advised the dalits to co-operate with the Congress and to think of their country first, before considering their sectarian interests. But then within a few months again, this alliance broke down over his differences with Congress stalwarts, who, among other things, refused to support him on the Hindu Code Bill. He resigned from the Cabinet in 1951 and in the subsequent general election in 1952, he was defeated in the Bombay parliamentary constituency by a political nonentity, whose only advantage was that he contested on a Congress ticket. Ambedkar's chief election agent, Kamalakant Chitre described this electoral debacle as nothing but a ‘crisis’.

Abstract: Implicit theories of intelligence were investigated by collecting both nominations and rankings of ideal exemplars. Study 1 involved a 5-wave survey of student judges (N =1174) asked to nominate a famous example of an intelligent person. Although the nominations were diverse, the set of most-frequent nominees was relatively stable across 16 years with Albert Einstein as the top nominee in every wave. Among living exemplars, the current u.S. President and Canadian and British Prime Ministers were consistently strong. It appears that four clusters of cultural exemplars persist over time. To control salience in Study 2 (N = 245), a fixed set of nominees were ranked. The highest ranked individuals virtually duplicated the popular nominees in Study 1. A number of idiosyncratic factors (familiarity, liking, occupational similarity, attitudinal similarity, sex-match) were shown to be associated with high nomination rates. The nomination process includes a tendency to select familiar and liked others as exemplars of intelligence.

Abstract: The 2000 presidential primaries were among the liveliest in recent memory. This article is the authors' first account of the changing fortunes of the candidates from the Iowa caucuses through Super Tuesday. It is based upon the nomination phase of the Annenberg 2000 Election Surveys, a collection of nearly 32,000 interviews conducted from November through March, nationwide and in special-purpose state and regional studies, on a broad range of political science and communications questions. The analysis of dynamics is facilitated by the survey's rolling cross-section design, in which the day of interview is itself a product of random selection. This account emphasizes the interplay between substantive and strategic contributions to the votes cast at different points in the campaign, between evaluations of the candidates as people and policymakers, on the one hand, and judgments about the candidates' chances of winning a party's nomination and the general election, on the other. The pervasive influence of i...

Abstract: Departing from the traditional focus on twentieth century federal electoral regulation and federal court decisions in election law, Adam Winkler examines the very first cases to decide the constitutionality of regulations governing political parties: those arising in the state courts from the 1880s to the 1910s. In these cases, which have escaped the notice of modern election law scholars, judges confronted the initial state regulations controlling the activities, nomination practices, membership rules, and internal governance mechanisms of political parties. Across the country, courts rejected the argument that political parties were private voluntary associations immune from state regulation on freedom of association grounds. Courts relied instead on a framework that melded an expansive understanding of the individual's right to vote, which included access to nomination practices and a say in party governance, with a profound fear of the corruption of party leaders, who were blamed for the chaos, violence, and fraud of late nineteenth century elections. Reforms were upheld to the extent they were perceived to advance these twin aims of expanding voters' rights and limiting parties' wrongs, regardless of the curtailment of party associational freedoms. Due to the widespread fear of party leaders' corrupting influence on elections, especially primaries and caucuses, the courts gave little weight to party claims of freedom of association. The impact of this history of the state court response to party and ballot reform on current electoral controversies -- such as two-party entrenchment -- and scholarly debates -- relating to the structure of political parties, the conservative character of Progressive era courts, and turn-of-the-century state-building is also assessed.

Abstract: Departing from the traditional focus on twentieth century federal electoral regulation and federal court decisions in election law, Adam Winkler examines the very first cases to decide the constitutionality of regulations governing political parties: those arising in the state courts from the 1880s to the 1910s. In these cases, which have escaped the notice of modern election law scholars, judges confronted the initial state regulations controlling the activities, nomination practices, membership rules, and internal governance mechanisms of political parties. Across the country, courts rejected the argument that political parties were private voluntary associations immune from state regulation on freedom of association grounds. Courts relied instead on a framework that melded an expansive understanding of the individual's right to vote, which included access to nomination practices and a say in party governance, with a profound fear of the corruption of party leaders, who were blamed for the chaos, violence, and fraud of late nineteenth century elections. Reforms were upheld to the extent they were perceived to advance these twin aims of expanding voters' rights and limiting parties' wrongs, regardless of the curtailment of party associational freedoms. Due to the widespread fear of party leaders' corrupting influence on elections, especially primaries and caucuses, the courts gave little weight to party claims of freedom of association. The impact of this history of the state court response to party and ballot reform on current electoral controversies -- such as two-party entrenchment -- and scholarly debates -- relating to the structure of political parties, the conservative character of Progressive era courts, and turn-of-the-century state-building is also assessed.

Abstract: Historians have portrayed Dwight D. Eisenhower as a reluctant candidate for president, one requiring persuasion from friends and advisers before undertaking a campaign for the Republican nomination in 1952. Lending their voices to the effort were several newspaper publishers and a few reporters. Drawing from correspondence in the Eisenhower Library, this study analyzes how the information they provided, from early poll results to analyses of opponents, may have helped persuade the general to seek the nomination. It also explores the nature of press partisanship of the era. Introduction Just after one o'clock in the afternoon, the toll of a single bell echoed from atop Round Tower at Windsor Castle. Wind-chilled mourners walked into St. George's Chapel to attend the funeral of King George VI. Across the world on 15 February 1952, subjects of the king and his majesty's friends, many of them allies during the world war a decade earlier, paid tribute to his reign. Attending the services as a friend of the royal family was Dwight D. Eisenhower, general of the U.S. Army and military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.1 Before returning to his Paris headquarters, Eisenhower would attend another serious gathering in London, one that would determine the course of his career and the leadership of his country. In two days, a group of friends and advisers would meet secretly with Eisenhower to persuade him to do what he had opposed for eight years-- seek the presidency of the United States.2 Eisenhower biographers cite the London meeting as a turning point. As early as 1943, with the world still at war and Eisenhower commanding Allied forces in Europe, political observers mentioned the general as a possible candidate for the 1944 election. Then, as he would until early 1952, Eisenhower publicly and privately rejected efforts to turn his life to politics. Yet the meeting in London ended with Eisenhower, perhaps still reluctant, agreeing to join the movement others already had begun.3 Historian Stephen E. Ambrose contended three arguments persuaded Eisenhower to seek the presidency: the American people wanted him as their leader; he wanted to lead rather than observe, confident that he was the man best prepared for the duties of president; and he worried that a victory by either the isolationist Republican Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio or the Democratic Party, which had held the White House for twenty years, would prove disastrous. "He wanted what was best for his country," Ambrose concluded, "and in the end he decided that he was the best and would have to serve."4 Among those in the press who urged Eisenhower to run for president, a handful of American newspaper publishers-and a few reporters-went well beyond encouragement through their editorial pages and columns. Acting in private, these pro-Eisenhower publishers provided analysis of opponents and issues, early poll results, reports on voter preferences, and other information aimed at persuading the general to make a bid. Their extraordinary aid is the subject of the following study, which is based on analysis of correspondence in the Eisenhower Library. These letters are significant in two ways. First, they show how influential voices within American journalism supported Eisenhower's criteria for seeking the presidency at a time when the general required persuasion to act. Second, the letters analyzed for this study help define the nature of press partisanship in the era as it was practiced in relation to politics. Background: The Reluctant Candidate Eisenhower had risen from colonel near the beginning of World War II to a five-star general of the army and acclaimed hero by its end.5 When his name was mentioned as a possible candidate for president as the 1944 election drew near, he vehemently denied any interest in politics. The general's attitude had changed little by 1945, even after the United States had celebrated him as a hero for victory over Germany. …

Abstract: Dr. Alison Sinclair leads a double life: part physician en route to becoming a pathologist and part critically acclaimed science fiction writer with 3 books, a rave review from The Times and a nomination for the Arthur C. Clarke Award. Sinclair brings her multiple talents and considerable energy to

Abstract: We choose our presidents "by their telegenic smile and their willingness to utter platitudes in southwest nowheresville two years before the election." -- Arthur T. Hadley(1) These words of a contemporary political analyst reflect the outright contempt some have for the process by which American political parties choose their presidential candidates. In fact, the present system used by the Democratic and Republican parties to select their nominees has few wholehearted defenders. Critics argue that the process lasts too long, costs too much, encourages intraparty factionalism, discriminates against voters in states with late primaries or caucuses, and ultimately makes it more difficult for the presidents we elect to govern. This article examines how the current process has evolved and considers prospects for future reform. Although I share the general feeling that the current system has major defects, this article makes it clear that there are important obstacles to reform, and that it is unlikely that any future reform will satisfy every group with a stake in the nomination process. How Political Parties Select a Candidate A political party is not a fixed entity; rather, it is an ever-changing mix of individuals and groups who use the institution of a party to advance their own goals. Figure 1 models a political party in terms of three concentric circles consisting of leaders, activists, and supporters. Leaders include prominent officeholders and party officials; activists are those who work on behalf of the party or specific candidates, generally as volunteers; and supporters are those who habitually vote for the party in general elections. As the model indicates, activists are also supporters, and leaders are both activists and supporters of the party. [Figure 1 ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Different groups within political parties may have different goals in the presidential nomination process. All party members are interested in winning elections, but depending on whether one is a leader, an activist, or merely a supporter, this goal may conflict with other purposes. Leaders want to nominate a candidate who will win the general election, but they also want to nominate a candidate who will not threaten the organizational stability of the party itself or their positions within it. A leader may prefer a nominee who will lose to a nominee who will win, but who may undermine his or her power. For example, in the 2000 primaries, the overwhelming opposition to Senator McCain among Republican elected officials may have reflected concern that his campaign finance reform agenda would threaten their ability to win reelection. Activists tend to be motivated by policy goals, and they often have views that are out of the political mainstream. Activists tend to be wealthier, more highly educated, and more likely to hold ideologically extreme views than are held by the electorate at large.(2) This group may prefer to lose an election with a candidate who zestfully champions their causes, like George McGovern or Barry Goldwater, than to win with a candidate who compromises on their principles. Finally, party supporters are more like the electorate at large. They tend to vote for the party's candidates, but their allegiance is conditional, and their support can be lost if the party fails to nominate candidates who reflect their views or if the candidate elected, once elected, fails to deliver good government. Moreover, the growth of primaries has correspondingly increased the public's belief that participation in the nominating process should be open to all party supporters and not restricted to activists and leaders. The public has an interest in how parties select their presidential nominees, as it has been 147 years since anyone other than a Democrat or a Republican has occupied the White House. What is the public's interest in nomination contests? …

Abstract: The issue of the future of the Adelaide Park Lands is again topical in the Adelaide community. Prompted by a series of public versus government debates and actions there are moves afoot to clarify this debate and establish a political future for this expansive landscape that engulfs the City of Adelaide.

Abstract: In order to arouse the people to conserve the heritages carefully, the concept of the World Heritage is created There are certain Standards concerning the world heritage nomination The government is responsible for the conservation of the cultural and natural heritages It must obey three principles: originality, readability and sustainability This paper criticizes the attitude and activities that regard the world heritage nomination as the shortcut to obtain political promotions

Abstract: Huang Zongzhen was one of the important me mbers in making preparations for the establishment of the Chinese Academy of Sci ences.In the narration of his recollections,he provided precious historical mate rial about the drawing up of A Draft for the Establishment of the People 's Academy of Sciences and the nomination of persons selected to be vice presidents of the Academy.He also recalled his personal experiences about his participation in starting the Scientific Era and his joining the Association of Chinese Scientific workers.

Abstract: A tentative list of World Heritage Places is a list submitted by a member nation of the World Heritage Convention, which constitutes its preliminary analysis of the places within its jurisdiction which it considers to be eligible for world heritage listing and which it intends to bring forward as nominations in the future (ie, the next five to ten years). Tentative lists have no standing under the Convention and can be withdrawn, augmented or revised at any time. At present a country is required to present a tentative list of cultural properties prior: to, or at the same time as, bringing forward a cultural property nomination. In the natural area tentative lists are encouraged but are not mandatory.

Abstract: WASHINGTON The controversial issue of government-funded fetal tissue research is emerging as a flash point in the race for the Republican presidential nomination.

Abstract: This article argues that contrary to perceived wisdom, President Lyndon Johnson wanted to be drafted by the 1968 Democratic convention. Johnson and his aides covertly planned all aspects of the convention, from the amount of space allotted to each candidate to the speech that he would give at the convention on his birthday. Although Johnson withdrew from the race in March, he controlled the convention in order to allow himself the opportunity to run again. Ultimately, although his control of the contention enabled him to pass his platform, he was not drafted because neither the old party bosses nor the new forces emerging within the Democratic Party wanted Johnson as their nominee. Bolingbroke: Are you contented to resign the crown? Richard: Ay, no; no, ay: for I must nothing be. Therefore no, no, for I resign to thee. -Richard II 4.1.199-201 "Accordingly, I shall not seek-and will not accept-the nomination of my party for another term as your president." When Lyndon Johnson spoke these words on March 31, 1968, he shocked both his friends and enemies by taking himself out of the bitter struggle for the Democratic nomination. Instead, he declared, he would rise above the petty partisan struggles engulfing the country: he would be a man above politics, disinterested in everything except the well-being of the nation. On April 1, the Washington Post editorialized that the president's "personal sacrifice in the name of national unity ... entitles him to a very special place in the annals of American history" (Califano 1991,270). Johnson could now work to solve the myriad and complex problems facing him without regard to his own political health. The entire nation, so overjoyed at the president's withdrawal statement, could relax. Johnson's career had ended. His decision-one that the whole world had head-was irrevocable. Or so they thought. While Johnson's withdrawal statement might have sounded unequivocal, it was not. Johnson orchestrated a secret plan to control the 1968 Democratic convention in order to keep his options open, including the possibility that the convention might draft him. From the White House, a nominally disinterested Johnson constructed an organization, opened up back channels of communication, manipulated other candidates, and ultimately tried to coordinate every detail of the convention. Johnson wanted to delay making a final decision about whether he would decide to be drafted until after the convention had begun. Despite his final decision not to attend the convention, he orchestrated a grand welcome there. Even though he had withdrawn from the race five months earlier, as the Democrats convened their convention in Chicago, Johnson wanted his party to draft him. Robert Dallek (1998) has recently argued that Johnson toyed with the idea of allowing himself to be drafted for the nomination after Robert Kennedy's death during the primary season. Because Dallek presents little evidence of how Johnson intended to be renominated, the Johnson of Dallek's book comes across as a person engaged merely in wishful thinking. Dallek chronicles Johnson's machinations about whether to reenter the political fray as half-hearted, lackluster, and without great thought. The truth, however, is far different. Johnson was able to respond to the ever-changing political atmosphere of 1968 because he kept his options open until the last possible second. His political apparatus let him reconsider the possibility of entering the presidential race until the Democratic convention itself. The depth of Johnson's plan and his continued ability to control events from behind the scenes show Johnson in a different light. Even in 1968, at the nadir of his presidency, Johnson remained the master politician. Even in defeat, he knew when to press his agenda, how to win battles over policy, and how to give himself the ability to reconsider his decision of March 31. Most startling of all, he did almost all of this work hidden from public view, with the pretense that he was above politics. …

Abstract: Nothing is more important in a democracy than the process by which the contenders for the top executive office emerge from the many aspirants and pretenders to that office. This nomination process tells us not only what type of leadership is preferred but also the dominant interests and forces behind this leadership and the type of governance the society will now have. An examination of this nominating process tells us also something about the quality of the leadership selection system, how genuinely competitive it is, how rational, how responsible, and even how democratic. By late March in 1996 the American parties had selected the three top candidates for the presidency: Robert Dole had won enough primaries to control a majority of delegates to the Republican convention, Bill Clinton long before had been given the Democratic nomination, and Ross Perot had erected his Reform party and had set in motion a process assuring him the designation as its candidate for the presidency. What was the system and process by which these selection decisions were made? How did our nominating system screen out all the other would-be candidates? And was it an effective process?

Abstract: This article examines political oral traditions in the Sefwi (Akan) area of Ghana. Two types of narrative are studied: negotiations over the political status of stools within the kingdom and the claims to succession of matrilineal branches within stools. Narratives are analysed in relation to their claims to historicity, to the political conflicts in which they are generated and to their correspondence to legal criteria of attribution of `traditional' political offices. It shows that pre-colonial dynamic norms concerning stool status and succession turned into a fixed legal corpus in the twentieth century. Contenders' histories have been used as evidence to judge `traditional' stool disputes. Narrators have thus constructed narratives presenting ideal pasts considered worthy of legal attribution of `traditional' political office. Narratives have consequently legalised narrators' claims with reference to ancient history. The study of the context of the emergence of oral traditions--hostility between particular stool holders, national politics' influence or conflicts over the sharing of stool revenue--shows that narratives and political conflicts have a history of their own which is carefully omitted from the narration. Since the beginning of the present century numerous scholars have described the impact of colonial politics and the spread of market-oriented production on the Akan political structure.(1) The political and economic dynamics of the twentieth century have greatly altered the foundations of chieftaincy. However, the Akan political structure derives its legitimacy from the claim of representing the continuation of a historically founded exercise of power and is therefore termed traditional. The self-representation of traditional politics tends to emphasise its status as an `ancient institution' (Ollennu, 1976: 52). Chiefs present themselves as custodians of traditional customs and of pre-colonial political authority. The aim of this article is to analyse some of the contradictions produced by the historical transformation of an institution legitimised by tradition. The object of study is Akan political narratives. These are used by chiefs as privileged representations of their conformity to tradition but, as we shall see, they also lend themselves to the study of twentieth-century political and economic dynamics. The work is presented in two sections which examine similar trends at two different political levels. The first is centred on oral traditions regarding the relationship between the king and important chiefs. The second is focused on narratives concerning the process of nomination and deposition of political office holders within matrilineages. Within each section a three-stage analytical path is followed. The first part of each section describes norms regulating the political structure, and examines their ambiguity and the potential conflicts arising from normative indeterminacies. The norms to which I refer formed the customary framework in the pre-colonial Akan area. They were unwritten and used as ideal references in a context of continuous reinterpretation and negotiation. The social and military environment determined their application: norms were subject to palavers, agreements and conflicts. From the late nineteenth century customary norms were written down in classical studies of Akan `traditional' politics and law (Sarbah, 1897; Danquah, 1928; Rattray, 1929; Busia, 1951; Ollennu, 1962). These studies were mostly aimed at faithfully recording customary norms but the process of codification and transcription transformed their fundamental characteristics (cf. Adas, 1995). Norms have lost their dynamic and negotiable character and have become a quasi-European legal corpus given the sanction of law by colonial and post-colonial governments (Ollennu, 1976; Addo-Fening, 1990; Gocking, 1992). Today norms are used to settle disputes between chiefs and within matrilineages both in the courts and in informal palavers. …

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Abstract: The article analyses the candidate selection procedures of each of the major parties in the run‐up to the 1999 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections, assessing the extent to which they reveal developments in party democratisation and decentralisation on the one hand, and evidence of countervailing central control on the other. Procedural innovations achieved greater openness in candidate nomination and gender balance in candidatures but developments in democratisation were contested and evidence of decentralisation was mixed. Surveys of candidates reveal a perception in the Labour Party that there was too much central influence, although its implications differed in Scotland and Wales. There were perceptions of unfairness and lack of internal democracy in the other parties as well, suggesting in particular a contradiction between central influence in all of the parties’ approaches to list selection and candidates’ expectations of such influence diminishing. Devolution, therefore, released tensi...