Showing papers on "Nomination published in 1982"
1 Mar 1982
TL;DR: Chase as discussed by the authors argued that the practice of "senatorial courtesy" no longer means that a home state senator of the president's party need only "incant a few magic words like personally obnoxioux" to block a president's nominee, instead, he must be prepared to fight, giving his reasons for opposing the nominee.
Abstract: shaping the policy output of the judicial system because they render the final judgment in a large majority of the cases which go beyond the trial courts in the federal system. In this policy-making role, scholars now generally agree that the values and attitudes of the judges on the courts of appeals influence their decision in a number of cases. Those who are involved in the selection of judges for the courts of appeals are often concerned about judicial policy making and it would be reasonable to expect them to try to assure the selection of those who hold policy values similar to their own. Several studies of the selection process indicate that most presidents are concerned with the policy values of their judicial appointees, though other factors sometimes appear to weigh more heavily in their final choice of a nominee. Moreover, presidents appear to differ in the importance they place on finding judicial nominees who hold the "right" policy or ideological values.2 Although most presidents show at least some concern with trying to nominate candidates who share their general policy orientation, it is less clear what motivates senators in their involvement in the selection process for judges for the courts of appeals. There have been no systematic studies of why home state senators of the president's party propose particular candidates for nomination or why they resist some of the choices of the president. For senators to influence decisively the policy values which are held by federal appeals court judges they must be able to determine what the policy values of the nominees are, they must be concerned with those values, and they must be able at least to veto any unacceptable nominees of the president. Several studies have investigated the extent to which home state senators of the president's party are able to influence the selection of nominees. Chase argues that the practice of "senatorial courtesy" no longer means that a home state senator of the president's party need only "incant a few magic words like personally obnoxioux" to block a president's nominee. Instead, he must be prepared to fight, giving his reasons for opposing the nominee (Chase, 1972: 7). Although these general considerations on the meaning of senatorial courtesy apply for all lower court nominations, there seems to be general agreement that the balance of power shifts at least slightly in the president's direction when nominations for the courts of appeals rather than the district courts are being considered (Chase, 1972: 43; Goldman, 1967: 186-214; Grossman, 1965: 27). The greater relative power of the president partially results from the fact that at least some of
14 citations
TL;DR: State legislators have about one chance out of four of winning a congressional seat and are most successful if they come from a more professional state legislature and run in an open seat as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Little is known about attempts by state legislators to advance to a U.S. House position. Data are presented which show that state legislators try for congressional nomination infrequently. When they run they are more likely to contest nonincumbent districts or primaries. State legislators have about one chance out of four of winning a congressional seat and are most successful if they come from a more professional legislature and run in an open seat.
13 citations
TL;DR: Theoretical cost/benefit propositions involving individual participation choices in the presidential election process were examined through an aggregate data analysis of turnout in the 1976 Democr... as discussed by the authors, where the authors examined the theoretical cost and benefit propositions of individual participation in the election process.
Abstract: Theoretical cost/benefit propositions involving individual participation choices in the presidential nomination process are examined through an aggregate data analysis of turnout in the 1976 Democr...
9 citations
1 Jan 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a taxonomy of areas in which public acquisition in process being considered is considered and access to public buildings is restricted or unrestricted in some cases: yes: restricted, yes: unrestricted no, no: unrestricted.
Abstract: Category district _ X . building(s) _X_ structure site A object Ownership public X private both Public Acquisition in process being considered Status _X_ occupied unoccupied work in progress Accessible _JL_ yes: restricted .. yes: unrestricted no Present Use agriculture commercial educational entertainment _ government industrial __ military museum park private residence religious scientific transportation X _ other: recreati
8 citations
Journal Article•
1 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: This paper found that FDR had a substantial if uneven impact on education, as a supporter of equalizing educational opportunity, and as a leader of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA).
Abstract: M. Charles Wallfisch Livingston University When Franklin Delano Roosevelt accepted the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 1932, he proclaimed, "I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people."1 In fulfilling that pledge, Roosevelt clearly changed the character of American government. But what impact did FDR have on American education? The answer, as this study reveals, is this: as a supporter of equalizing educational opportunity, he had a substantial if uneven impact on education. In this field, as in government, he undoubtedly kept his pledge.
1 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In 1980, more than a dozen candidates in 37 primaries spent more than $100 million campaigning for the privilege of being nominated for the Presidency, a situation which will likely be repeated in this Presidential election cycle as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In 1980, more than a dozen candidates in 37 primaries spent more than $100 million campaigning for the privilege of being nominated for the Presidency, a situation which will likely be repeated in this Presidential election cycle. The experience has produced, among politicians and voters, the growing conviction that we must change the manner in which we choose our Presidential candidates. In a world of rapid change, we can no longer afford an electoral system that tends to hobble the governmental decision-making process for months. This not only harms us at home, but concerns and alarms our friends and allies. Presidential candidates are currently nominated in the quadrennial rite of the national party conventions, which are preceded by months of state conventions, primaries and caucuses in which delegates to the national conventions are chosen. The process suffers from a number of problems. First, it takes too long. The state primaries and caucuses stretch from January to June of the election year. A successful campaign requires many months of preparation before the first primary to organize supporters and raise money. The successes of George McGovern in 1972 and Jimmy Carter in 1976 have shown the value of early grass-roots organization in primary and caucus states. Senator McGovern announced his candidacy in January 1971, 18 months before the Democratic convention, and President Carter announced his candidacy in December 1974, 19 months before the convention. And, this election cycle has so far proved no different. Both, in fact had spent many months testing the political waters before making their formal announcements. In addition, the Federal election law of 1974 gives a financial incentive to an aspiring candidate to begin his campaign early. The law requires a candidate, in order to qualify for public financing, to raise $5,000 in at least 20 states through contributions of $250 or less. The upshot is that the race for the nomination has become at least an 18to 24-month endurance test which provides an advantage to nonincumbent candidates who can devote a substantial amount of time to campaigning and forces incumbents also to devote substantial time and effort to their re-election despite the already overwhelming demands on
1 citations
1 Sep 1982
TL;DR: The neo-conservatives fault the post-1968 reforms in presidential nominations because, they argue, increased participation opportunities have weakened political parties and produced unrepresentative candidates who are unable to govern as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The neo-conservatives fault the post-1968 reforms in presidential nominations because, they argue, increased participation opportunities have weakened political parties and produced unrepresentative candidates who are unable to govern They favor changes that would enhance the influence of party regulars and professionals because it is asserted that such participation would strengthen parties and encourage the selection of more popular and better qualified nominees We argue that the critique suffers from several weaknesses: a failure to consider other plausible explanations for the effects attributed to the reforms; the use of inadequate or misleading measures; and the misuse of historical examples In addition, we find that a key concept in their critique–professionalism– is not clearly defined, and that the several plausible definitions suffer from a variety of logical and analytic shortcomings Although many political scientists
1 citations