TL;DR: These elections are semi-competitive because rural residents are accorded the legal right under the Organic Law of Villagers Committees to choose their candidates, but are not given the choice of different political platforms as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Political scientists have long studied competitive elections and electoral participation as an essential feature of democracy or democratization in developing countries (Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Verba 1980). The implementation of semi-competitive elections in rural post-Mao China since 1988 invariably has attracted great scholarly attention. Indeed, instituting villagers’ self-government by means of direct and contested elections in rural China is one of the most signifi cant political reforms in post-Mao China (Unger 2000: 89). The Organic Law of Villagers Committees (Trial) came into effect in June 1988 after it was passed by the National People’s Congress in November 1987. After ten years of implementation, the trial law was formalized in November 1998.1 Among the signifi cant changes that it brings about, the Organic Law (Permanent) aims to ensure fair and competitive elections by stipulating every villager’s right to directly nominate candidates (i.e. haixuan); election by means of non-equal quota method (i.e. more candidates than the number of offi ces to fi ll: cha e xuanju); and secret balloting (Article 14 of the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees; Jacobson 1999: 4); and by declaring that candidates running for the post of village head should be given a chance to air their views before elections.These elections are semi-competitive because rural residents are accorded the legal right under the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees to choose their candidates, but are not given the choice of different political platforms of different political parties.
TL;DR: Knowledge-based competencies maintain a central role in modern conceptions of elite medical practice, although, contrary to the historical dominance of biomedical abilities, a diverse set of skills and professional aptitudes are also well represented.
Abstract: Background To understand the modern conceptions of elite practice informing the hidden curriculum through use of peer nominations asking clinicians to identify exceptional practitioners. Method We distributed a Web-based survey to Department of Medicine faculty at five universities in North America. Participants were asked to nominate individuals they deemed to be "outstanding practitioners" and to provide reasons. They were then asked to nominate "exceptional diagnosticians" and "exceptional professionals." Results Two hundred eighty-two physicians nominated 558 unique peers as "outstanding practitioners." Justifications included knowledge (45.1%), patient-related interpersonal skill (18.7%), teaching skill (10.8%), and research success (6.8%). More "exceptional diagnostician" nominees were nominated as "outstanding practitioners" (65.2%) relative to "exceptional professional" nominees (56.1%), although the effect size was small (phi = 0.09). Conclusions Knowledge-based competencies maintain a central role in modern conceptions of elite medical practice, although, contrary to the historical dominance of biomedical abilities, a diverse set of skills and professional aptitudes are also well represented.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods and show that the interaction of democratic decentralization (i.e., the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) and party centralization (e.g., the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for subnational office) will produce the best outcomes for public service delivery.
Abstract: As more and more of the world’s states devolve power and resources to sub-national governments, decentralization is emerging as one of the most important global trends of the new century. Yet there is still no consensus on the benefits of decentralization and on how to design institutions that can realize these benefits in individual countries. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”. This theorem, which points to the efficiency benefits of sub-national goods provision, was first developed by Oates (1972) and has influenced virtually all of the recent literature. Our extension suggests that the interaction of democratic decentralization (i.e. the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) and party centralization (i.e. the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for sub-national office) will produce the best outcomes for public service delivery. Democratic decentralization creates the accountability necessary for public goods provision, while party centralization increases the government’s incentives to provide public goods with spillover effects. To test this argument empirically, we make use of a new dataset of sub-national political institutions created for this project. Up to this point, scholars interested in sub-national political institutions have been forced to focus on single cases (especially the United States) or to assume that national level political institutions are replicated at the sub-national level. Our new dataset allows us to examine how the structure of municipal politics influences educational outcomes (our proxy for public goods provision) in nearly 150 countries across nearly 25 years. This empirical analysis, to our knowledge the broadest quantitative exploration of sub-national politics in the literature, provides strong but not absolute support for our theoretical expectations.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods and show that the interaction of democratic decentralization (i.e., the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) and party centralization (e.g., the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for subnational office) will produce the best outcomes for public service delivery.
Abstract: As more and more of the world’s states devolve power and resources to sub-national governments, decentralization is emerging as one of the most important global trends of the new century. Yet there is still no consensus on the benefits of decentralization and on how to design institutions that can realize these benefits in individual countries. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”. This theorem, which points to the efficiency benefits of sub-national goods provision, was first developed by Oates (1972) and has influenced virtually all of the recent literature. Our extension suggests that the interaction of democratic decentralization (i.e. the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) and party centralization (i.e. the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for sub-national office) will produce the best outcomes for public service delivery. Democratic decentralization creates the accountability necessary for public goods provision, while party centralization increases the government’s incentives to provide public goods with spillover effects. To test this argument empirically, we make use of a new dataset of sub-national political institutions created for this project. Up to this point, scholars interested in sub-national political institutions have been forced to focus on single cases (especially the United States) or to assume that national level political institutions are replicated at the sub-national level. Our new dataset allows us to examine how the structure of municipal politics influences educational outcomes (our proxy for public goods provision) in nearly 150 countries across nearly 25 years. This empirical analysis, to our knowledge the broadest quantitative exploration of sub-national politics in the literature, provides strong but not absolute support for our theoretical expectations.
TL;DR: Walmart engages its users through the social media or to be more specific Facebook The company launched 12 days of giving campaign where Facebook users can nominate local organizations for receiving a part of $15 million in grants this holiday season Walmart will accept submissions aiming for the perfect local organizations which are providing…
Abstract: Walmart engages its users through the social media or to be more specific – Facebook The company launched “12 Days Of Giving” campaign where Facebook users can nominate local organizations for receiving a part of $15 million in grants this holiday season Walmart will accept submissions aiming for the perfect local organizations which are providing…
TL;DR: Gagatek et al. as mentioned in this paper reviewed the past record of Europarties and the challenges that they will face in the event these innovations would be implemented, and argued that while limited competition between the candidates for President of the European Commission is to be welcomed, the creation of a pan-European constituency would elevate the expectations of the role of EuroParties to a level which many of them will simply not be capable of dealing with.
Abstract: At the mid-term of the European Parliament’s 2009–2014 legislative session, two relatively recent developments have re-opened the discussion on the prospects for an increased role of Europarties in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. The first concerns a proposal that Europarties nominate their own candidates for the President of the European Commission, whereas the second suggests creating a transnational EU constituency, from which a small percentage of Members of the European Parliament will be elected. This paper critically reviews these developments, both by surveying the past record of Europarties and the challenges that they will face in the event these innovations would be implemented. It is argued that while limited competition between the candidates for President of the European Commission is to be welcomed, the creation of a pan-European constituency would elevate the expectations of the role of Europarties to a level which many of them will simply not be capable of dealing with. Under what conditions should we expect political parties at the EU level to develop? This key question has always stood at the centre of academic and political discussions concerning party politics at the EU level, mainly in relation to the elections to the European Parliament (hereinafter also sometimes referred to as the ‘EP’). Very often the weaknesses of Europarties1 are attrib201 * Wojciech Gagatek, Ph.D. – University of Zurich and on leave from Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw. 1 The term ‘Europarties’ is used in this article to mean transnational, extra-parliamentary federations of national political parties from several EU Member States, united by political affinity. These organizations are therefore not identical with political groups in the EP, although they closely cooperate with one another, being a part of the same political family. The two biggest and most well-known Europarties are the European People’s Party (EPP) and Party of European Socialists (PES). See generally: S.Hix, C.Lord, Political parties in the European Union, Bas-
TL;DR: The current caucus-and-convention system used by political parties in Utah to nominate candidates for the primary and general elections has become quite controversial in recent years as mentioned in this paper, and the central focus of the debate targets the selection of state party delegates who are chosen to represent the rest of the voting population.
Abstract: The current caucus-and-convention system used by political parties in Utah to nominate candidates for the primary and general elections has become quite controversial in recent years. Top political minds in the state have been taking divisive stances on the issue, which was brought to center stage with the recent election cycle in 2010. At the party nominating conventions in May, delegates used their narrowing power to unseat three-term Republican incumbent Senator Bob Bennett and force a primary election for four-term Democratic incumbent Congressman Jim Matheson against challenger Claudia Wright. The central focus of the debate targets the selection of state party delegates who are chosen to represent the rest of the voting population. Advocates of the current system maintain its republican, representative nature, while opponents argue the system as it stands violates the principle of equal protection as presented in the United States Constitution. This paper will present both arguments, as well as an in-depth analysis of the caucus and convention system in Utah, and formulate a conclusion on the constitutionality of the system. I will not specifically call for a complete end to the convention system in Utah, but I will argue for the need for immediate reform in the way delegates are allocated within the convention system.
TL;DR: The single transferable vote (STV) is a system of p referential voting designed to minimize wasted votes as mentioned in this paper, which is a type of voting where a constituency elects two or more candidates per electorate and transfers surplus or unused votes according to the voter's stated preferences.
Abstract: The single transferable vote (STV) is a system of p referential voting designed to minimize wasted votes. In STV, a constituency elects two or more re presentatives per electorate. As a result the const ituency is proportionally larger than a single member constitu ency from each party. Political parties tend to off er as many candidates as they most optimistically could e xpect to win; the major parties may nominate almost as many candidates as there are seats, while the minor parties and independents rather fewer. STV initial ly allocates an elector's vote for her most preferred candidate and then, after candidate have been eithe r elected or eliminated, transfers surplus or unused votes according to the voter's stated preferences ( ties disallowed). The paper deals with different STV cou nting methods so that one can compare among them an d analyze advantages and drawbacks of them. Since in STV ties are disallowed, so that tie-breaking in ST V is important and are discussed in some details. In STV manipulation of voting is sometimes possible and t paper has taken an attempt to give a clear concept of STV manipulation.
TL;DR: The dataset contains digitized treatments of a new species and new continental record for the nominate subgenus in Amazonian Peru.
Abstract: This dataset contains the digitized treatments in Plazi based on the original journal article Erwin, Terry L., Ball, George E. (2011): Badister Clairville 1806: A new species and new continental record for the nominate subgenus in Amazonian Peru (Coleoptera, Carabidae, Licinini). ZooKeys 147: 399-417, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3897/zookeys.147.2117, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3897/zookeys.147.2117
TL;DR: The conference on sauropod gigantism was the best conference ever.
Abstract: I’m just back from a three-day conference in Bonn, Germany, which I unhesitatingly nominate as the best I’ve ever been to. To begin with, the subject was a guaranteed winner: sauropod gigantism.