TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed three different electoral systems used at different times for the large-magnitude nationwide tier of Japan's House of Councillors, including closed and open-list proportional systems and the single non-transferable vote.
TL;DR: Using the first dimension of DW nominate scores for the U.S. House and Senate over the period 1956-2004, this paper analyzed how the degree of ideological polarization between the parties varies as a function of district ideology, defined in terms of Democratic presidential support in the district.
Abstract: Using the first dimension of DW nominate scores for the U.S. House and Senate over the period 1956–2004, we analyze how the degree of ideological polarization between the parties varies as a function of district ideology, defined in terms of Democratic presidential support in the district. We find, as expected, that the more Democratic-leaning the district at the presidential level the more liberal are the representatives from the district, and that for any given level of Democratic presidential support, Democrats elected from such districts are, on average, considerably more liberal than Republicans elected from such districts. However, we also find that—consistent with theoretical expectations of spatial models that have recently been put forward—the ideological difference between the winners of the two parties is as great or greater in districts that, in presidential support terms, are the most competitive—a finding that contradicts the intuitive expectation that the pressure for policy convergence is greatest when the election is most competitive.
TL;DR: The authors found that individual members of the U.S. House of Representatives are strategic with their decision to participate in or abstain from the presidential election, and they also have personal, strategic incentives that may foster or prevent their participation in the nominating process.
Abstract: Even though political parties maintain control of presidential nominations, little is known about what leads individual party members to participate in the process. Party elites have a collective incentive to nominate an electorally viable and ideologically unifying candidate, and they also have personal, strategic incentives that may foster or prevent their participation in the nominating process. Using endorsement data on a subset of party elites—members of the U.S. House of Representatives—this article finds that individual members of the extended party are strategic with their decision to participate in or abstain from the nomination process.
TL;DR: The United Nations Security Council has global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and it is therefore essential for Australia to nominate periodically for non-permanent membership, and 2013-14 was the earliest feasible opportunity available to the Rudd government as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The United Nations Security Council has global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is therefore essential for Australia to nominate periodically for non-permanent membership, and 2013–14 was the earliest feasible opportunity available to the Rudd government. Australia's uneven record of participation in the United Nations over the last decade and a half was an impediment to election, but recent renewed commitment to international law and upgraded multilateral engagement, among other factors, strengthened the case for election. Australia was elected in the first round of voting, principally due to effective political leadership and the sustained campaign organised by diplomatic officers. Membership will enable Australia to participate actively in discussion of issues on the Council's agenda and to lead discussion of two or three additional subjects. 联合国安理会负有维护国际和平及安全的责任。因此澳大利亚有必要定期提名为非常任理事国,2013—14年对陆克文政府是最早的机会。过去十五年中澳大利亚参与联合国事务颇不均衡,这不利于其当选。而最近它对国际法的重新关注、对多边关系的提升则有助于其...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore empirically the relation between political parties' institutions and quality of government, focusing on procedures used to nominate presidential candidates given the importance of candidate selection in party politics.
Abstract: This article explores empirically the relation between political parties’ institutions and quality of government. I focus on procedures used to nominate presidential candidates given the importance of candidate selection in party politics. Using a panel dataset of Latin American countries, I find robust evidence of a positive relation between the use of democratic procedures, such as primaries, and quality of government. To shed light on the mechanism, I examine why parties use primaries. I find evidence suggestive that the results are mostly driven by the increase in political competition and candidates’ pre-electoral incentives.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the factors that affect the probability of a cross-party judicial nomination occurring, in order to better understand the goals that presidents are seeking to advance through these unusual actions, finding that a greater number of opposition senators from a state and a higher level of electoral competition between the Republican and Democratic parties in a state increase the probability that a president will name someone from outside of his party from that state to a federal court vacancy.
Abstract: Scholars have argued that U.S. presidents use their judicial appointments to advance their political goals. However, on rare occasions, presidents nominate people who are not members of their political party to the judiciary. This study will examine the factors that affect the probability of a cross-party judicial nomination occurring, in order to better understand the goals that presidents are seeking to advance through these unusual actions. Looking at nominations to United States federal circuit courts and district courts between 1977 through 2004, the study finds that, controlling for a number of relevant factors, a greater number of opposition senators from a state and a higher level of electoral competition between the Republican and Democratic parties in a state increase the probability that a president will name someone from outside of his party from that state to a federal court vacancy. The findings support the hypothesis that presidents make cross-party judicial nominations to further their partisan electoral objectives, and as a response to institutional pressure from opposition senators through the use of Senate rules.
TL;DR: In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission passed a rule that made it easier for shareholders to nominate people for the slate for a corporation's board of directors as mentioned in this paper, which was challenged successfully before a federal circuit court and the rule was invalidated on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious.
Abstract: In 2010 the Securities and Exchange Commission passed a rule that made it easier for shareholders to nominate people for the slate for a corporation’s board of directors. The rule was challenged successfully before a federal circuit court and the rule was invalidated on the grounds that it was “arbitrary and capricious.” The article discusses whether the rule (or the circuit court case) was justified and what the burden of proof should be when a circuit court reviews a rule of an administrative agency.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the extent to which U.S. presidents influence police practice case outcome through the Supreme Court justices they nominate and found that presidents can have an enduring political impact long after they have left office.
Abstract: Utilizing presidential influence theory as a conceptual framework, this study examines the extent to which U.S. presidents effect police practice case outcome through the Supreme Court justices they nominate. Through their confirmed nominees, presidents can have an enduring political impact long after they have left office. Results from a sample of 253 Fourth Amendment police practice cases from 1953–1997 demonstrate that presidents do have an indirect influence on police search and seizure practices. While presidents do not vote in Supreme Court cases, they still have an effect on case outcome because their appointees generally vote along similar ideological lines. Specific results, study limitations, and policy implications for law enforcement agencies are discussed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the eect of endogenous party formation on platform choice in plurality elections is studied, and the authors show that there can neither be full convergence nor extreme polarization of party platforms in equilibrium.
Abstract: The paper studies the eect of endogenous party formation on platform choice in plurality elections. Policy-motivated citizens can form parties in order to share an exogenous cost of running in the general election and nominate a presidential candidate in primary elections. Thus, parties allow like-minded citizens to coordinate their political behavior in order to improve the policy outcome. The paper concentrates on political equilibria with two active parties which exist for all levels of membership cost and electoral uncertainty. In contrast to the citizen candidate model (Besley and Coate 1997) and the classical median voter model (Downs 1957), there can neither be full convergence nor extreme polarization of party platforms in equilibrium. Crucially, allowing for endogenous party formation eliminates the extreme multiplicity of equilibria in the citizen candidate model. This insight is provided most clearly in the benchmark case of full electoral certainty, where a unique political equilibrium with positive platform distance exists.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the selection of internal and external candidates in election 2011 Yogyakarta by the Democratic Party and investigated the reasons why the party did not carry its own cadres and what political preferences influenced the choice during the selecting process of the head region (mayor) of Yyakarta.
Abstract: Recently, The Posture of "gigantic" Democrats is undeniable. As the winning
party of election 2004 and 2009, it has put many of its cadres in the legislative
seats, both local and central levels. Nevertheless, the victory was not similar to
mayor election in Yogyakarta. Despite having a high number of votes at the
legislature, it was democrats Yogyakarta is the second time does not automatically
nominate its own cadres in the elections. Indeed, it is so strange, since the
substance is placed as the �office seeking� political parties (position public office
seekers). Also, It becomes a vote seeking in order to get legitimacyfrom the
people. The chance even exists in the electoral process.
Moving on from the above phenomena, this study aims to explore the
selection of Democrats� internal candidates in election 2011 Yogyakarta. It
studied primarily to understand the context of nomination selection of regional
head (mayor) of Yogyakarta by the democrat party. Secondly, to know the reasons
why the Democrats did not carry its own cadres and what political preferences
influence the choice during the selecting process of the head region (Mayor) of
Yogyakarta 2011.
The flow of this research through two determinants, namely the analysis of
internal and external parties. Chronology of internal analysis conducted by
reviewing the related democrat position and power base of party support. The
flow of external analysis is focused on the political constellation domain and the
impact of direct elections character to support the analysis. This study analyzes
the internal and external carried out simultaneously. Both of these analyzes will
lead to party decisions on the candidate.
The approach used in this study was descriptive qualitative. The data was
collected using the case study method. The results showed that the "reluctant" of
democrat in carrying cadres themselves for various reasons. Most noticeable is the
impact of local political constellation associated with RUUK Yogya that impacted
to unfavorable democrat. It is due to internal forces increasingly vulnerable party.
Coupled by Democratic regeneration failures that led to the phenomenon of
fading ideology, strengthening pragmatism. In addition, the taste was centralized
in decision-making that all comes lumpy in the central leadership (DPP).
The elected Hanafi Rais at once instead cadre�s democratic sovereignty
showed that the selection process was limited to a mere ceremonial. Taking the
logic to win the contestation, the election requires a populist candidate figure. And
because of the availability of volunteers in crisis, for the sake of victory would not
want democrats to be inclusive. The reason, the other party�s candidate has higher
popularity and electability than its own cadres.
TL;DR: In this paper, a mixture of experienced and loyal officers are used to promote bureaucrat-regents to the top ranks of the executive branch of the United States government, using the power of presidential election.
Abstract: Presidents have the power to nominate the top ranks of the executive branch and they use it toward their own goals. Presidents need a mixture of experienced and loyal officers to promote bureaucrat...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors draw on an original dataset on the political experience of party candidates in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to explicitly link the second-order election model to independent actions of political parties.
Abstract: Elections to the European Parliament fall within the category of second-order elections (SOEs). Because these types of elections do not lead to the formation of government, there is less at stake and, consequently, voters behave differently when casting votes. But do also political parties also behave as if there is less at stake as voters do? This article draws on an original dataset on the political experience of party candidates in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to explicitly link the SOE model to independent actions of political parties. The results show that political parties indeed nominate higher quality candidates to the first-order arena, where more is at stake. Moreover, parties in government in first-order arena react to domestic situation and nominate lower quality candidates to EP elections than parties in opposition.
TL;DR: The goal is not only to familiarize attendees with ideas from related conferences such as WWW, ICWSM or CIKM, but also to present ideas and quantitative methods closer to political science such as Poole's and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score for a politician's political orientation.
Abstract: The tutorial will summarize the state-of-the art in the growing area of computational political science. Like many others, this research domain is being revolutionized by the availability of open, big data and the increasing reach and importance of social media. The surging interest on the part of the academic community is matched by intense efforts on the part of political campaigns to use online data in order to learn how to best disseminate information and reach the right potential donors or voters. In this context, a tutorial can summarize existing methods in a fascinating, high-interest area and allow participants with diverse backgrounds to get inspiration from the methods and problems studied. The tutorial will feature seminal research concerning (i) political polarization, (ii) election prediction and polling, and (iii) political campaigning and influence propagation. The goal is not only to familiarize attendees with ideas from related conferences such as WWW, ICWSM or CIKM, but also to present ideas and quantitative methods closer to political science such as Poole's and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score for a politician's political orientation.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the role of political consultants in U.S. House election and assess whether candidate use of the former type increases the ability to win a primary election compared to the latter type.
Abstract: Do political consultants' roles in American elections reflect candidate-centered or party-centered politics? I reassess the argument that American politics is candidate-centered if party organizations cannot nominate congressional candidates. I evaluate an overlooked means of party influence over U.S. House nominations via the market for consultants, many of whom contract with party committees to conduct electioneering activities while others maintain contractual autonomy from party committees. This dichotomy between connected and unconnected consulting firms is a consequence of campaign finance policy contributing to the expansion of parties' coordinated and independent spending efforts. Many political consulting firms that contract with parties also take on House candidates as clients, while other firms with candidate clients do not contract with parties. I assess whether candidate use of the former type—i.e., the party-agent consultant—increases the ability to win a primary election compared t...