Showing papers on "Nomination published in 1986"
TL;DR: Wirls et al. as discussed by the authors argue that the gender gap is the result of unequal rates of defection by men and women away from liberal values and the Democratic party. But they do not consider the role of women in the political process.
Abstract: This study offers an analysis of the recent political differences between women and men that contradicts the conventional description of the "gender gap" in American politics. Beginning with the 1980 elections, the differences between women and men in their opinions on political issues, in voting behavior, and in partisan identification frequently have been portrayed as a result of women's rejection of Reagan and of Republicans and conservative values and their attraction to more liberal political positions and to the Democratic party. This description is misleading and cannot explain the full spectrum of political behavior by the sexes in the 1980s. This analysis argues that the gender gap has been the result of unequal rates of defection by men and women away from liberal values and the Democratic party. Greater movement by men toward conservative positions and the Republican party produced the gender gap. Consequently, the Republicans were never the potential victims but have always been the potential and actual beneficiaries of the gender gap. Daniel Wirls is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government, Cornell University. The author wishes to thank Benjamin Ginsberg, whose insight and encouragement initiated this study and improved it throughout the project's duration. Kathleen Frankovic graciously provided CBS News polling data. Martin Shefter, Alice Talbot, and the anonymous reviewers provided helpful comments and criticisms that improved the substance and presentation of the argument. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 50:316-330 ? 1986 by the Amencan Association for Public Opinion Research Published by The University of Chicago Press 0033-362X/86/0050-316/$2.50 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.127 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 05:56:11 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REINTERPRETING THE GENDER GAP 317 ing negatively to Reagan, Republicans, and revitalized conservatism.' According to this predominant view, the gender gap spelled trouble for Ronald Reagan in 1984 and signaled the potential coalescence of a women's voting bloc as a key constituent of a new Democratic coalition for the 1980s. This interpretation was the decisive factor behind the nomination of Geraldine Ferraro as the Democratic vicepresidential nominee. In 1984, however, the gender gap did not live up to its putative potential. The difference between the electoral choices of women and men narrowed; had only women voted, Reagan still would have won a landslide victory. Despite the unexpected results in 1984, the conventional interpretation has gone largely unquestioned, though references to the gender gap have become fewer and muted. What explains this contrast between the expectations generated by the popular interpretation of the gender gap in the early 1980s and the reality of 1984? Proponents of the conventional argument often drew conclusions about the dynamics and future of sex-linked political differences from static measurements of opinion and voting, which showed women to be more liberal or Democratic than men at discrete points in time over the last several years. The history of the gender gap demonstrates the danger of projections based on static data and a conceptual focus on women as the relevant political actors. Longitudinal analysis of the direction of political motion by both women and men produces a much different portrait of the meaning and significance of the gender gap. This study argues that the gender gap resulted from a general movement by the electorate toward Reagan, the Republicans, and more conservative values. While both men and women have been defecting from the Democratic party and moving away from liberal values, rates of defection among men have been greater than rates among women. Hence the gender gap. Rather than reflecting an increase in Democratic and liberal sentiments among women, the gender gap resulted from more rapid and widespread movement among men than women to conservative values and the Republican party. Consequently, Reagan and the Republicans were never the potential victims, but the potential and actual beneficiaries of the gender gap in 1984. 1 For example, Lou Harris said that "consistently, women are voting more Democratic than Republican, but most particularly, are inclined to vote against Ronald Reagan in his bid for reelection" (Ms., July 1984:53). Reagan's chief political advisor during the campaign of 1984, Ed Rollins, warned that the gender gap could "lock" the Republicans "into the status of a minority party," and that it threatened the chances for Reagan's reelection (Washington Post, June 6, 1983). For the perspective of the women's movement see Abzug (1984) and Smeal (1984). This content downloaded from 157.55.39.127 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 05:56:11 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
154 citations
TL;DR: For example, this article found that Republican party organizations, especially the Republican National Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee, provide candidates with more assistance than do their Democratic counterparts, and the NRCC is more effective at targeting their assistance to candidates involved in competitive races.
Abstract: Political scientists have expressed concern over the decline of political parties in recent years. This study provides evidence that at least one element of the political party, the party organization, is experiencing a resurgence rather than a decline. Data collected from nearly 400 House candidates reveal that party organizations continue to play an important role in congressional elections. National party committees, particularly the parties' congressional campaign committees, are now providing candidates with valuable assistance in activities that require technical expertise, in-depth research, or connections with the Washington campaign community. Included among these activities are campaign advertising, issue development, and fund-raising. State and local party organizations continue to assist candidates with gauging public opinion and mobilizing the electorate. Republican party organizations, especially the Republican National Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee, provide candidates with more assistance than do their Democratic counterparts. The RNC and the NRCC are more effective at targeting their assistance to candidates involved in competitive races. Party organizations are successfully adapting to the changing political environment. T he last few decades comprise an era of tremendous change for American political parties. Newly enacted campaign finance laws have served as a catalyst for the growth of vast numbers of political action committees (PACs), which now compete with parties for influence over candidates and voters. Party-initiated reforms in the nomination process have restructured the roles of party organizations in candidate recruitment and selection. The emergence of a more independent and more volatile electorate has helped to bring about changes in the tactics that candidates and parties use to garner support. Finally, technological innovations developed in the field of public relations have been adapted to the
85 citations
TL;DR: The carryover hypothesis as mentioned in this paper asserts that participants' candidate support behavior in the general election is affected by their preferences for their party's nomination, and that there is a detectable carryover effect on voting behavior both for activists and for citizens generally.
Abstract: The carryover hypothesis asserts that participants' candidate support behavior in the general election is affected by their preferences for their party's nomination. This paper examines data from activist and national sample surveys for evidence of a carryover effect in the 1980 election. There is a detectable carryover effect on voting behavior both for activists and for citizens generally. Among activists, where evidence about candidate support behaviors beyond voting is available, the effect on such activity is substantial, and increases with the effort associated with the general election activity in question.
58 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, four correlates of vote choice (issues, ideology, candidate qualities, and electability) were examined separately for each candidate competing in the 1980 presidential primaries for the United States.
Abstract: Four correlates of vote choice (issues, ideology, candidate qualities, and electability) are examined separately for each candidate competing in the 1980 presidential primaries. In general, candidate qualities were found to have the most frequent and consistent relationships with vote choice. Issues tended to be uncorrelated with candidate preference. Ideology was associated with vote choice only in the Republican primaries. Electability correlated with vote choice only in primaries held late in the nomination season. These patterns in the correlates of vote choice reflect patterns and changes in the candidates' campaigns.
57 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of disgruntlement among those primary voters who supported U.S. presidential candidates who lost the election has been analyzed in the last five presidential elections in order to determine if differences exist between those supporters of the winning candidate in each party and backers of other candidates who also sought the nomination.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the effect of disgruntlement among those primary voters who supported U.S. presidential nomination losers. It analyzes the general election voting behavior of primary voters in the last five presidential elections in order to determine if differences exist between those supporters of the winning nominee in each party and backers of other candidates who also sought the nomination. A multivariate analysis of the determinants of voter turnout shows significant results only for the Democrats in 1972, when primary voters who supported candidates other than George McGovern were more likely to abstain in the general election. Taking into account the option of defecting to another party in November, both parties appear to have been plagued by a considerable amount of disloyalty on the part of supporters of candidates who failed to win the nomination, although for the Republicans this type of response is confined to the 1980 election. The existence of a third party or independent candidacy may be an important variable influencing the behavior of these disgruntled primary voters.
57 citations
TL;DR: Aldrich et al. as discussed by the authors investigated the allocation behavior of the candidates in the two campaigns investigated, and they help to explain differences in that behavior among candidates, including those who are neither well-known nor well-financed.
Abstract: Candidates in nomination campaigns manipulate expendable resources to maximize their probability of securing the nomination. Since presidential nominations are determined by a majority of delegates at the national convention, candidates may rationally choose to allocate their resources to maximize their share of delegates. However, many candidates, particularly those who are neither well-known nor well-financed, must first increase their public support and resource base in order to have the funds to continue campaigning effectively. At least two allocation strategies are applicable to candidates in nomination campaigns: maximizing delegates and maximizing momentum. The appropriateness of each depends on the competitive status of the candidate at the time. These two strategies collectively explain much of the allocation behavior of the candidates in the two campaigns investigated, and they help to explain differences in that behavior among candidates. The presidential nomination system is a critical link between the American people and their political leaders. The behavior of the candidates, and the electoral consequences thereof, are influenced by a set of factors that comprise the formal and informal structure of the nomination process (Aldrich, 1980a).' The factors over which candidates have substantial control are those relating to the level, location, and timing of resources to be allocated to the various contests. From the perspective of the candidate, the nomination campaign involves a series of resource allocation decisions, accompanied by changes in the campaign environment. Some of these changes are partially dependent on previous allocations by the candidate. Candidates can influence, within legal, financial, and situational limits, the outcomes of state contests by manipulating the resources they expend.2 For example, a candidate may allocate substantial time and money to a particular primary that he or she
50 citations
TL;DR: The authors explored two hypotheses to explain the selective pattern of participation of primary voters in the 1980 Democratic and Republican presidential election, and found that participation in Democratic primaries was influenced by both contextual and individual factors.
Abstract: Presidential primary voters constitute a subset of presidential election voters. Two hypotheses are explored to explain this selective pattern of participation. One hypothesis centers on characteristics of individual voters, whereas the other centers on characteristics of the political environment. The research supports the second hypothesis for Republicans, who were mobilized to vote in the primaries by aspects of the campaign and legal structures. Participation in Democratic primaries, however, was influenced by both contextual and individual factors. Differences between the 1980 Democratic and Republican nomination races are suggested as reasons for the divergent explanations found for participation in the two parties' primaries.
21 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: A review of Senate responses to Court nominations reveals considerable variation in pattern and criteria as mentioned in this paper, indicating that the Senate has deferred to presidential judgment even if not necessarily comfortable with the political philosophy or policy values of the nominee.
Abstract: Appointment of a United States Supreme Court Justice is the product of a constitutional power sharing scheme between the executive and legislative branches. The president is empowered to nominate "Judges of the [S]upreme Court." Confirmation, however, is subject to "the Advice and Consent of the Senate." Given the role of seeking out and designating a candidate, the executive branch is an active force in the selection process. The Senate, given largely a veto function, exercises influence to the extent that it may reject a nomination. Disapproval of a nominee, therefore, only occurs if a majority of the Senate becomes sufficiently aroused to mobilize in opposition.Standards for rejecting a nominee are not constitutionally defined. A review of Senate responses to Court nominations reveals considerable variation in pattern and criteria. In its most combative movements, the Senate has spurned multiple nominees for the same seat. At other times, it has deferred to presidential judgment even if not necessarily comfortable with the political philosophy or policy values of the nominee.
14 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of unpledged superdelegates on the 1984 Democratic National Convention were analyzed, and it was shown that Mondale would have had a much tighter race for the nomination without the votes of superdelegate; he might have been denied a first-ballot victory.
Abstract: This article analyzes the votes of party leaders and elected officials, or superdelegates, at the 1984 Democratic convention. Analysis of state-level data reveals that unpledged superdelegates voted overwhelmingly for Walter Mondale, even in those 26 states in which Gary Hart or Jesse Jackson won the primary or caucus. This Mondale advantage among unpledged superdelegates was substantial enough in many of these states to tip the balance of the state's delegation away from Hart or Jackson. The candidate preferences of these unpledged superdelegates were also in direct constrast to those of pledged superdelegates; the latter were more likely to reflect the preferences of voters in their state's primary or caucus. Analysis of hypothetical delegate vote totals at the convention reveals that Mondale would have had a much tighter race for the nomination without the votes of unpledged superdelegates; he might have been denied a first-ballot victory. The effects of unpledged superdelegates on the 1984 Democratic ...
10 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that strong liberals participated at higher rates despite a very strong conservative on the Republican side in the 1980 election, and that competitiveness considerations are more important for mobilization during the primaries.
Abstract: Until 1964, ideological conservatives tended to participate in presidential campaign activities at higher rates than liberals. Since then, Beck and Jennings (1980, 1984) have shown the variable nature of the participation-ideology relationship, arguing that ideologically extreme candidates have successfully mobilized their followers in particular elections. In this paper, we explain the “anomaly” of the 1980 election in which strong liberals participated at higher rates despite a very strong conservative on the Republican side. Using data collected over time in 1980 by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies (CPS/NES), we broaden the Beck-Jennings model to include participation during the primary season and hypothesize that mobilization of ideological groups may result from ideological candidatesand the competitiveness or closeness of a nomination contest. We find that the ideological candidate model explains general election participation to a significant degree, while competitiveness considerations are more important for mobilization during the primaries.
4 citations
TL;DR: Fehrenbacher et al. as discussed by the authors concluded that the Lincoln-Douglas election of 1858 proved to be a contest without a real winner, since the momentum gathered in their contest for a Senate seat carried both Lincoln and Douglas to the threshold of the White House, but only one could enter.
Abstract: Who won the Lincoln–Douglas election of 1858? is a question that has frequently been pondered by historians This is not surprising, since the campaign of 1858 in Illinois was, in David Potter's words, “perhaps the most famous local political contest in American history” It made Abraham Lincoln's national reputation, though Lincoln had enjoyed strong support in his run for the Senate in 1855, and had been a respectable midwestern candidate for the Republicans' vice-presidential nomination in 1856 It also confirmed Senator Stephen A Douglas's differences with the national Democratic Party under President James Buchanan's leadership The acrimonious division among Illinois' Democrats between Douglasites and Buchanan's followers in 1858 prefigured a wider struggle throughout the northern Democratic Party during the two following years, a struggle which, to some of his party rivals' surprise, Douglas won by a huge margin Because both men achieved their parties' presidential candidacy in 1860, it is easy to accept the force of Don E Fehrenbacher's conclusion: “The Lincoln–Douglas campaign of 1858 proved to be a contest without a real loser… The momentum gathered in their contest for a Senate seat carried both Lincoln and Douglas to the threshold of the White House, but only one could enter” What is less obvious is how Illinois' electorate responded to the rhetoric so plentifully presented to them and how far the debate over sectional issues subsumed all other political questions in 1858
TL;DR: In the post-convention period, Eisenhower's public relations advisors used television to soften the General's military image, reach Democrats and Independents, and increase the pro-Eisenhower voter turnout as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The election of 1952 saw the beginning of the age of telepolitics. In that year the medium of television played a decisive role in the nomination by the Republican Party of Dwight D. Eisenhower since it exposed convention proceedings to a national audience and gave that national audience, as well as representatives of the media, major influence over convention events. In the post‐convention period, Eisenhower's public relations advisors used television to soften the General's military image, reach Democrats and Independents, and increase the pro‐Eisenhower voter turnout. Whereas Stevenson never fully mastered the demands of television, Eisenhower was adept and skillful at using the medium as a major new campaign vehicle.
1 Jan 1986
TL;DR: The impasse at Panmunjom coincided with presidential election year in the US, a conjunction which worried the UN allies as discussed by the authors, who redoubled their efforts to contain Washington.
Abstract: The impasse at Panmunjom coincided with presidential election year in the US, a conjunction which worried the UN allies. The volatile state of American public opinion and its possible impact on the conduct of the war had long been a source of concern. In September 1951 Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked that it was as necessary to ‘restrain the more impulsive elements in America as it was to avoid provoking the Soviet Union’.1 In February 1952 the Canadian ambassador, Hume Wrong, noted uneasily that the leading contender for the Republican nomination, Senator Taft, was advocating the unleashing of Jiang and a US-sponsored nationalist landing on the Chinese mainland. The public response to such appeals was ‘hard to assess’: ‘There is a powerful sentiment … for winding up of the fighting in Korea. … Coupled with it is a desire to make the Chinese Communists suffer for what they have done. Unless there is an armstice soon, this will be exploited for domestic reasons during the campaign. In an election year, amateur strategy and diplomacy can exercise an unusually powerful influence on policy.’2 The UN allies, therefore, redoubled their efforts to contain Washington.
1 Jan 1986
TL;DR: CATEGORY ^DISTRICT _ BUILDING(S) _ STRUCTURE —SITE _OBJECT OWNERSHIP _PUBLIC _PRIVATE _XBOTH PUBLIC ACQUISITION and WORK in PROGRESS ACCESSIBLE —YES: RESTRICTED X_YES.
Abstract: CATEGORY ^DISTRICT _ BUILDING(S) _ STRUCTURE —SITE _OBJECT OWNERSHIP _PUBLIC _PRIVATE _XBOTH PUBLIC ACQUISITION ._IN PROCESS _BEING CONSIDERED STATUS ^-OCCUPIED —UNOCCUPIED —WORK IN PROGRESS ACCESSIBLE —YES: RESTRICTED X_YES. UNRESTRICTED _NO PRESENT USE —AGRICULTURE —MUSEUM -X.COMMERCIAL —PARK —EDUCATIONAL X_PRIVATE RESIDENCE —ENTERTAINMENT —RELIGIOUS —GOVERNMENT —SCIENTIFIC —INDUSTRIAL —TRANSPORTATION —MILITARY —OTHER:
Book•
7 Feb 1986TL;DR: In this article, a survey of more than 17,000 delegates to state presidential nominating conventions in eleven states in 1980 is presented, showing that most of the generalizations about party activists in the presidential election process were based on studies of national convention delegates, in particular those attending the 1972 conventions.
Abstract: Commentators, especially since the Democratic party reforms following 1968, have expressed serious concerns about the role of party activists in the American political system. Have they become so concerned with ideological purity that they are unable to nominate strong candidates? Are activists loyal only to particular interest groups, with little concern for the parties as institutions? Are the reformed nominating procedures open to takeover by new activists, who exit the party immediately after the presidential nominations fight? With such an unrepresentative set of activists, can parties adjust to changing environments?Based on a survey of more than 17,000 delegates to state presidential nominating conventions in eleven states in 1980, this pathbreaking book addresses these questions in a comprehensive way for the first time. Heretofore most of the generalizations about party activists in the presidential nomination process have been based on studies of national convention delegates, in particular those attending the 1972 conventions. But those delegates were atypical activists, as this book shows. The state of the activist stratum of the parties differs from what many of the critics have suggested.