Abstract: Political campaign discourse is instrumental, designed to persuade voters to perceive the candidate as preferable to the opponent. To appear preferable, candidates may acclaim (engage in self‐praise) to make themselves appear better, they may attack the opposition to make opponents seem worse, or they may defend against attacks from the opposition to restore lost desirability. We analyze these three basic functions in presidential nomination acceptance addresses from 1960–1996. Nominees primarily produce acclaiming (72%) and attacking (27%). Defenses were relatively rare (1% of the discourse). Democrats acclaim more than Republicans, while Republicans attack more than Democrats. Challengers attack more than incumbents, while incumbents acclaim more than challengers. Recent nominees (1980–1996) are more likely than earlier speakers (1960–1976) to direct utterances toward the candidates instead of the parties, signaling the decline in the importance of political parties and the rise of candidate‐centered po...

Abstract: The contemporary presidential nomination process is widely criticized for contributing to the "candidate-centered" nature of American politics. In particular, candidates mobilize their own followings during the nomination stage, which contributes to factionalization and divisiveness within the party. While the critics have a point, we contend that these qualities of presidential nominations may also contribute to party responsiveness and change. Insurgent candidates like. Pat Robertson are especially likely to attract underrepresented interests and mobilize them into nomination campaign activity. We show that this nomination-stage mobilization tends to carry over and spill over into the general election stage, both in the party's campaign for president and in U. S. House campaigns. Robertson's candidacy had extraordinary potential to change the Republican. Party because his supporters were very different from supporters of other candidates, and a large proportion were newcomers to active involvement in th...

Abstract: It is generally recognised that political parties have failed to emerge as important actors in the vast majority of Russia's regions.' Party underdevelopment on the regional level has been testified by recent studies focused on candidate nomination strategies and electoral performance in the 1995 national legislative elections2 and in the 1995-97 gubernatorial elections.3 On the one hand, this situation can be explained with reference to a particularly unfavourable constellation of institutional and political factors in Russia as a whole.4 On the other hand, the modest role of parties in gubernatorial elections arguably stems from these elections' inherently majoritarian features.5 In this analysis I will attempt to identify factors facilitating party development on the regional level by focusing my attention on a presumably favourable institutional milieu of sub-national legislative elections. So far, this subject has not attracted much scholarly attention. In addition to a number of descriptive studies,6 the 1993-94 regional legislative elections generated two articles discussing primarily the occupational structures of the assemblies.7 In particular, it has been demonstrated that the electoral strength of administrative and economic managers impedes party development. Some of the studies of more recent elections confirm this inference.8 Taking different but still elite-centred perspectives, other analyses related regional party development in Russia to the 'split and reconfiguration of ex-Communist party factions'9 and to intra-elite conflicts on the regional level.'1 Both explanations have been based on fairly limited numbers of observations. In this analysis I will examine the results of regional legislative elections held in 86 regions of Russia in 1995-98. By regions I understand constitutionally defined sub-national units of the Russian Federation-republics, kraya, oblasti, federal cities, the autonomous oblast' and autonomous okruga (AO)." First, I will identify the empirical indicators of party development on the regional level, thus constructing a set of dependent variables. At the same time, some basic factual information about the regional assembly elections and those political parties that are active on the regional level will be provided. Second, I will formulate and substantiate several hypotheses about the causes of party development. The operationalisation of these hypotheses will provide a set of independent variables. Third, I will statistically examine the strength of the hypothetical causal relationships. On this basis, a number of factors facilitating party development in Russia's regions will be identified.

Abstract: Most work on Russian political parties to date has focused on describing the features of the party system rather than using the Russian case to test contending theories of party development. An approach to the analysis based on candidate selection for the single‐member districts in the Russian State Duma elections of 1993 and 1995 allows the use of Russian data to test general theories of party development. A study of changes in party candidate recruitment patterns over time, combined with analysis of where parties chose to run candidates and what kinds of individuals were selected to represent the different parties, allows the testing of specific hypotheses and proves revealing. Explanations of party selection behaviour that focus on the internal politics of the parties (such as the degree of cohesiveness of the parliamentary parties) account for Russian party nomination behaviour better than environmental factors.

Abstract: significant changes in party organizations and their relevance to the nomination of presi dential candidates. What this literature has so far neglected is the explicit link between nomination procedures and the possibility of maintaining democratic governance. Vari ous authors have speculated that the evolution of the presidential nominating proce dures from a party-brokered system to a candidate-centered system should have pro found implications for the way in which candidates act during the campaign and once they assume office,1 but few studies have explicitly explored the probable links between nominating procedures and governing activities.2 In this paper, we argue that as presidential campaigns have evolved from a brokered-convention system to a candidate-centered system, we should expect to see a shift in the way in which presidential candidates relate to the various elements in their nominating, electoral, and governing coalitions. We first look at the number of presiden tial issue stances taken by the candidates. We then compare these positions to the party platforms. The rate of agreement between the presidential candidates and their parties' platforms indicates the extent to which candidates take seriously the various elements of the coalitions that nominated them. Second, we categorize the types of issues that presi dential candidates address. The types of issues are relevant both to campaigns and to gov ernance. The types of issues reveal the coalitions, appeals, and strategies on which candidates will rely. If the actors in presidential campaigns have changed over time, then we should expect changes in the nature of the appeals candidates make. Finally, we com pare the stances of the candidates to positions taken by congressional leaders. If congres sional leaders have truly been excluded from the process of nominating presidential candidates, then we should expect candidates to articulate a greater number of positions that diverge from those taken by the party leaders. Congressional leaders once exercised a modicum of control over the presidential selection process. In the absence of such con trol, congressional leaders and presidential candidates are less likely to agree.

Abstract: This research note expands on the work of Guliuzza, Reagan, and Barrett (1994) by reexamining the impact of the Bork nomination on the confirmation criteria that the Senate Judiciary Committee applies to Supreme Court nominees. In a multivariate analysis we examine empirically whether the Bork nomination did, in fact, mark a change in the level of constitutional questions to which the nominees are subjected. Contrary to Guliuzza et al., we find that the Bork nomination did produce a substantively and statistically significant impact on the Committee's probe of the nominees' constitutional views. However, further study suggests that the extra focus on the judicial philosophies of Supreme Court nominees by the Judiciary Committee began earlier, with the first Rehnquist nomination, and that the Bork nomination simply continued this process. Additionally, we find that the level of constitutional questioning is significantly affected by the individual characteristics of the nominees (qualification and political closeness to the President) and one element of the political environment- the President's fourth year in office. Robert Bork's 1987 failed nomination to the Supreme Court and its impact on the Senate confirmation process has been the subject of considerable debate among judicial scholars and commentators (Ackerman 1988; Bork 1990; Carter 1990, 1988; Danelski 1990; Frank 1990; Grossman 1990; Hodder-Williams 1998; Monaghan 1988; Nagel 1990; Watson and Stookey 1988; and Totenberg 1988). While most agree that the Bork hearings significantly raised the visibility of the confirmation process, there is considerably less agreement on whether the hearings marked a drastic change in the criteria the Senate Judiciary Committee applied to Supreme Court nominees. And yet, despite this interest in Bork's nomination, few analysts have examined the question systematically Guliuzza et al. (1994) are a notable exception. Previous Empirical Research on the Bork Nomination In their study of twenty-three Supreme Court nominees from 1955 to 1991, Guliuzza et al. employ content analysis to examine the nature of questions that the Senate Judiciary Committee members asked the nominees. They test the hypothesis that the Bork nomination was substantively different from other nominations in that the Judiciary Committee's questioning focused more on assessing this nominee's constitutional philosophy than it had in the past. However, their analysis indicates that the proportion of constitutional questions directed to Bork by the Judiciary Committee members was roughly the same as those found for successful nominations. The Bork nomination becomes atypical only when compared with other unsuccessful nominations. Based on this evidence Guliuzza et al. conclude that the Bork confirmation process did not radically change the confirmation criteria. The study by Guliuzza et al. has two other distinguishing features. First, their dependent variable is different from that of previous works which either examined only the confirmation outcome (see Segal and Spaeth 1986; Segal 1987; Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992; and Ruckman 1993) or examined the confirmation process, but only as a means of explaining or predicting outcome (Frank 1990; Watson and Stookey 1988). In contrast, Guliuzza et al. focus their analysis on the confirmation process itself, and they provide a unique approach to measuring change in the confirmation criteria by examining the content of the hearings. However, their analysis provides an incomplete picture of Judge Bork's impact on the confirmation criteria because it does not provide a systematic and controlled test of the impact of the Bork nomination. Their initial effort may be expanded to a more highly specified model of the process and a more rigorous test of their hypothesis. Indeed, the authors themselves suggest that their "approach can be used to conduct a more exhaustive study of the impact of the Bork nomination-or of related research questions" (774). …

Abstract: Most studies on media coverage of presidential campaigns build on Thomas Patterson's argument that the "game" schema guides the selection and interpretation of campaign events.(1) Journalists view candidates as players in a game who are principally concerned with winning. The focus is on who is ahead, who is behind, and how the game is being played. Candidates' actions and statements, including their policy positions, are seen as calculated behaviors intended to improve their chances of winning. These observations, however, are based on analyses of news coverage. Scholars have neglected commentary coverage of politics, even though commentaries are a significant part of print media coverage. There are good reasons to expect differences between news and commentary coverage of campaigns. Keeping opinions out of the news has been a central component of objective journalism since the early twentieth century.(2) Unconstrained by norms of objectivity, editorial staff and columnists are free to choose sides, present one-sided arguments, and let ideological considerations guide their writing. On the other hand, the differences between news and commentary coverage of politics may be fading since news coverage has become more interpretive and critical of the candidates and their actions.(3) Just how different are news and commentary coverage of presidential campaigns? Comparing the quality and quantity of candidate coverage in news and commentary items should give us a fuller picture of the information available to voters. The media play a powerful role as intermediaries between political leaders and the public.(4) The media's role is especially important in the nominating campaign. Because most people are poorly informed about the candidates, what the media say and write about candidates has considerable potential to influence voters' judgments about the candidates.(5) By portraying candidates more or less favorably and as more or less likely to win the nomination, the media influence at least some primary voters' decisions to support certain candidates rather than others by altering their strategic calculations and attitudes toward the candidates.(6) How the media act as intermediaries and how they affect presidential nominations are questions worth studying. Patterns of Campaign Coverage The limits of space and time make bias inevitable in media coverage. The form of the media's bias can be found in the themes or frames used by journalists to select and interpret events. The predominant frame in campaign coverage is the game schema where journalists view politics as a strategic game in which politicians compete for strategic advantage.(7) Viewing the campaign as a game, journalists pay more attention to the "horse race" and to campaign strategy than to substantive policy issues or candidate qualifications.(8) The amount of coverage given to candidates reflects journalists' expectations of candidates' chances of winning the race.(9) The tone of candidate coverage also follows a candidate's fortunes in and at the polls, although with greater variation as a result of attention given to scandals, blunders, and other conflicts.(10) Four major story lines pervade the game schema. The first is the front-runner story line. Front-runners receive the most coverage, but the coverage tends to be critical as reporters focus on the candidates' efforts to stay on top.(11) The second story line is that of the likely losers--candidates judged by the media to be unlikely to win the nomination.(12) Unless or until they exceed expectations in or at the polls, likely losers receive little attention from the media.(13) Likely loser coverage tends to be critical as reporters focus on the candidates' personal or programmatic flaws and problems with the candidates' strategies.(14) Journalists treat candidates who fall in between the extremes as "plausibles" who might break through to win the nomination.(15) Coverage of the candidates shifts with perceived changes in their chances of winning. …

Abstract: In this paper, I test two hypotheses about the origin of opinion of partisan activists. The first is a rational-choice thesis that states that due to electoral considerations, activists will adopt positions on issues that correspond to where they believe voters to stand on those issues. The competing hypothesis is based on the influence of contenders for the parties' presidential nomination. This hypothesis predicts that just as candidates play a role in activating segments of the party to participate in the nomination process, they also influence the views held by those activists. Using data from the 1988 and 1992 Convention Delegate Studies, I conduct tests of these hypotheses. The results point toward a candidate-motivation explanation for the origin of opinion of party activists. The implications of these findings are that the information about politics that flows to the mass citizenry is influenced by the candidates who choose to seek the party's nomination and, in the process, activate segments of t...

Abstract: The significance of presidential nomination politics in the major parties is abundant and obvious as viewed through the lens of practical politics. This is no less than the process by which the parties set the choices to be faced by the electorate in the November election. But analytically, presidential nomination provides a window of opportunity to consider the impact of organization within a contemporary political environment dominated by media and money. For, in fact, caucuses, as mechanisms through which parties conduct delegate selection, lend themselves well to strong organizations and "retail methods" of campaign politics. This quality is underscored with the Iowa precinct caucuses that--for reasons of context and calendar--purportedly reward candidates who excel at organization. This article examines presidential nomination politics in Iowa on an abstract level approaching the state as a critical case; if traditional organization and retail methods are to matter anywhere, they will matter in this environment. As such, it considers how one might challenge the media-dominated model that now characterizes much of U.S. campaign politics, especially that directed toward the presidency. More concretely, this article explores the 1996 GOP presidential nomination contest in Iowa. It focuses on how candidates use organization to compete, and it assesses the impact of this tool on candidate Success. Theoretical Context Iowa caucus politics provides opportunities for significant activist impact on the course of presidential nomination politics. At the same time, it offers an environment marked by disincentives for participation, one in which--at least theoretically--a strong organization will make a difference in the outcome of the caucuses. In this section, I describe a framework to understand activist involvement in politics. The application of this framework to the Iowa caucus setting helps explain why Iowa caucus politics is a critical case. Given the formal rules that structure presidential nominations, dual tasks face candidates vying for the nomination of one of the two major parties. The first of these is raising funds to finance a campaign and, importantly, to sustain it through the inevitable bumps of the nomination season (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995).(1) The second task, indeed the one to which much of the fundraising effort is directed, is the persuasion and mobilization of the activists; their involvement in primaries and caucuses determines a vast majority of the delegates who will attend the parties' nominating conventions and who will ultimately nominate the presidential candidate. I focus on this second task, the candidates' efforts to persuade and mobilize in the caucus setting, and use a theoretical framework to structure expectations about the role of strong organizations. The job of the candidate in caucus politics is to mobilize his supporters to the caucuses, which are used in a handful of states for presidential delegate selection. There are a variety of activities undertaken at the Iowa precinct caucuses, including the initial stages of delegate selection and, at Republican caucuses in most years, a straw poll measuring preference of the caucus attendees for the party's nomination candidates. Additional activities deal more directly with party organizational business and include consideration of platform planks and selection of party officials. In short, much significant work is accomplished at these meetings. Yet, it remains that for activists, incentives for nonparticipation are high. There are two strong dynamics in a caucus setting that work against participation among party activists and others who are generally interested in presidential nomination politics. The first involves the high cost of participation. Attending a caucus, as opposed to "merely" voting in a primary, means that the individual commits to a meeting at a narrowly specified time. …

Abstract: Through the twentieth century, Canadian city politics has operated under the pretense of non-partisanship. Municipal governments have been a refuge for special interests who, garbed in antipartyism and common sense, were left alone to rule their local roosts. For instance, the Civic Non-Partisan Association, Vancouver's dominant political organization and living oxymoron, long espoused the Burkean notion that council "should not be a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests."1 With its recent and massive restructuring of urban government in Ontario however, the government of Premier Mike Harris has rendered Canadians a service: by focussing public attention on "who does what" at both levels of government, Harris inadvertently smoked out almost everyone with a priorized municipal agenda. In spite of its somewhat brutal methods, the Ontario provincial government has provoked a broad rethinking of how local political business should be transacted. Canadian city politics have yet to mature, either as they might or as their citizens have a right to expect. In the small debate about local democracy and citizen-centred government one obvious question is scarcely considered: should formal parties be introduced into civic elections in Canada's major cities?2 Over the years non-partisanship has veiled a conservative and incrementalist policy-making style that seems inappropriate for postmodern metropolises. That non-partisanship is a conservative force is really not all that surprising. Among the political gladiators in Vancouver, Canada's most overtly partisan city, the most conservative faction has seen the city as a business and somehow independent of politics.3 The Maud Commission in Great Britain found anti-party feeling strongest among rural, suburban and more conservative councillors generally. In Canada, voter turnout is very low municipally compared to other political levels, perhaps because the issues at stake are obscured by the lack of coherent policy positions. Debates and decisions of local councils are generally understood to be muddled when not petty; this obscures partisan ties to other levels and to avoid quasi-ministerial accountability for the consequences of council actions. In addition to this general concern with appropriate representation, non-partisan local politics has not been benign but inefficient and wrong. When well-educated citizens are denied fundamental opportunities for reasonable democratic choice, as Henry Milner's comparative study has convincingly argued, municipal electoral participation is discouraged.4 There may well be a growing appreciation among the civic political elite of the importance of these issues in big city elections.5 But by the evidence from the playing fields, little partisanship is admitted to in Canadian city politics in the 1990s.6 Even where they have been most successful over the years, Canada's purely local city parties have been very small cadres, often no more than a few dozen activists in the gladiatorial roles. For example, in Edmonton, the Citizens' Committee that held all council seats between 1945 and 1959 was never a large group: "when founded in 1936 it comprised 41 professionals and businessmen led by the president of the chamber of commerce, and at its nomination meeting in 1962 only 27 members were present, including candidates."7 Enough party-like activity, such as slate-making, has taken place during the twentieth century to inform a small debate as to whether such behaviours, or even open party politics are desirable.8 Across the Prairies, the hypocrisy of pretended non-partisanship prevailed in city elections in Regina and Saskatoon in October, 1988. These elections saw Saskatoon Mayor C. Wright retire after being given an Order-in-Council appointment by the provincial Conservatives, to be replaced by 12-year council veteran and New Democrat Henry Dayday. In Regina's march of the political toreadors, new Mayor D. …

Abstract: The election of the seventh president of Ireland, held on October 7, 1990, witnessed the triumph of Mary Robinson as the first woman president and the first successful non-Fianna Fail(1) candidate since 1945. The Irish Constitution states that the office of the president should be filled by a direct vote of the people for a period of seven years. In practice, however, four presidents have been appointed by consent, thereby avoiding the need for an election. Therefore, it was only the fifth president actually elected, the first presidential election in seventeen years, and the first since 1945 to be contested by three candidates. The office of the Irish presidency as outlined in Articles 12 through 14 of the Irish Constitution is primarily ceremonial in character. Most of the president's responsibilities are purely formal, and other functions can be performed by her only on the "advice" (meaning permission) of the government. Six areas in which the president enjoys some power may be identified.(2) In three of these, the president has up to now been inactive, primarily because the initiative lies with some other institution that has chosen not to exercise it. First, the Senate (equivalent to the English House of Lords) may request the president to refer the question of whether a bill is or is not a money bill to a Committee of Privileges; the president may then, after consultation with her Council of State (her committee of advisers), appoint such a committee (Article 22.2). Second, in certain exceptional circumstances, the government may seek to restrict the amount of time the Senate may spend in considering a bill, but this requires the concurrence of the president, who is obliged first to consult with her Council of State (Article 24.1). Third, a majority of members of the Senate, along with at least one-third of the Dail (parliament), may ask the president not to sign into law a bill passed by both houses; after consultation with the Council of State, the president may either sign the bill or cause "the will of people" to be ascertained, entailing either a referendum or a general election. In two of these cases, any request to the president implies the unlikely event of a serious clash between the Dail and the Senate; the third implies an emergency. In this context, it is not surprising that the president's powers have not been used. On the other hand, three other powers have been used. First, the president may after consultation with the Council of State, convene either or both houses of the Oirectheas (Senate and Dail) (Article 13.2.3). Up to 1990, the only instance in which this power has been invoked was when de Valera convened a meeting of both houses in 1969 to address them on the fiftieth anniversary of the inaugural meeting of the First Dail. Second, the president may refer a bill to the Supreme Court to obtain the court's ruling on its compatibility with the Constitution, again following consultation with her Council of State. This has been the most frequently used power, used on eight occasions; in three cases (1942, 1981, and 1983) the bills have been deemed unconstitutional. Perhaps the most potentially important power contained in Article 13.2.2, which states that the "the president may in his [her] absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dail Eireann on the advice of the Taoiseach (prime minister) who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dail Eireann." There have been three occasions on which the president could have used this power, but in all cases the dissolution has been granted. The Irish Constitution provides that the president be elected for a seven-year term, which is renewable once by single transferable vote of those eligible to vote in Dail elections. Whereas presidents coming to the end of their first term may nominate themselves for reelection, the nomination for first-time candidates is extremely restrictive. Candidates must be nominated either by a minimum of twenty Dail deputies and/or senators or by the councils of at least four counties and/or county boroughs. …

Abstract: WHEN ALLEN DRURY DIED LAS YEAR on his 80th birthday, the thoughts of editors and obituary writers naturally turned to Advise and Consent, the book that made him famous, that gave a memorable last film role to Charles Laughton, and that in many ways invented a genre in fiction. Henry Adams and John Dos Passos had written novels on politics in Washington. But the use of a racy intrigue, if possible involving both sex and foreign policy, is what characterizes the contemporary form. Forty years on, Advise and Consent is the only book of this genre that a literary-minded person really ought to read. Indeed, as Saturday Review noted in August 1959, "It may be a long time before a better one comes along." Forty years so far. The plot of Advise and Consent revolves around a showdown between the president of the United States and the senior senator from South Carolina, the memorable Seabright Cooley. They belong to opposing wings of the same party and disagree on most things, and specifically, in this case, the president's nomination of one Robert A. Leffingwell - slick, popular with the media, devious, liberal (he was played by Henry Fonda) - to be secretary of state. The president of the United States has the right - everyone in this book agrees - to his policies. But the Senate has the duty to protect the higher interests of the nation, in this case its basic security, since the nominee may be a communist and is certainly a liar. The first question is how the senators should use their prerogatives and their oversight responsibilities to block Leffingwell's nomination or so circumscribe him that he will be ineffectual if confirmed in the position. The next question is to what ruthlessly manipulative lengths the president and his allies are willing to go to get their man in. The final question is how much the men of character in the novel will grow from the awful dramas resulting from the confirmation fight - notably the rather bumbling vice-president, who will soon find himself, when the president dies, with the ultimate responsibility of facing down the Soviet Union. Loosely inspired by the Hiss case, the plot of Advise and Consent unfolds against the double background of nasty domestic politics and an ominous international situation. The story, set contemporaneously, was written in 1958 - Drury said he had started it several years before and returned to it - and published in 1959. The date is noteworthy, because it evokes a time when Washington really was a simpler place than it is today ("a sleepy southern town," the saying went). Also, the great political forces set in motion by the New Deal, regarding the power of the federal government in relation to the states, and the power of the executive in relation to the other branches, had not entirely resolved themselves. The immense power of the presidency was a fact, but it was not quite a custom yet. The Senate still had prestige, and Drury loved - and taught millions of readers to love - its grand traditions of oratory and parliamentary politics. These protected the states and the republic against the excesses of the executive's grasp for power. Drury understood perhaps as well as anyone in his time that executive power was corrupting, in the manner Lord Acton said it was. Transcending the immediate issue - whether the president should jeopardize national security by placing an appeaser, and possibly an agent, of the Soviet Union at the helm of American diplomacy when the Soviets (this too dates the story in the late 1950s) seemed to be pulling ahead of the U.S. in the arms race with the successful testing of a moon rocket - the question was whether the president should be able to run foreign policy without waiting for, as the Constitution has it, the Senate to Advise and Consent. This is a question, as the next decades would amply confirm, that transcended ideological or partisan differences, as every president, conservative or liberal, found himself in bitter disputes with the Senate over foreign policy questions. …

Abstract: Abraham Lincoln won the presidential election in 1860 partly because of a split in the Democratic Party between Douglas and Breckenridge. This split destroyed the compromise over slavery that, in some sense, had been embedded or hidden within the Constitution. This paper identifies the beginning of the split in the party with the defeat of the gag-rule by a coalition of Northern Whigs and Democrats in 1844. The reason for the split was anger by Northern Democrats against their Southern allies, over the election of James Polk, a slaveholder from Tennessee, to the Democratic presidential nomination. This betrayal was directed against ex-president Martin van Buren, because of his reactions to the Amistad slave case tried in U.S. courts in 1839-40. While the Amistad case started the Democratic split, the Dred Scott decision by the Supreme Court in 1857 gave Lincoln the means by which to change the beliefs of the Northern electorate about the moral acceptability of the compromise over slavery.

Abstract: Although Paul M. Angle and Earl Schenck Miers edited Fire the Salute! Abe Lincoln Is Nominated (Kingsport, Tenn.: Kingsport Press, 1960) in which on pages 53 through 61 are listed the official voting delegates to the Republican National Nominating Convention at Chicago in 1860, there is no comparable source for the delegates to the Illinois State Republican Nominating Convention that year. It was this latter body which chose Lincoln as its favorite son, and a huge number of members labored diligently for his nomination a few days later in Chicago. These stalwart men served as the backbone of his candidacy, and yet too many of them are totally forgotten today. In 1961, The Willow Press at LaCross, Wisconsin, published my study entitled Lincoln the Railsplitter. However, it dealt mostly with the origin of the sobriquet "Railsplitter" given to Lincoln at Decatur on May 9 and 10, 1860. No attempt was made at that time to catalogue the delegates entitled to vote. So, I left the official proceedings buried in the Daily Illinois State Journal (Springfield), May 12, 1860, p. 2, cc. 3-4. From this issue the names have been compiled for this study. Since the appointed secretaries of the Convention or the delegates themselves often set down only initials for first and middle names, no effort has been spared to ferret out fuller identities. To accomplish this end, the United States Census for 1860 has been consulted as well as county histories, the correspondence of Abraham Lincoln, etc. Nevertheless, some of these people only revealed one initial to the enumerator, also. A few persons somehow completely escaped inclusion in the census, but an attempt was made to check for phonetic spellings. My additions or corrections have been added silently to the names. While struggling with census records for identification, it was noted that a great majority of these new Republicans stemmed from the New England States or areas north of the Ohio River. Only a very small number came from the South, evidently being anti-slavery advocates. Nevertheless, only a handful were probably full-blown abolitionists at that time. Amazing as it might seem today, some of the delegates were physicians. In those days, doctors often dabbled in politics. No doubt others were also physicians but have not been discovered by me as such. Following is the revised list of the 645 delegates. They were the power base for Lincoln's sudden rise to the Presidency. Of course, numerous others supported him very actively, too. Many of them attended both the State and National conventions but were not official delegates. Some were running for nomination to State offices and did not deem it proper to appear also as voting delegates. Anyhow, we have rescued the delegates themselves from obscurity. LIST OF DELEGATES TO THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATING CONVENTION AT DECATUR IN MAY OF 1860 ADAMS COUNTY, 16 votes. Orville Hickman Browning, John Tillson, Henry Asbury, Jacob Dick, Frederic W. Jansen, Jackson Grimshaw, Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss, John E Morton, Lewis Braddee, Joseph Turner, Thomas Bailey, James J. Graham, William Booth, Pardon B. Grover, Kiler K. Jones, and Nathaniel Pease. ALEXANDER COUNTY, 1 vote. James C. Sloo. BOND COUNTY, 4 votes. C. W. Johnson, J. D. Lansing, A. G. Henry,1 and S. P. Moore. J. F Alexander, William M. Evans, Alexander Kelso, and William Plant [either 4 alternates or else 1/2 vote for each of the 8 delegates]. BOONE COUNTY, 5 votes. Stephen Augustus Hurlbut, Allen C. Fuller, J. Nels Brockway, Luther W. Lawrence, and Horatio C. DeMunn. BROWN COUNTY, 4 votes. S. R. Glenn, J. E. Moorman, E M. Stout, and James S. Irwin. BUREAU COUNTY, 10 votes. John Howard Bryant, Cyrus Bryant, George W. Stipp, S. Allen Paddock,2 T. K. Waldron, Thompson Gordon, Chauncy A Dean, Tracy Reeve, William M. Whipple, Chauncy C. Nicholls, Cyrus Todd, and Dr. Charles S. Latimer. CALHOUN COUNTY, 2 votes. …

Abstract: This book describes the dramatic rise and dizzying fall of Al Franken, the first Jewish president of the United States. From the first days of the Franken campaign as the candidate pledges 'to walk the state of New Hampshire, diagonally and then from side to side' as Al, aided by his covering sex addict and alcoholic deputy campaign manager, stuns the pundits by defeating Al Gore for the democratic nomination, then is swept into office carrying all fifty states. But from that moment of triumph it's downhill all the way...

Abstract: (1999). William O. Douglas's “Political Ambitions” and the 1944 Vice‐Presidential Nomination: A Reinterpretation. The Historian: Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 325-342.

Abstract: Our paper extends this research by examining more fully the role that race plays in induction into Baseball’s Hall of Fame. Evidence that such a study is needed can be found both in the recent claim made by Tony Perez that sportswriters discriminate against Latin Americans in Hall of Fame voting and in the vociferous defense of the writers made by John Steadman of the Baltimore Sun. (1) Our results indicate that after controlling for a number of measures of lifetime performance and past awards for non-pitchers, there is evidence of discrimination against both Latin American and African American players in both the nominating process and voting. These results are consistent with the findings of Pascal and Rapping (1972), Scully (1974), Gwartney and Haworth (1974), and Medoff (1975) concerning labor-market discrimination against nonwhites in baseball. The evidence of discrimination found in this study both supports and contradicts the results of Findlay and Reid (1997) on discrimination in Baseball Hall of Fame voting. In a similar analysis of Hall of Fame voting patterns, they find that black players are less likely to receive any votes than their white counterparts and that Latin American players also appear to receive fewer votes than whites. This is consistent with our results. We do not, however, find any significant decline in discrimination over time against either African American or Latin American players. Our study differs from theirs in a number of ways. First, we examine the nomination process. Then, we explicitly control for the selection process onto the Hall of Fame ballot in our estimates of voting discrimination, and we incorporate a more complete set of explanatory variables in estimating the percentage of votes received by a player. In the following sections of the paper, we discuss a) the eligibility criteria and selection process for induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame, b) the data and model used to test for the existence of racial discrimination in Hall of Fame nominating and balloting, and c) the empirical results. Eligibility and Selection to the Baseball Hall of Fame The Baseball Writers’ Association of America (BBWAA) annually selects players for the Baseball Hall of Fame based on rules established by the Board of Directors of the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum. (2) Election to the Hall of Fame is a two-stage process in which a six-member BBWAA Screening Committee initially prepares a ballot of eligible players. Nomination by at least two members of the Screening Committee is required to place a player on the ballot. Active and honorary members of the BBWAA with a minimum of ten years as active baseball writers are eligible to vote for up to ten players in each election. Approximately four hundred writers cast ballots annually. Nominees are elected to

Abstract: The role of mass media in the presidential primaries has not been examined in the same fashion as in the presidential general elections, congressional elections, and gubernatorial elections. This study is based on a survey (face‐to‐face interviews) of 392 adults randomly selected from a city with a population of 444,000 during the 1996 presidential primaries. The results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses show that television news programs increase learning about candidate issue policies. People's confidence in judging which candidate has a better chance to win the party's nomination is influenced by reading of newspaper campaign stories, viewing of the campaign commercials, and their attention to the campaign news on TV. This study enriches our understanding of media effects in the presidential primaries.

Abstract: Abstract John Corigliano comes from a musical family. His father was concert-master of the New York Philharmonic, and his mother was a pianist. Corigliano played the piano and composed from an early age and studat Columbia College with Otto Luening and at the Manhattan School of Music with Vittorio Giannini. He worked as a composer, arranger, and producer in radio and television for a number of years, and his score for Ken Russell’s film Altered States received an Academy Award nomination in 1981.

Abstract: Abstract Roy Wilkins was unyielding in his belief that the move toward full integration was the only way to a united America. He frequently challenged the so-called separatists and militants about their beliefs that a system that was centuries old could be eradicated overnight. In the following article, written in March 1974, he offers a definition of black power. There is considerable indication, cropping up here and there, that some aspects of the black power hysteria that spread into all race relations when it was first voiced in 1966 are on the way out. In fact, among more advanced thinkers these aspects are dead. Negro political leaders in New York City, fresh from their soul-searching in the hectic and discouraging experience of the nomination and appointment of a black deputy mayor, were among those who redefined “black power.” Its real meaning is far from the sloganeering of marches, demonstrations, and confrontations. It is fully as far from the chip-on-the-shoulder bragging of some of its less thoughtful early proponents.

Abstract: This research examines the proliferation of Democratic state presidential preference primaries from 1972-80, an unintended consequence of McGovern-Fraser reforms to delegate selection adopted following the acrimonious 1968 Democratic National Convention. Unlike previous work, which has addressed the primary proliferation qualitatively and in a way that does not permit sorting out the various elements that may underlie the adoption of party reforms in the 1970s, we operationalize and test hypotheses about the influence of several factors-Democratic National Committee directives, party strength and type, partisan control of state government, home-state candidates, and divisive caucuses -on states moving from a caucus/convention arrangement of selecting delegates to a presidential preference primary Our findings suggest that both national party efforts to involve more rank and file in the process and state characteristics predisposed some states to move in the direction of a preference primary rather than continuing with a party caucus/convention. Democratic control of state government, the presence of home-state candidates, and noncompliance with DNC directives were the most powerful forces behind states adopting Democratic presidential preference primaries. NOTE: An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 18-20, 1996. We would like to thank John Bruce for his helpful comments. Divisions between Democratic party regulars and insurgent rank and file over the Vietnam War and Hubert Humphrey, the party's presidential nominee in 1968, led to reforms opening the process of delegate selection to the party's national nominating convention. Following the reforms, and perhaps a consequence of them, many states moved from a caucus/convention arrangement of selecting delegates to a presidential preference primary (Reiter 1985; Keeter and Zukin 1983; Shafer 1983; Polsby 1983). Between 1968 and 1980, the number of states with Democratic presidential primaries increased from seventeen to twenty-eight.l The increase meant more Democrats involved in the nominating process, and an end to winning the nomination without contesting any primaries and ignoring the party's rank and file, as Humphrey did in 1968 (Crotty and Jackson 1985).2 The shift to a presidential nominating system dominated by primaries has had considerable impact on both the political process and candidates nominated for president. No longer do primaries serve an "advisory role" to party leaders, as they had from 1912 to 1968 (Geer 1989: 2). Harry Truman may have said it best when he called primaries of the period "eyewash," events with only peripheral importance to the nomination (Polsby 1983: 9). After 1968, Democratic aspirants would have to take primaries seriously. The shift to primaries gave party outsiders an unprecedented chance to run and win. Jimmy Carter's nomination in 1976, culminating in the presidency, would have been impossible under a caucus-dominated system. The changes following 1968 helped another Southern governor, Bill Clinton, win the party's nomination and the White House in 1992. Clearly, the primary dominated system has opened the Democratic party's nominating process where outsiders have a much greater opportunity to succeed. What pushed a system dominated by caucuses as late as 1968 to one dependent upon primaries by 1980? Were the changes in state procedures for selecting delegates primarily a reflection of national party efforts to involve more rank and file in the process as many maintain (for example, see Aldrich 1980; Lengle and Shafer 1976; Ranney 1978)? Or were the changes a reflection of state characteristics that, in concert with national party directives, predisposed some states to move in the direction of a preference primary rather than continue with a party caucus/convention, as others argue (Shafer 1983; Bode and Casey 1980)? …

Abstract: Abstract Jackson, calvin, comp, pno; b. Philadelphia, PA, 5/26/19; d. Encinitas, CA, 12/9/85. Mother was a concert singer. Extensive mus. studies; thirteen yrs. w. private teachers in Phila., at Juilliard, and at NYU. First prof. job w. Frankie Fairfax. Asst. mus. dir. to George Stoll at MGM, Hollywood 1943–7; also wrote arrs. for Harry James ’43. Moved to NYC ’48, pl. at Café Society w. Mildred Bailey. Settled in Toronto ’50, where he had own radio and TV shows. Ret. to West Coast ’57, app. as soloist in classical and jazz concerts ’61–2; own radio show ’65. Film: soundtrack for Blood and Steel; Oscar nomination for score to The Unsinkable Molly Brown; app. in Three on a Couch. TV: soundtrack for series, The Asphalt Jungle; apps. on Steve Allen, The Detectives; NBC special, Rehearsing With Calvin. Comp: Profile of an American, dedicated to J. F. Kennedy, perf. by Hollywood Symph. ’66. Recs. on Col., Rep.; w. Phil Moore (Verve). CD: w. Buddy Collette (Cont.).

Abstract: Historians have long indulged in the exercise of categorizing U.S. presidents into groupings such as "great," "near great," "average," and "failures." Given the expanded profiles now enjoyed by retired chief executives, it is perhaps time to subject ex-presidents to similar scrutiny and classification. To date, there have been forty-two presidents, counting the ever-pesky Grover Cleveland twice. Excluding the incumbents, the eight presidents who died in office, and James Polk and Chester Arthur (who lived too brief a time after leaving office to be considered here), thirty-one presidents remain for our study. Each can appropriately be placed into one of the following six categories: Still Ambitious, Exhausted Volcanoes, Political Dabblers, First Citizens, Embracers of a Cause, and Seekers of Vindication. This article first describes these categories and the ex-presidents included within them. It then concludes with some summary observations and assessments about the ex-presidency. Still Ambitious The Still Ambitious ex-presidents are those whose appetites for power remained unsated even after serving in the nation's highest political office. Surely, William Herndon's famous description of his law partner's ambition as "a little engine that knew no rest"(1) applies at least as much to the five ex-presidents in this group as it did to Abraham Lincoln. Few men have left the presidency with as much unfulfilled ambition as did Martin Van Buren. After suffering defeat in his 1840 reelection bid against William Henry Harrison, Van Buren retired to New York. He longed for a comeback. As the 1844 Democratic Convention approached, Van Buren seemed the near certain nominee. Then, he and his Whig rival Henry Clay issued simultaneous letters opposing the immediate annexation of slaveholding Texas, a ploy to keep this issue out of the upcoming campaign. The maneuver enraged southern Democrats and expansionists, and Van Buren lost the nomination to dark horse candidate Polk. Although Van Buren now claimed he was "sincerely and heartily desirous to wear the honors and enjoyments of private life uninterruptedly to the end,"(2) his ambition resurfaced in 1848, just as the slavery issue was intensifying sectionalist tensions. That year, his opposition to slavery and support of the Wilmot Proviso secured him the presidential nomination of the Free Soil party. Defeated yet again, Van Buren retired for good. He died in July 1862. After two scandal-ridden terms, Ulysses Grant should have retired from politics in 1877. But he missed the glory and acclaim of the presidency, and in 1880 he allowed his name to go before the Republican Convention. He led on the first thirty-five tallies but ultimately lost the nomination to James Garfield. More misfortune plagued Grant's final years. Bankrupt and diagnosed with terminal throat cancer, he hurriedly completed his memoirs to earn money for his wife. He died in July 1885. "I want you to take good care of all the furniture and ornaments in the house, for I want to find everything just as it is now when we come back again." So instructed Frances Cleveland to a White House servant as the First Lady and her husband, Grover, left to attend the inauguration of Benjamin Harrison, who had defeated Cleveland in 1888. "We are coming back just four years from today,"(3) Mrs. Cleveland promised. Her husband had won more popular votes than Harrison (but lost in the electoral college), he had been the only Democrat since the Civil War to win the presidency, and no one else of stature was available. Thus, Cleveland's renomination in 1892 was ensured, and this time he won, attaining an unprecedented second, nonconsecutive term. After winning the presidential election of 1904, Theodore Roosevelt pledged never to "be a candidate for or accept another nomination."(4) Later, he admitted that he would have willingly cut off his right hand not to have uttered that promise. …

Abstract: Abstract To cope with the polymorphic character of rhythmicity as an indexical sign, different aspects of the material have been selected for analysis. Rhythmic patterns are described in the sequential context of openings and topic nomination (§3). A global hypothesis is formulated to explain the finding that rhythmicity is strongly and persistently present at the boundaries (openings/closings) of calls, where rhythmically integrated transitions across three speakers are found (§4).

Abstract: Abstract Speaking Engagements On January 7, the Executive Director attended [a] meeting of the Special Contributions Fund Trustees, and later that evening attended the Association’s Fellow ship Dinner in New York City; on January 8, attended annual meeting of the Association, and the Board of Directors meeting in New York City; attended staff meeting on January rn; testified at hearing of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare against [the] President’s nomination of Peter J. Brennan as Secretary of Labor in Washington, D.C., on January 18; was honorary pallbearer at funeral services for Elmer Carter on January 19 in New York City; attended memorial services for President Lyndon Baines Johnson at City Hall in New York City on January 24; and on January 25, attended funeral service for President Johnson in Washington, D.C.; on January 29, attended annual meeting and annual dinner of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.