Abstract: Over the course of the twentieth century, the Democratic and Republican parties have reversed positions on racial issues. This reversal is credited to a variety of factors, chief among them strategic decisions on the part of party leaders competing for votes. An original dataset of the opinions expressed by political thinkers in leading magazines and newspapers is used to develop a measure of ideological positions parallel to nominate scores for members of Congress. Results show that the current ideological pattern, in which racial and economic liberalism are aligned together, emerged among political intellectuals at least 20 years before it appeared in congressional voting. The finding is consistent with the view that ideology shapes party coalitions.

Abstract: President George H. W. Bush famously employed a veto strategy in the 101st and 102nd Congress to project strength and defend "his party and his powers" (Mullins and Wildavsky 1992, 36). This strategy served President Bush rather well until he suffered a serious defeat at the end of his time in office. On September 17, 1992, the House of Representatives adopted the conference report on S. 12, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, by a margin of 280-128 (CQ Almanac 1992). This supposedly "veto-proof' margin barely surpassed the two-thirds supermajority needed to override the president's veto. President Bush vetoed the bill on October 3, 1992. Bush's veto set up a highly public confrontation between Congress and the president in the midst of his reelection campaign. The White House "stressed loyalty to the president as the main reason why Republicans should switch" their votes on the cable bill and vote to sustain the president's veto (CQ Almanac 1992). In the end, the White House lost this argument as the House overrode the president's veto by a margin of 308-114. On perhaps the highest profile veto of Bush's presidency, zero members of the House switched their votes to support his position while 38 members either switched their votes to defect from the president's coalition or abstained on the final passage vote and then voted against the president during the veto override attempt. This crushing legislative defeat helped cripple Bush's already weak campaign for reelection. President Bush lost both the cable battle in October and the electoral war in November. Political science currently offers two primary explanations for member voting behavior on presidential agenda items. The two dominant arguments assert that members respond to the president based on (1) party (Bond and Fleisher 1980, 1984, and 1990; Edwards 1980, 1989), (2) ideology (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Krehbiel 1998; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Some scholars combine party and ideology to argue that American politics takes place in a "four-party" system composed of liberal Democrats, conservative Democrats, liberal Republicans, and conservative Republicans (Burns 1963; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Fleisher and Bond 1996). Neither party nor ideology fully accounts for member behavior on the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. First, Democrats held 270 seats in the 102nd Congress (61%), and therefore needed Republican assistance to override President Bush's veto. Second, ideological explanations do not accurately describe member behavior on S. 12 in 1992. Of the 38 members who changed their votes to defect from President Bush's coalition or abstained on the final passage vote and then voted for S. 12 during the veto override attempt, only four come from the veto pivot quintile. In fact, the members who changed their votes on S. 12 came from all over the ideological spectrum as captured by NOMINATE scores. In this article, I argue that to more accurately predict and explain member behavior on veto override attempts, political scientists must consider how constituencies and electoral incentives affect members' votes. The high stakes politics surrounding veto override attempts offer an ideal opportunity to study the president's influence in Congress. A bill's content is identical on both final passage and override votes, yet some members of Congress vote differently on these two roll-calls. Cameron (2000) examines veto power at the macro-level and finds that the veto's existence as an institutional rule can cause Congress to strategically modify legislation both in anticipation of a potential veto and after the president issues a veto. I build on these findings by looking at the micro-level and examining the behavior of the individual members of Congress, whose support the president needs to successfully veto legislation. Krehbiel (1998, 163) is one of few to study the veto's effect at the individual level. …

Abstract: More women MPs than ever before were elected to the lower house of the national parliament of India in the 2009 general election. Yet, the increase in women's presence in the Lok Sabha cannot necessarily be attributed to the increased willingness of political parties to field more women candidates, despite rhetorical party political support for increasing women's participation in political institutions. This article analyses party political nomination of women as candidates in the 2009 election, and finds significant variations in levels of nomination across parties and across India's states. The article also examines in detail the nomination of female candidates by the two largest political parties, the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, both of which support proposals for introducing reserved seats for women in national and state legislatures. The findings reject the proposition that parties only nominate women in unwinnable seats, but finds support for the proposition that p...

Abstract: Most scholars conclude that the introduction of one member, one vote (OMOV) into the electoral college that chooses the Labour leader demonstrates a new, reduced role for the party's affiliated trade unions. This article examines the adoption of OMOV by Labour. It looks at discussions in the Labour party–trade union review group that moulded the decision to adopt OMOV during 1992–1993. Drawing on the full breakdown of results, it goes on to examine the outcome of the 1994 leadership contest. The distribution of votes, union by union, indicates that, contrary to the conventional view, trade union leaderships retained the capacity to shape the pattern of voting through their ability to nominate candidates. The article concludes that the introduction of OMOV did not reduce the role of trade union leaderships in Labour's internal affairs in the manner that many scholars have concluded to be the case.

Abstract: The request of Alibaba, China’s largest e-commerce firm, to allow a self-selected group of its past and present management known as the “partners” the right to nominate a majority of the directors in its negotiation with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for an initial public offering has reignited a new round of debate over the one share, one vote policy, which has survived for 27 years in Hong Kong. This article discusses the viability of allowing the dual-class share structure in the city. Although the United States has adopted the dual-class share structures for decades, this article identifies the major institutional differences between Hong Kong and the United States and argues that Hong Kong should not follow suit due to these differences.

Abstract: The Localism Act 2011 has provided the right for community organizations to nominate local buildings to be listed as an Asset of Community Value. In England a number of inner urban neighbourhoods h...

Abstract: After the European elections of 2014, the European Parliament managed to seize the power to select the Commission president from the EU heads of state and government. This democratic advance, however, is yet to find its counterpart in the subsequent process of selecting the other commissioners. For one thing, the entitlement to equal representation of all 28 member states hinders any reduction of the Commission to a more workable size. For another, because the right to nominate commissioners rests solely with the national governments, the composition of the Commission primarily reflects the partisan majorities of the Council rather than those of the Parliament, leading to a limited reflection of the president’s mandate in the composition of the Commission. The following article examines how these problems could be resolved. It proposes a moderate amendment to the parity principle to reduce the Commission’s size, a larger pool of candidates from which to select commissioners and the election of candidates by European citizens. The last proposal could even be implemented without any change to the treaties.

Abstract: The request of Alibaba, China's largest e-commerce firm, to allow a self-selected group of its past and present management known as the ‘partners' the right to nominate a majority of the directors ...

Abstract: Myths versus Reality Mistakes about how the world selects temporary members of the UN Security Council permeate casual discussions of the institution. The public, by and large, simply misunderstands the process. For example, we often hear that UNSC membership “rotates,” when, in fact, selection is by election. Some people believe the permanent members of the UNSC (the P5) have veto power over selections, when in fact, they have no such authority. There is also a misconception that regions select their representatives, when, in reality, they merely nominate candidates, and countries can also self-nominate without any regional endorsement. The final decision actually belongs to a two-thirds majority of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Grains of truth may drive some of these misunderstandings. There exists no formal rule to rotate membership, for example, but each region has adopted – to varying extents – a norm of taking turns. Officially, the permanent members of the UNSC exert no privileged control over the ultimate selection of temporary members, but they may have enough informal influence to occasionally block truly distasteful candidates from winning. And while the final vote on UNSC members belongs to the UNGA, we observe multiple candidates really contesting elections less than 20 percent of the time. Typically, the regions dominate the process by nominating exactly one candidate per seat, leaving the UNGA to rubber-stamp the selection.

Abstract: Mixed-member electoral systems became a popular choice for “electoral engineers” in the 1990s. Countries as diverse as Venezuela, Hungary, Lesotho, and Italy adopted the system. The assumption was that introducing singlemember districts (SMDs) in countries that used list proportional representation electoral systems would introduce “constituency” oriented legislators who could be more easily held accountable to voters. This paper explores any changes associated with the adoption of a mixed-member electoral system in Bolivia. It does so through a candidate-level analysis looking at differences in candidate profiles between two elections (1993 and 1997) and between two tiers (list and nominal) in the post-reform election (1997). The paper relies on portion of a dataset (collected by the author) of Bolivian legislative candidate characteristics. The paper hypothesizes that parties should nominate candidates with strong local attachments and/or track records of addressing or delivering public goods (or “pork”) to local constituencies. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2014 International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, May 21-24. Available for download at: http://works.bepress.com/mcentellas/22/

Abstract: Heinrich Himmler, leader of the Schutzstaffel (SS, Protection Squadron), regarded sports and sports competitions as efficient means to strengthen the importance of his organisation. The members of the SS were obligated to obtain the sports badges of the Sturmabteilung (SA, Storm Detachment) and the ‘German Sports Badge’, thereby – according to national socialist ideology – promoting a ‘natural selection’ and guaranteeing the formation of an elitist troop. The SS wanted to ensure they could successfully compete with other organisations during nationwide sports events and to nominate 50% of the members of the German Olympic Team. Moreover, the athletic rivalry between SS and SA continued in the struggle over the leadership within German sports. The SS tried to occupy as many positions of party officials as possible and consequently SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich saw himself as the legitimate successor of the Reichssportfuhrer,1 the leader of the national socialistic sports system.

Abstract: Why do political parties nominate candidates who have the potential to damage parties' reputation among voters? Specifically, why do parties in India nominate candidates who have been charged with committing violent crimes? In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between parties' goals, candidates' attributes, and electoral competition in order to understand why parties nominate candidates with normatively bad reputations. Chapter 1 provides the motivation for the project, highlighting the importance of understanding parties' candidate nomination logic when trying to understand why candidates with criminal charges are electorally successful in India. Chapter 2 develops a theory of candidate selection that serves as a framework for understanding why parties nominate certain types of candidates. In Chapter 2, I contend that parties nominate candidates who have a comparative advantage in helping parties increase their chances of winning a given seat (vote-generating candidates) into competitive electoral constituencies; parties nominate candidates who have a comparative advantage in helping parties increase their organizational capacity (party-capacity building candidates) into safer electoral constituencies. In Chapter 3, I apply this theory to India, arguing that parties' demand for vote- generating candidates has been increasing over time and that criminal candidates are primarily skilled at increasing parties' vote-share in the constituencies they are nominated into. In Chapter 4, I empirically test the relationship between constituency level electoral competition and the probability parties nominate candidates with violent criminal charges. I analyze party- constituency level data from 22 state level elections between 2003 and 2007. I find that parties that were the closest to winning a seat in their prior election --- parties that faced the highest level of electoral competition --- are the most likely to nominate a candidate with violent criminal charges into that constituency in the current election. I also find that electorally competitive parties that nominate these candidates are more likely to win their constituencies, compared to parties that nominated non-charged candidates. In Chapter 5, I examine whether, consistent with existing scholarship, parties nominate candidates with criminal records because they are wealthier than non-charged candidates. If this conventional wisdom were true, then I would expect parties to nominate their wealthiest candidates into their most competitive electoral constituencies. In contrast to this expectation, I find that parties nominate their wealthiest candidates into their safest electoral constituencies, thus implying that wealthy candidates are party-capacity building candidates and that the electoral success of candidates with violent criminal charges is not due solely to wealth. In Chapter 6, I examine if parties face any downstream consequences related to governance because they nominated candidates with violent criminal charges. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the attendance rates of Members of Parliament (MPs) with violent criminal charges who barely defeated a non-charged challenger with the attendance rates of MPs without criminal charges who barely defeated a challenger with a violent criminal charge. I restricted this analysis to MPs who were elected in the 2004 or 2009 national elections and who served out their entire term. I find that MPs with violent criminal charges attend office less often than their non-charged peers

Abstract: This EPIN study brings together contributions from a ​broad selection of member states ​and ​provid​es ​insightful analysis ​into the 2014 elections to the European Parliament on the ground. The report reveals the different factors that impede the development of genuine European elections and the consequences of the ballot in the member states covered by the study​, namely Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and the UK​,​ and at EU level. The report finds that:• The EP Resolution to encourage European parties to nominate candidates for the next Commission President has not really increased public interest in the EU and voter turnout will probably remain low. • Visibility of the European top candidates in most member states has been quite limited. • National manifestos do not coincide – and sometimes event conflict with – the European parties’ manifestos. • Election debates focus on national issues; EU issues are only brought to public debate when they are relevant for domestic politics. • Again, we will see a protest vote against governments and large parties. The EP elections are still perceived as a test ahead of local and national elections, or as a vote of confidence in national governments. • This year the protest vote also concerns the EU. The report predicts a more eurosceptic ballot that might complicate decision-making in the EU, exacerbate the conflict between the national and European levels and increase tensions among member states.

Abstract: Following the September 2013 federal elections and three months of coalition building, Berlin finally got back to business in late 2013. Chancellor Angela Merkel has since been leading the second grand coalition, in her third term in office. Like its 2005-2009 predecessor, this coalition includes Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The coalition treaty suggests that Berlin is set to continue mostly along the lines of the past four years on the eurozone and wider EU affairs,1 which is what analysts predicted during the election campaign.2 Wolfgang Schauble is one of only two CDU ministers who kept his position, at the helm of the Ministry of Finance, a sign of continuity for the government's approach to the ongoing reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In her first speech in the Bundestag following her re-election,3 Merkel III portrayed herself as Merkel II revisited. After a federal election campaign in which, to the surprise of many outside observers, European affairs were largely absent, on the eve of the last European Council in 2013 the chancellor outlined the main topics to be discussed at the upcoming summit, and her government's EU priorities for the year ahead. Her speech sounded more like business as usual than a new departure. The chancellor's government policy statement in January 2014 did not give any more clarity about the prospect of a "real" monetary union and the treaty changes needed for such a step.4But ironically, the start of 2014 marks a "nach der Wahl ist vor der Wahl"5 moment for Merkel and her new cabinet: less than six months into the start of the coalition government, European elections are to be held, on 25 May 2014, and parties have started to get in gear for their campaigns. Having just agreed on a joint programme to work together for the next four years, this year's European campaign is to bring a dynamic into the German EU debate that will not leave the new government coalition in Berlin unaffected.While in previous European elections "Europe" hardly mattered in the national context, 2014 is set to be different. For the first time since 1979, European party families decided to nominate candidates who will campaign for the office of commission president. This decision reflects the ambition in the European Parliament (EP) to turn 2014 into the year of the first truly European elections, offering citizens both faces and real choices at the ballot box.In the German context, this prospect is of particular interest since Martin Schulz (SPD), the president of the European Parliament, was nominated as the candidate designate of the PES for commission president in November 2013.6 The European Social Democrats are set to challenge the past years of crisis management dominated by Conservative governments in the European Council, and a commission headed by a Conservative president. Martin Schulz demonstrated over the past months that he is determined to run an ambitious campaign.No less interesting is that the Angela Merkel's previous coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), aims to re-conquer the national political arena in this year's European elections. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, the FDP did not make it into the Bundestag in the September 2013 elections, and is therefore seizing the 2014 opportunity for its political comeback.Is the German public eventually to wake up to "debating Europe"? What impact will the European campaign have on the new coalition government? How can the Social Democrats match their ambition of changing the majorities in the EU with their performance as part of a coalition at home? And how do the other German parties place themselves in the run for the 96 German seats in the European Parliament (EP)? This paper will show that, actual turnout and results of the European elections aside, the drive of the Lisbon Treaty has started to Europeanise political parties in the German national context. …

Abstract: This explicit point of view explains several soil functions, including the least known function of soil as an intergenerational living archive. Well-known scientific approaches are related to their features and functions, in particular to the influence of human activity. However, the importance of productive, environmental and cultural historical heritage sites does not seem to be sufficiently clear and investigated. In the context of global change this function is particularly important, both locally and globally, supporting the management of the sustainable use of land and soil (productive, social and environmental). According to the worldwide proposal of the United Nations, we recommend to nominate the 5th of December as the National Day of the Soil.

Abstract: This paper examines the nature of party nomination of candidates and the effect of this on women representations in politics in Nigeria. Women under-representation continues in spite of official party policy of equitable representation of women in party organs based on a 35% affirmative action. The paper demonstrates that this official party policy often comes into contradiction with cultural and political realities. The degree of this contradiction measures the level of democratic consolidation. The under-representation of certain groups, particularly women, indicates the limits of the democratic space. The future of democracy in Nigeria will to a large extent depend on the progressive expansion of the democratic space by, among other things, increasing the representation of women beyond statutory provisions of equality and affirmative action on paper. The democratic system will remain unsustainable where political parties are not inclusive, and the candidates they nominate for elections remain male dominated. Based on the November 2013 local election in Enugu State, the paper highlights the particular obstacles that women face in the political process, especially in getting nominated as candidates and concludes that a strong link exists between the prevalent culture of political 'godfatherism' and women under-representation in local politics in Nigeria since 1999.

Abstract: The two major concerns in Indian electoral system are enormous spending and increased criminalization of politics. While roughly one third of all elected offices (State or National) have members with some criminal charges, the spending in 2009 General elections exceeded the total spend in US General elections held a year earlier. This paper links the two. We develop a theoretical model that views candidates as a strategic choice by the parties. We propose a two dimensional contest function. In this framework we analyze the likely scenarios when a party chooses candidates with criminal records as well as how much to spend for that candidate. Our framework also analyzes the role of reservations. We use records of 36,731 candidates who contested elections at either Loksabha or Assembly level during the last 5 years.The empirical results suggest that:(a) Parties nominate candidates strategically.(b) Parties are more likely to nominate candidate with particular attributes if the other major parties also do so.(c) The most prominent direct response attribute is wealth status.(d) Irrespective of political ideology, parties follow similar strategy.

Abstract: Mixed-superposition electoral systems, while devoid of compensatory mechanisms interconnecting their proportional and non-proportional sections, may create effective linkages that exert some impact upon the behaviour of political parties. This article examines the resulting interdependence effects with respect to women's electoral participation and legislative representation. It is hypothesized that if political parties embrace the logic of ticket-balancing when forming their candidate lists in the proportional representation sections of elections, they become more willing to nominate female candidates in majoritarian districts, which creates an important interdependence effect that ultimately contributes to the increased levels of women's representation. This hypothesis is empirically tested on a sample of 139 sub-national elections held in Russia in 2003–2011, with some additional information derived from the results of 81 previously held elections. The statistical analysis confirms the presence...