TL;DR: One of the themes of 2016 so far has been the challenges faced by political institutions as discussed by the authors, from Brexit to Bernie Sanders' potent critique of the Democratic Party, we have heard a lot about how voters...
Abstract: One of the themes of 2016 so far has been the challenges faced by political institutions. From Brexit to Bernie Sanders’ potent critique of the Democratic Party, we’ve heard a lot about how voters ...
TL;DR: For example, this article argued that major trends over the past two decades, such as the rise of new political media, the flood of early money into presidential election, and the conflict among party factions, have made it easier for factional candidates and outsiders to challenge elite control of nominations.
Abstract: Political scientists have devoted vastly more attention to general presidential elections than to party nominations for president. This emphasis might be reasonable if parties could be counted on to nominate generic representatives of their traditions. But it is clear that they cannot. Since the party reforms of the 1970s, regulars like Bill Clinton, Bob Dole, and Al Gore have sometimes won fairly easy nominations, but outsider candidates like Jimmy Carter and Howard Dean have made strong runs or even won. 2016 has produced extremes of both types: ultimate regular Hillary Clinton on the Democratic side and far outsider Donald Trump on the Republican side. It seems, moreover, that party regulars are having more difficulty in recent cycles than they did in the 1980s and 1990s. There is therefore some urgency to the question: when and why do party regulars tend to win nominations? We examine this question from the point of view of two well-known studies, Nelson Polsby’s Consequences of Party Reform and our own, The Party Decides. The former explains why incentives built into the reformed system of presidential nominations make outsider and factional candidates like Trump likely. The latter argues that, following the factional nominations of the 1970s, party leaders learned to steer nominations to insider favorites. This article uses the logic of these studies to argue that major trends over the past two decades – the rise of new political media, the flood of early money into presidential nominations, and the conflict among party factions – have made it easier for factional candidates and outsiders to challenge elite control of nominations.
TL;DR: In this paper, a case study of the 1920s highlights the challenge of interpreting NOMINATE scores in periods when party lines do not map well onto the main contours of ideological debate in political life.
Abstract: Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores have been a boon to the study of Congress, but they are not without limitations. We focus on two limitations that are especially important in historical applications. First, the dimensions uncovered by NOMINATE do not necessarily have a consistent ideological meaning over time. Our case study of the 1920s highlights the challenge of interpreting NOMINATE scores in periods when party lines do not map well onto the main contours of ideological debate in political life. Second, the commonly used DW-NOMINATE variant of these scores makes assumptions that are not well suited to dealing with rapid or non-monotonic ideological change. A case study of Southern Democrats in the New Deal era suggests that a more flexible dynamic item-response model provides a better fit for this important period. These applications illustrate the feasibility and value of tailoring one's model and data to one's research goals rather than relying on off-the-shelf NOMINATE scores.
TL;DR: The use of DW-NOMINATE in historical work in American politics has been criticised as mentioned in this paper, and alternative approaches to the use of roll call voting data have been suggested.
Abstract: Several of the articles in this volume criticize the use of DW-NOMINATE in historical work in American politics and suggest alternative approaches to the use of roll call voting data. While many of criticisms are certainly valid, their practical implications are often overstated. Moreover, the suggested alternatives are either impractical for most historically oriented scholars and or do not adequately address the underlying problems. Almost all of the criticisms can be addressed by correct application of DW-NOMINATE results or those of other closely related measures.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider why states as well as international courts and tribunals should act to remedy the gender imbalance on international benches and argue that the most appropriate question is not why they must, but why they should.
Abstract: This contribution considers why states as well as international courts and tribunals should act to remedy the gender imbalance on international benches. In my view, the most appropriate question is not why they must, but why they should. Arguments that states are legally bound under the UN Charter to address this gender imbalance are weak, though human rights law does provide a basis for claims that states must take action. But arguments about legitimacy—both normative and sociological—could provide a more persuasive basis for arguing that states as well as courts and tribunals should act. In particular, the normative legitimacy of international courts and tribunals could benefit from selection procedures designed to help ensure that states nominate the most meritorious candidates for judgeships.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify a latent ideological dimension from the matrix of following relations, which corresponds closely to roll call-based estimates for congressional officeholders, and find support for the hypothesis that ideological extremity is advantageous in party primaries.
Abstract: Many cite the growing tendency of political parties to nominate ideologically extreme candidates in U.S. primary elections as a reason for increasing congressional polarization. However, a lack of quantitative data on candidate ideology makes this claim difficult to test. We propose a unique solution to this problem that exploits data from the increasingly popular realm of social media by estimating ideal points for candidates for the U.S. Senate based on the patterns of connections in their Twitter social network. We identify a latent ideological dimension from the matrix of following relations, which corresponds closely to roll call-based estimates for congressional officeholders. Controlling for other relevant factors, we find support for the hypothesis that ideological extremity is advantageous in party primaries.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used archival data from the Dwight Eisenhower and Gerald Ford Presidential Libraries to identify which legislators contacted the president about a specific nomination or appointment request and under what conditions these requests were successful.
Abstract: There is persistent debate about who most influences the federal appointment process, especially whether the executive branch staffs the federal bureaucracy with individuals loyal to the White House or relies on the process as an accommodation to important political players, especially members of Congress. Yet, people still know little about the role members of Congress play in the process of shaping the prenomination environment. In this article, the authors address this debate by using unique archival data from the Dwight Eisenhower and Gerald Ford Presidential Libraries to identify which legislators contacted the president about a specific nomination or appointment request and under what conditions these requests were successful. The authors find that legislator resources, Senate membership, and those closer ideologically to the president are related both to the number of requests made and to the number of successful appointment or nomination requests granted. The results suggest that the president relies on members of Congress for credible information about staffing administrative positions, but they appoint or nominate individuals that are in their own interest, not necessarily to accommodate Congress.
TL;DR: VoteView as discussed by the authors provides two-dimensional snapshots of congressional roll calls, among other data that it generates, and is a major resource for understanding other eras in American political development (APD) besides the current great polarization.
Abstract: Steady political polarization since the late 1970s ranks among the most consequential transformations of American politics—one with far-reaching consequences for governance, congressional performance, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, and citizen perceptions of the stakes of party conflict and elections. Our understanding of this polarization critically depends on measuring it. Its measurement in turn began with the invention of the NOMINATE algorithm and the widespread adoption of its estimates of the ideal points of members of Congress. Although the NOMINATE project has not been immune from technical and conceptual critique, its impact on how we think about contemporary politics and its discontents has been extraordinary and has helped to stimulate the creation of several similar scores. In order to deepen appreciation of this broadly important intellectual phenomenon, we offer an intuitively accessible treatment of the mathematics and conceptual assumptions of NOMINATE. We also stress that NOMINATE scores are a major resource for understanding other eras in American political development (APD) besides the current great polarization. To illustrate this point, we introduce readers to Voteview, which provides two-dimensional snapshots of congressional roll calls, among other data that it generates. We conclude by sketching how APD scholarship might contribute to the contemporary polarization discussion. Placing polarization and depolarization in historical perspective may powerfully illuminate whether, how, and why our current polarization might recede.
TL;DR: In the experimental mobbing game as discussed by the authors, each player in a group has the option to nominate one of the other players or nominate no one, and if the same person is nominated by all other players, he loses his payoff and the mob gains.
Abstract: We introduce the experimental mobbing game. Each player in a group has the option to nominate one of the other players or nominate no one. If the same person is nominated by all other players, he loses his payoff and the mob gains. We conduct three sets of experiments to study the effects of monetary gains, focality and fear of being bullied. We find that subjects frequently coordinate on a victim, even for modest gains. Higher gains make mobbing more likely. Richer and poorer players are equally focal. We find no evidence that fear of becoming the victim explains mobbing. Commonly employed social preference theories do not explain our findings.
TL;DR: The NOMINATE algorithm has become the most important analytical tool used in the study of the United States Congress and congressional scholars have developed a great many social conventions, practices, and assumptions that enable interpretation of the statistical artifacts the algorithm produces as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The NOMINATE algorithm has become the most important analytical tool used in the study of the United States Congress. As such, congressional scholars have developed a great many social conventions, practices, and assumptions that enable interpretation of the statistical artifacts the algorithm produces. However, as many of these scholars recognize, serious problems emerge whenever we try to translate these statistical artifacts into language and thus attempt to assign them meaning in historical analysis. These problems are irresolvable because they reside in the very construction of the algorithm itself.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the internal institutional mechanisms of the European Parliament and the voting behavior of the members of the Parliament of the Central European countries (MEPs).
Abstract: 1.Introduction: MEPs as Agents of Two PrincipalsDespite the fact that Central European countries have been member states of the European Union for over a decade, the knowledge about the activities of their Members of the European Parliament (MEPs1) is still very limited both in the academic world and among ordinary citizens. What important topics are MEPs engaged in and how these issues affect citizens often goes without significant media coverage, and it is even more so when it comes to the voting behavior of the representatives and the internal institutional mechanisms of the European Parliament.The lack of research about the activities of the Central European MEPs is especially regrettable if we take into account the outstandingly intriguing political context in which MEPs work. MEPs are selected by their national parties, which are the ones to send them to represent their values and interests in Brussels and Strasbourg. All representatives are voted for their five-year long mandate in their home countries. Since EP elections are held at the national level, politicians arrive to serve in the European Parliament after being elected in different electoral systems. Therefore, close connections to the domestic politics of their home country is given. Moreover, having a good relationship and regular contacts with the sending party is not only a moral imperative, but it is also the key to reelection and is vital to build a long-term political career in the EP (Hix-Hoyland 2013). For this reason, the party leadership of the sending parties possesses very important power tools which have the potential to exercise serious political influence on the MEPs delegated by them.On the one hand, there is always a possibility that MEPs get advice from back home regarding what they should do. On the other hand, voting behavior of an MEP might be influenced to a large extent by the pressure coming from their own party group in the European Parliament. The factors behind the influencing potential of a European party group are completely different to that of the national parties. Gail McElroy (2001: 3) argued that "the European Parliament lacks the incentives that are necessary to keep the party groups disciplined". This statement is only partly true. The European Parliament's internal logic differs from that of the national parliaments as it lacks the traditional government-opposition divide due to its special place within the institutional structure of the European Union. Another huge difference is that the party groups of the European Parliament do not have the right to nominate their members. Therefore, European party groups miss the most important tool to exercise pressure over their members: the decisive role in the candidate selection process.However, there are some more sophisticated instruments at their disposal. Such instruments include the nomination for the most prestigious positions of the EP and within the party groups, and the distribution of positions and policy-based tasks in the committees. Those politicians who harbor long-term ambitions and do not consider Brussels and Strasbourg the quite end of their career have outstanding career-building opportunities in the European Parliament (Verzichelli-Edinger 2005, Biro-Nagy 2016). An MEP has numerous instruments to build up a strong political/policy profile that is not only helpful in gaining professional reputation but to reach high-level positions within the European party groups and the institutional structure of the EP as well. It is also worth to note that being a parliamentarian in the EP makes it possible that with competent policy work and "defending the national interests" further reputation can be won among the electorate of the sending country. Speeches at the plenary sessions might be also used to influence the domestic political scene. Furthermore, a clear political profile built during the EP years can help (re-)enter domestic politics. This brief summary indicates that adapting to the norms and inner mechanisms of the EP might be also of key importance to the representatives since this strategy might be extremely fruitful regarding their long-term political career goals. …
TL;DR: The generalist-specialist controversy has raised its head from time to time in Britain and countries which were formerly governed by the British and have retained either intact or with modifications institutions and procedures of British origin, such as parliamentary democracy and a civil service recruited on merit.
Abstract: The generalist-specialist controversy has raised its head from time to time in Britain and countries which were formerly governed by the British and have retained either intact or with modifications institutions and procedures of British origin, such as parliamentary democracy and a civil service recruited on merit. In the United States, although 90 per cent of Federal appointments are within the purview of the Civil Service Commis sion, there is no class of career civil servants equivalent to the administrative class of Britain, who advise and assist the minister or member of the Presi dent's Cabinet in policy formulation and in over-seeing the execution of policies. Some students of public administration in the United States have bemoaned the absence of such a category of civil servants. Don K. Price says : "In this respect, of course, government in America simply follows the example of society as a whole, which in business and in education has glorified the specialist and neglected the overall problem of developing the generalist."* Perhaps the need for such a cadre of generalist-administrators has not arisen in the USA because the President can nominate to his Cabinet distinguished lawyers, successful businessmen and renowned academics. Americans and continentals have always, somewhat derisively, called Britain a country governed by amateurs, both because British ministers do not generally bring any previous experience of administration in government or local bodies or of management in business to their office and also because their advisers, namely, the senior ranks of the adminis trative class, have only honours degrees and no post-graduate qualifications in Law, or the Physical and Social Sciences. Somehow, the British who have a sound system of secondary school education and specialize to a consi derable extent in their honours course at the university, have not the same veneration for doctorates as do the Americans and the continentals. In many European countries a doctorate is an essential qualification for entry into the higher ranks of the civil service. The Generalist-Specialist controversy in India has been taken to the streets in such a virulent form that it has in several states, particularly in Electricity Boards and other technical organizations, led to a complete
TL;DR: The authors argue that ideal point measures such as DW-NOMINATE can illuminate much about politics and lawmaking and be very useful to better understand some of the key questions put forward by American political development (APD) scholars.
Abstract: This article aims to persuade historically oriented political scientists that ideal point techniques such as DW-NOMINATE can illuminate much about politics and lawmaking and be very useful to better understanding some of the key questions put forward by American political development (APD) scholars. We believe that there are many lines of inquiry of interest to APD scholars where ideal point measure could be useful, but which have been effectively foreclosed because of the assumptions undergirding DW-NOMINATE. In particular, we focus on three issues as particularly important: (1) the assumption of linear change; (2) the collapsing of distinct policy issue areas into a single “ideology” score; and (3) an agnosticism toward policy development, institutional context, and historical periodization. We go over these issues in detail and propose that many of these concerns can be addressed by taking seriously the proposition that policy substance, historical and political context, and the temporal dimension of political processes be integrated into the core of our measures and analyses. We also discuss a set of techniques for addressing these issues in order to answer specific questions of broad interest to both APD scholars and other Americanists.
TL;DR: This thesis examines the impact of mass tourism on global heritage site preservation through two case studies: San Antonio Mission complexes and Ephesus, Turkey, analyzing site management, preservation decisions, and World Heritage listing effects.
Abstract: This thesis considers some of the affects of mass tourism on global heritage sites. This issue will be addressed by investigating how the allure of tourism and the subsequent economic benefits it can produce influences the management and thereby preservation practices and decisions of such places. Two main case studies were used along with smaller, more minor examples as supporting evidence. The first case study is the San Antonio Mission complexes in San Antonio, Texas, which is made up of a total of five mission churches including the Alamo. The second case study is an archaeological site which features the historic ruins of the ancient city of Ephesus in Selçuk, Turkey. The thesis is organized by topic with each chapter relating to both case studies within the context of that theme. The first chapter explores site management practices and how they are affected by mass tourism. Following this, the second chapter discusses how mass tourism influences site management practices and preservation decisions. The third chapter looks at how large-scale development in and around the site is handled and what are the motivating factors behind such endeavors. The fourth and final chapter centers around the World Heritage List, looking briefly at the decision-making and application process to nominate a site, and more in depth at how listing impacts global heritage sites.
TL;DR: The authors found that primary voters in right-leaning parties might select fewer female nominees than would their left-leaning counterparts even if both parties' elites are equally likely to select female nominees.
Abstract: How candidates are selected, such as through nomination by party elites or election by primary voters, potentially influences the underrepresentation of women in political office. Partisan differences suggest that primary voters in right-leaning parties might select fewer female nominees than would their left-leaning counterparts even if both parties’ elites are equally likely to select female nominees. This hypothesis is confirmed by an analysis of lieutenant governors in the United States, a position that varies in whether candidates are appointed by party elites or elected by primary voters. In cases where lieutenant-governor candidates are appointed, Democratic and Republican gubernatorial nominees are equally likely to choose female running mates; where primary voters select the lieutenant governor, Republicans are less likely to nominate women.
TL;DR: In this article, a model that combines parameters estimated from existing data with values of some measurable characteristics of senators, such as party affiliations, party loyalty levels, and ideological positions, is used to identify potential swing voters in the Senate.
Abstract: This paper forecasts current senators’ votes on Merrick Garland’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the unlikely case that a vote actually takes place. The forecasts are necessarily conditional, awaiting measurement of the nominee’s characteristics. Nonetheless, a model that combines parameters estimated from existing data with values of some measurable characteristics of senators—particularly their party affiliations, party loyalty levels, and ideological positions—is sufficient to identify potential swing voters in the Senate. By accounting for a more nuanced and refined understanding of the confirmation process, our model reveals that if President Obama were to nominate almost any nominee (conservative or liberal) today, that nominee would be rejected if a vote was allowed to take place. So why nominate anyone at all? Obama’s hope for a successful confirmation must come from the stochastic component, that is, from outside the traditional decision-making calculus.
TL;DR: This work studies the computational complexity of deciding if there is a set of nominees such that a candidate from a given party wins in the final election, and shows that these problems are computationally hard, but are polynomial-time solvable for restricted settings.
Abstract: We consider a Plurality-voting scenario, where the candidates are split between parties, and each party nominates exactly one candidate for the final election. We study the computational complexity of deciding if there is a set of nominees such that a candidate from a given party wins in the final election. In our second problem, the goal is to decide if a candidate from a given party always wins, irrespective who is nominated. We show that these problems are computationally hard, but are polynomial-time solvable for restricted settings.