Abstract: “And the question which I have for you (Professor Anita Hill) is how reliable is your testimony in October of 1991 on events that occurred 8, 10 years ago, when you are adding new factors, explaining them by saying you have repressed a lot?,” asked Senator Specter. (Republicans and Democrats alternate in questioning, 1991). It is October 11, 1991, and the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee is considering the controversial nomination to the Supreme Court of Judge Clarence Thomas. Toward the end of the nomination process, there is a surprise witness. An attorney, Anita Hill, who used to work for Thomas, claims he sexually harassed her a decade earlier. Hill, now a University of Oklahoma law professor, reluctantly agrees to testify in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and much of the nation watches spellbound as she testifies on television. “My working relationship became even more strained when Judge Thomas began to use work situations to discuss sex. … His conversations were very vivid. He spoke about acts that he had seen in pornographic films involving such matters as women having sex with animals and films showing group sex or rape scenes. … One of the oddest episodes I remember was an occasion in which Thomas was drinking a Coke in his office.

Abstract: * Introduction: Party Unity and Presidential Elections * Do Democratic Rules Make the Nomination Process More Divisive? The Divisive Primary Revisited * Ideological Cohesion in the American Party System * Ideological Cohesion over Time: The Origin and Evolution of the Party Coalitions * Group Appeals and the Democratic Coalition * The Politics of Democratic Disunity

Abstract: Since 1980, more than 175 scholarly articles, chapters, or books have been published about the post-reform presidential nomination system. Numer ous authors investigate primary rules, media coverage, candidates, voters, or momentum. Less well covered are the subjects of interest groups, win nowing of candidates, campaign contributors, and connections to other phases of the presidency Research on presidential nominations has to con tend with an ever-changing environment as rules change, candidates exit the contests, and the primary season progresses from February through June. This environmental complexity adds to the challenge of investigating the first phase of the presidential selection process. Coupling this environ mental complexity with a lack of consensus among scholars on measure ment, model building, and theory leads to contradictory findings in a number of areas. Nevertheless, much has been learned about the patterns of presidential nominations.

Abstract: This article presents an exploratory analysis of the flow of funds raised in American presidential nomination campaigns. Using detailed financial data for all the major party candidates in the 1988 presidential contest, we explicate and test two rival models of fund-raising: A "campaign-driven" model, which ties the fund-raising success to performance in the campaign itself, often in the form of momentum; and an "organization-driven" model, which ties it to the quality of candidates' political bases and fundraising efforts. We find much more support for the latter model. Most candidates' funds are raised before the start of the primary season; the patterns of fund-raising remain largely stable even during the primary season; and variations are largely a function of fund-raising efforts rather than poll standings, campaign events, or even primary/caucus performance. Though specific primaries and caucuses do sometimes affect fund-raising, the impact is typically modest and short-lived. These findings suggest that at least under current campaign conditions, candidates should give priority to building fund-raising organizations rather than relying on campaign performance to provide monetary momentum. No one denies the importance of money for would-be presidential nominees. Without money, candidates typically are strapped for staff and facilities, ignored by the media, and unable to gain voter attention. Especially since the advent of a primary-based nomination process, presidential hopefuls must acquire adequate and timely funds for mass campaigning. But there is no clearly established evidence on how this is done. We know a lot about total amounts raised, types of contributors, expenditures, and even the impact of money on nominations and elections (cf. Wilcox 1991; Corrado 1996). But we do not know exactly how money flows into presidential nomination campaigns, the timing involved, or the factors that explain the flow. Extant studies suggest two sharply contrasting possibilities. One, derived from the literature on primary voting and "momentum," holds that fund-raising is bound up with the relative performances of the competing candidates during the campaign itself, and so can be described as "campaign-driven" The other postulates that the flow of funds is determined not by progress of the campaign, but by candidates' pre-existing political bases and organization; it is therefore "organization-driven." Though neither of the approaches is particularly well-developed, each does implicitly incorporate different theories about campaign strategy, the nature of fund-raising, and donor behavior. In this study we seek to explicate these models more fully, match them to existing evidence, and test them with data from the 1988 presidential nomination contests. The results, which rather strongly confirm the organizational basis of fund-raising, have important implications for both the theory and practice of modern elections. MODEL ONE: CAMPAIGN-DRIVEN FUND-RAISING The idea that the pattern of candidate fund-raising stems from the progress of the campaign was first clearly expressed by John Aldrich, who pointed out that the most important campaign resources-national popularity, media attention, and money-can all be acquired by strong showings in highly publicized and contested primaries. A successful candidate may receive "ever-increasing flows of money" (1980a: 106), thereby enhancing his chances in future contests. Meanwhile, unsuccessful candidates get caught in a "vicious circle" of declining funds and declining success (1980b: 659). Aldrich thus views the acquisition of money and other resources as highly unstable, especially in multicandidate races (1980a 111-12). Both other political scientists and political practitioners have agreed; Larry Bartels cites Hamilton Jordan's observation that "early primary showings can have a profound and irrevocable effect on succeeding primaries and a campaign's ability to raise funds and recruit workers" (1988: 25). …

Abstract: Little of the considerable research devoted to the connections between the Supreme Court and the mass public has addressed popular attitudes toward nominees to the High Bench. Here we hope to stimulate interest in this important and understudied area by examining the wellsprings of opinionation and sentiment toward the confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas. Relying on data from CBS News/New York Times polls and using statistical models of opinion-holding and support for Thomas' confirmation, we examine whether citizen attitudes were grounded in policy preferences, political orientations of long-standing such as partisanship, ideological convictions, group ties, and presidential approval. We also develop and directly link a model of the formation of opinion toward the nomination--a model of activation, in which citizens assimilate information and form an opinion--with a model of sentiment, in which citizens develop a positive or negative feeling toward the nominee. We report dramatic and systematic shift...

Abstract: Theory: Contrary to scholars who criticize the openness of the contemporary system of selecting presidential nominees, we theorize that citizen participation in presidential nomination campaigns can have beneficial effects for a political party's subsequent mobilization efforts. Hypothesis: Presidential-level campaign mobilization before the summer nominating conventions increases the activist's work on behalf of United States House candidates during the general election (this relationship is labeled the spillover effect). Methods: Path analysis is used (estimated via LISREL), based on a panel survey of presidential nomination participants in 1988 and 1992. Results: Activity in congressional campaigns conforms to expectations. In no instance does involvement in losing presidential nomination campaigns cause individuals to defect from fall campaign work at the House-level; rather, preconvention mobilization into presidential politics tends to increase participation on behalf of House candidates. Furthermore, such spillover effects are long-term; involvement in a nomination campaign in 1988 is found to increase participation in congressional campaigns four years later.

Abstract: This article examines the nomination choices of the major Russian political parties for the single-member districts in the ethnic republics for the December 1993 and December 1995 State Duma elections. Using western-based theories on party behavior in multi-ethnic societies, this article tests several hypotheses relating to the factors which affect where parties were active and examines the different recruitment strategies of individual parties. In general, it was found that the Russian proto-parties tended to be most active in urban and predominantly Russian areas of the republics. However, there were differences between the parties, with notable parties more likely to recruit non-Russian elites to their banners as opposed to program parties. Moreover, when comparing across time, the party which most increased its recruitment of non-Russian elites from 1993 to 1995 was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).

Abstract: Studies of the Supreme Court confirmation process have traditionally concentrated on factors that lead to Senate defeat of nominees (e.g., Scigliano 1971; Songer 1979; Palmer 1983; Segal 1987; Cameron et al. 1990; Ruckman 1993; Van Winkle 1994). Thus, they look at such institutional and political variables as presidential strength, timing, the partisan composition of the Senate, and whether an appointment may alter partisan coalitions on the Court. More recently, a separate body of literature has begun to examine the effects of interest-group lobbying for and against Supreme Court nominees (e.g., Caldeira 1988-89; Caldeira and Wright 1990,1991; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). For example, Austen-Smith and Wright characterize the allocation of lobbying resources across senators supporting, opposing, and indifferent to Robert Bork's 1987 nomination. Our study, which examines the lobbying against the 1881 nominations of Stanley Matthews, is part of this second wave of research on group lobbying and Supreme Court nominations. We argue that National Grange influence affected senators' votes on Matthews's nomination during a period not associated with interest-group activity.

Abstract: This article explores the basis of opinion formation and public attitudes toward recent Supreme Court nominees. The high salience of several re cent Court nominations has transformed the selection process from an elite affair to one with a popular dimension. We develop a model of opinion-holding in response to the Rehnquist, Bork, Souter, and Thomas nominations. We find that education and having an opinion about the president are strongly associated with opinion-holding about the nomi nees. We also find that presidential approval, party identification and ideology are all highly related to approval of the nominees. The influence of age, race, and gender on opinion-holding and evaluation tends to vary with the nomination. Of particular interest is the strong link we find be tween presidential evaluation and nominee evaluation. Presidents serve as important cues for those who have opinions about Court nominees.

Abstract: The outcomes of votes to confirm cabinet nominations can be viewed from the perspective of the individual nominee's qualifications for the position or one which places confirmation votes in the context of institutional politics between the president and the Senate. This article specifies and tests a linear regression model designed to assess which perspective best explains confirmation votes for the 201 cabinet nominations made between 1945 and 1993. The analysis indicates that, unlike nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court, the key conflict is between the nominee's own background and the Senate's standard of appropriate conduct in personal and business affairs. But when conflicts of interest arise, the president's standing with the public becomes an important factor. Mr. President, the nomination before us today confronts this body with extremely difficult choices. One choice—and the one I would much prefer to make—would honor the President's prerogative of selecting his own Cabinet and give to Mr. Donovan the benefit of the doubt with regard to the allegations that have been made against him. But the second choice, Mr. President, is to raise the question of whether we can in good faith confirm a nominee to an office of high public trust about whose background there remain so many serious questions and doubts (Senator Howard Metzenbaum).1

Abstract: Taiwan went through a year of political turbulence in 1995. Across the Taiwan Strait, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) GeneralSecretary Jiang Zemin's eight-point policy proposal in January for peaceful reunification generated a sense of optimism for improved Taiwan-mainland relations. But this had subsided in July when the Beijing authorities launched the first of four military exercises aimed at intimidating Taiwan after President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States. By year's end, the cross-strait relationship had suffered serious political setbacks, as Beijing's bellicose rumblings damaged the atmosphere of reconciliation that had developed since 1987 through trade, investment, tourism, and semi-official contacts. Not since the early 1960s has the People's Republic of China (PRC) displayed such military belligerence toward its Taiwanese "compatriots." As Beijing authorities poise themselves for continued military intimidation, at least through Taiwan's first popular presidential election in March 1996, security in the Taiwan Strait could get worse before it gets better. On the domestic front, partisan politics perforated this young democracy; the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) was saddled with internal dissension over the nomination of candidates for president and vice-president. Three leading figures left the KMT to run against the party ticket of incumbent President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan. The departures of KMT Vice-Chairman Lin Yang-kang and former Premier Hau Pei-ts'un further split the party. This political dissension had the immediate effect of diluting the KMT vote in the December election for the Legislative Yuan and benefiting the New Party, whose leaders had left the KMT in 1993. The outcome of the parliamentary election, as well as the political dynamics of the upcoming presiden-

Abstract: The U.S. Constitution is, among various confluent motives, a characterological document that motivates the image‐based politics characteristic of contemporary confirmation controversies. This essay suggests that this motive results in the embodiment of ideology in the characters who dominate American public life. An illustrative example is the 1967 confirmation debate regarding the nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court. In this debate, Marshall embodied opposing conceptions of “civil rights” for both opponents and supporters of his nomination. Ultimately, I maintain that such ideological embodiment may democratize and problematize ideological debate by allowing for more polysemous readings of public discourse.

Abstract: A little more than two decades ago, the rules and institutions governing American presidential nominations were decisively reshaped by two major "reform" movements. The first occurred primarily between 1969 and 1972, when the Democratic party completely rewrote its rules concerning the selection of national convention delegates, which in turn compelled substantial changes in state primary laws and caucusing procedures. The second took place in 1974, when the U.S. Congress instituted sweeping changes in the federal campaign finance laws. For reasons that have never been clear to me, analysis and commentary about the new dynamics of presidential selection-from both academics and journalists-have focused overwhelmingly on the first of these developments, while largely ignoring the second. While a small river of ink has been expended on the alleged effects of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines, there is surprisingly little systematic work on whether and how the new campaign finance laws have altered the tenor of presidential nominating politics. For example, probably the best-known academic account of the contemporary nomination process is that developed by Larry M. Bartels in his award-winning book, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (1988). Bartels mentions the subject of campaign finance on exactly three pages, and then only in passing. His model provides important roles for press coverage, public opinion, previous primary results, and enduring political predispositions, but essentially ignores the role of money (The same can be said of many other leading works on this topic, including Keeter and Zukin 1983; Brady and Johnston 1987; and Geer 1989.) Against this background, Katherine A. Hinckley and John C. Green's article "Fund-raising in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: The Primary Lessons of 1988" represents, I believe, a significant contribution to the literature. Hinckley and Green do take money seriously-and in so doing, provide a very useful way of organizing and conceptualizing some of the major questions about its role in presidential politics. Indeed, I would go further than this and say that, by the end of their article, they convince me that they are about half right. "Organization," in their sense of the term, does seem to be one important factor explaining the flow of presidential campaign funds. What I wish to defend is the proposition that the campaign also matters: that fund-raising also has much to do with the relative performance of the competing candidates. My argument proceeds in three stages. In the first, I raise a number of questions about Hinckley and Green's interpretation of the "campaign-driven" fund-raising model and the predictions that may reasonably be derived from it. Next, I offer a few criticisms of the variable the authors use as a measure of organizational influences on fund-raising. Finally, I provide a brief sketchgiven space limitations, it can be no more than that-of some of the most important ways that campaign performance and fund-raising success do seem to be interrelated. THE CAMPAIGN-DRIVEN MODEL REEXAMINED Hinckley and Green, it should be said at the outset, have taken on a very difficult challenge in this article: they are attempting to test and refute a model that, as they correctly note, has never been "particularly well-developed." If good academic work often profits from the existence of a strong and wellformulated counterargument, the "target" that Hinckley and Green are aiming at is a regrettably blurry one. Conceding the inherent difficulty of their task, however, I nevertheless feel that the authors have significantly misunderstood and/or mischaracterized the body of arguments and insights that tie fundraising success to campaign performance. Indeed, I would contest almost every one of the hypotheses they list as being a clear or necessary implication of a campaign-driven model. Specifically: 1. A significant number of candidates raise the bulk of their funds during the period of the primary campaign. …

Abstract: Campaigning in the final days before Oregon's special Senate election in January 1996, Democratic nominee Rep. Ron Wyden was introduced at each event with a song written in 1944 and recorded by Bing Crosby and the Andrews Sisters: “Ac-cent-tchu-ate the positive … E-lim-in-ate the negative…”The sudden enthusiasm with which Wyden embraced his new theme song struck more than a few Oregonians as ironic. Wyden had adopted his positive campaign posture after reading polls that showed a plurality of voters more concerned about the negative tone of the campaign than about any other issue. That negative tone had largely been established by Wyden himself (Wells 1996).The Wyden campaign—both on the attack and on the defensive, in repentance and in victory—offers a microcosm for the state of campaigning for Congress in the mid-1990s.Wyden, an eighth-term member from Portland, won his Senate nomination in November over another House Democrat from a more rural district who was unable to raise comparable amounts of cash. His Republican rival, state Senate President Gordon Smith, had made himself wealthy in food-packaging and won the nomination by heavily outspending two statewide officeholders (Gruenwald 1995).

Abstract: The present study addressed the problem of self-nomination in peer nomination forms (PNF) used with children to designate classroom peers who have superior abilities or talents. Its goal was to ass...

Abstract: In this study of preprimary gubernatorial endorsements by state parties, we find that the endorsee is less likely to be challenged in a primary if the endorsement is based on state law rather than party rules; though in both situations, the percentage of contested endorsees who win has been declining. Evidence from a number of 1994 endorsing conventions shows that the gubernatorial endorsee is more likely to win nomination if (a) the party endorses a politically strong candidate, (b) the endorsing convention is reasonably united and representative of party primary voters, and (c) the endorsee receives considerable tangible support as a result of being endorsed.

Abstract: EAGER TO OUTDO HIS CONSERVATIVE RIVALS, California's Governor Pete Wilson launched his short-lived campaign for the Republican nomination for president with an attack on affirmative action. On 1 June 1995, he issued an executive order urging the University of California and other state institutions to "end preferential treatment and to promote individual opportunity based on merit." Complying with the governor's request, the University of California Board of Regents met on 20 July and decided that, as of January 1997, "race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin" would not be used "as a criterion for admission to the University or to any program of study."' While the political motivation of its authors is clear, one of the most remarkable features of the Board's policy is that it does not merely repeal affirmative action. Certainly, according to the new rules, the University is obliged to disregard the race, gender, and ethnicity of all its applicants. Yet, if we read the document issued after the Board's meeting, it appears that, contrary to the governor's executive order, individual merit and academic achievement will not be the only criteria for admission to the University of California. Claiming that they are still involved in "academic 'outreach,"' the Regents want to introduce a different type of preferential treatment based on a new set of criteria.2 In their own words, they want to give special consideration to candidates who have "suffered disadvantage economically or in terms of their social environment (such as an abusive or otherwise dysfunctional home or a neighborhood of unwholesome or antisocial influences)."3 Should we understand that the Board's decision aims at instituting a revised form of affirmative action, whereby preferential treatment will be based on low income and underprivileged social environment rather than on race, ethnicity, and gender? Coming from the appointees of a Republican governor, such an emphasis on class difference seems rather incongruous. Today more than ever, conservative rhetoric vehemently rejects the concepts of class struggle and class interest as both inappropriate and divisive notions. Moreover, Republican politicians never fail to accuse their Democratic opponents of preaching class warfare whenever the latter dare to object to fiscal or financial measures favoring the richest segments of the population. It is therefore hard to imagine that a former

Abstract: Ardoth A. Hassler (hasslera@guvax.georgetown.edu) is Executive Director of Academic Computing and Information Technology and CIO for the main campus at Georgetown University. She has served as chair of the CAUSE Nomination and Election Committee, is a member of the CAUSE Recognition Committee, and is serving as program chair for EDUCOM’97. She has made numerous presentations at CAUSE, Educom, ACUTA, Southern Directors, and other professional organization conferences.

Abstract: I Introduction Public choice economists and political scientists, after nearly four decades of examining the economics of political and social choice, have begun to consider the potential impacts of legislative term limits. Recent work in the area includes that of Adams and Kenny (1986), Reed and Schansberg (1990 and 1994), Zupan (1990), Schansberg (1994), Will (1992), Fund (1992), Becker (1990), Dick and Lott (1993), and Benjamin and Malbin (1992). Many of these studies produce conflicting results. Becker (1990), for example, points out that with only an unrealistic view of human nature could one predict that limiting the right to continue a job would improve job performance (i.e. legislative performance); however, it is more likely that congressmen will take less interest in their work by limiting legislative tenure or terms. Zupan (1990) points out that there are serious "last-period" control problems (i.e. "political shirking") when congressional representatives do not face a reelection constraint, which will be exacerbated with the implementation of term limits. Some writers state that term limits would discourage challengers, who would then wait until the incumbent's limit was reached - thus equating term limits with term guarantees (see Benjamin and Malbin, 1992). Others believe that term limits will produce greater competition. Schansberg (1994) and Reed and Schansberg (1994) find that continuation rates from elections after 1976 are significantly different from preceding periods; in fact, the last four Congresses have been characterized by very high survival rates, implying long stays in office. They state that such long stays in office are due to special interests, who would have less incentive to support incumbents under term limitations. This action would reduce disparities between campaign expenditures, making election contests much more competitive (Reed and Schansberg, 1994). Their study also provides evidence that while shorter terms in office "unambiguously reduce the value of holding office," term limits could potentially increase the value of holding office because the opportunity to become a leader in the House (very valuable) is made easier. The effect of political performance will be determined by the dominant incentive (Reed and Schansberg, 1994: 85-86). There are moral hazard and adverse selection consequences involved. On one hand, when the value of office increases, one expects candidates/incumbents to work harder to win votes (moral hazard). Those candidates who most highly value a short timespan between election and nomination to Party leadership positions will be more likely to run for office under term limits. Those who find the prospect of shortened congressional careers too costly will be less likely to run for office (these incentives may also vary from state to state). The adverse selection in favor of "non-professional" politicians is cited by many proponents of term limits as more likely to prevail (Reed and Schansberg, 1994: 86, note 12). In addition, these economists provide evidence of higher Congressional turnover and a reduced Democratic advantage in the House (along with a potential increase in the quality of legislation passed) as a result of term limits. The present paper provides an examination of Congressional term limits from a history of economic thought perspective. Borrowing from the ideas of Jeremy Bentham (1789) and Edwin Chadwick (1829, 1859, 1862, 1866, and 1887), this study points out that the gap between the public interest and the private interest within political markets creates an opportunity for term limits to serve as an artificial identification between these competing ends. These ideas have been the subject of much public choice literature and serve as a precursors to modern-day thought in this area. It is now well-known that this divergence creates political incentives for deficit spending in democracies (see Nordhaus, 1975; Crain and Ekelund, 1978; Holcombe, 1983), as well as rent seeking and resource transfers in competition for monopoly rents that politicians often control (Tullock, 1967, 1989; Tollison, 1982; Mixon, Laband, and Ekelund, 1994; Laband and Sophocleus, 1992). …

Abstract: It is the thesis of this article that the deferred taxation of gain provision of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,1 has become an extremely important tool for easing the transition of individuals from the private sector into positions as presidential nominees and appointees. The success of the deferred taxation of gain provision has ended the search for an effective remedy for the financial conflict-of-interest problems of presidential nominees and other political appointees. A president, prior to the Second World War, could pick up the phone and ask an individual to serve in his administration and announce the nomination in less than twenty-four hours. Today, the process of selecting a presidential nominee for a high-level administration position can take weeks. Ethics officials working in the White House Counsel's Office, the Office of Government Ethics, the Department of Justice, and the nominee's designated agency ethics official must spend hours carefully reviewing the financial affairs of the prospective nominee, the nominee's spouse, and minor children to see whether they present conflict-of-interest problems. If conflictof-interest problems appear, additional time must be spent to resolve these problems prior to any announcement of a nomination. The passage of the deferred-taxation-of-gain provision of the Ethics Reform Act has greatly simplified the process of working with presidential nominees and other political appointees to resolve financial conflict-of-interest problems. Mandated Divestitute and Deferred Taxation of Gain The 1992 election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States ended twelve years of Republican control of the White House. President Clinton faced the difficult task of filling hundreds of high level positions with individuals who could withstand intense public scrutiny of their personal and financial affairs? Like all presidential transitions since the early 1960s,3 the Clinton transition carefully reviewed the financial affairs of potential nominees and appointees for possible financial conflicts of interest.4 Compliance actions by presidential nominees and appointees, prior to the passage of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, most often involved: (1) creation of either a "qualified" or "diversified" blind trust, (2) executed recusal or disqualification agreements, (3) resignation from positions in corporations or other organizations, and (4) the sale of stock or other assets.5 The Clinton transition was the first to have the opportunity to make use of the non-recognition-of-gain provision of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 added section 1043(a) to title 26 (federal tax laws), United States Code. This section is entitled "Sale of property to comply with conflict-of-interest requirements."6 The new tax provision "permits an officer or employee of the executive branch of the federal government to rollover any gain on property sold in order to comply with any conflict of interest requirements into permitted property."' Besides permitting the covered executive branch officer or employee to make use of the provision, the law permits the spouse or minor children to apply for and receive a certificate of divestiture from the Director of the Office of Government Ethics OGE) or the President of the United States.8 Trustees, finally, have the right to request a certificate of divestiture on behalf of a federal employee who has given the trustee responsibility for managing his or her financial holdings.9 The law does not limit the number of certificates of divestiture an employee or family member of the employee can receive or the amount of capital gain subject to the rollover provision. These features make certificates of divestiture an extremely effective remedy for financial conflicts of interest. The Evolution of Financial Conflict Resrictions and Remedies Since the early 1950s, federal ethics officials and presidential transition scholars have searched for ways to balance the need to prevent financial conflicts of interest with the impact of financial conflict-of-interest rules on the recruitment and retention of presidential appointees and nominees. …

Abstract: The distribution of power between government and supporting parties in Germany does not depend only on party characteristics, on the party system, or on cabinet cohesion; it has been also influenced by four further factors. (1) Governments have always been supported by relatively substantial parliamentary majorities (see Table 5.1); (2) parliamentary parties in the Bundestag have been characterised by marked party discipline, this party discipline being enhanced by the financial support enjoyed by candidates and by the nomination procedures; (3) there has been a moderate multi-party system with a further tendency – until at least 1980 – towards concentration; (4) finally, parties have come to dominate and control increasingly positions and resources in the public sector and even in many parts of the private sector.

Abstract: Catherine Gowrie's father, Don, is close to his greatest ambition - nomination as Presidential candidate - and nothing must be allowed to stand in his way. But Sophie Narodni, a young journalist from Prague, carries a secret that could destroy everything that Don had dreamed of.

Abstract: During the past two decades a new perspective known as nonlinear dynamics has caught the imagination of researchers in a number of disciplines of the physical sciences. Recently, some of the assumptions of this theory have begun to be applied to the social sciences, including economics, political science and public administration. We believe that the way the current presidential nomination system aggregates individual preferences into a social choice exhibits behavior consistent with nonlinear dynamics. We argue that the nomination system is characterized by two nonlinear processes: sensitive dependence and nonmonotonic behavior. In this paper, we present a nonlinear dynamical perspective for understanding presidential nomination processes. In particular, we address the question of whether very modest changes, in parameters can produce major changes in the outcome of the campaign. We suggest that resource acquisition, resource allocations, vote outcomes, and media verdicts interact with each other in a complex and dynamic fashion that has dramatic effects upon the allocation of delegates, and hence, the final nomination outcome.

Abstract: This thesis seeks to introduce the reader to the underpinnings on which John F. Kennedy's 1960 Presidential campaign was based. Well before Kennedy declared his candidacy for Democratic Party nomination for President he gathered together a group of academics from in and around the Boston area and formed his own personal think tank in much the same way that Franklin D. Roosevelt did before his Presidential campaign of 1932. Unlike Roosevelt, Kennedy did not call his group a Brains Trust, instead he chose to call his collection of professors the Academic Advisory Group. This treatise will establish the Academic Advisory Group's existence, flesh out its mandate, identify its creator and map out its evolution from its earliest origins to the interregnum prior to John F. Kennedy's Inauguration. The aim is to identify some of the key players within the Group and show how they individually and collectively related to the candidate and his campaign. Essentially, this treatise will examine the details surrounding the speech-making process of a Presidential campaign, and answer three distinct questions: who advised Kennedy; what was he told; and did he heed the advice he was offered?

Abstract: This study employs a decision model to study the effects on popular support of candidate chances and candidate moderation in the American presidential nomination process. The decision model draws upon psychological and rational choice theories of decision making to accommodate both the complexity of choice citizens face in the typical nomination campaign, and the need to keep decision costs in bounds. We use the model to simulate voter decision making under repeated trials of nomination campaigns. The simulation trials vary the chances candidates have of winning their party's nomination, and the ideological moderation of competing nomination candidates. Our results show that increasing a candidate's chances for the nomination can have substantial payoff in support, but that the consequences of moderating a candidate's ideological stand are more muted. Our research speaks to broader guest ions of decision making when information costs are high but cognitive effort remains low, and to the resolution of intraparty conflict in a dynamic and volatile political environment.