Abstract: The selection process for U.S. Supreme Court justices has grown ever more complex. Presidents have the constitutional power to nominate justices, and, in doing so, they have employed several criteria at different times, including professional merit, ideological compatibility, and political support by the president and his advisers. Under the Constitution, the Senate has the authority to consent to or reject appointees. In recent decades it has used public hearings to ascertain a nominee's qualifications and, within certain limitations, the nominee's ideological attitudes. This process is intensely political and, as such, it reflects the Supreme Court's broad authority as the final interpreter of the Constitution, many of whose provisions raise highly contestable issues of great political significance. This article discusses these matters in light of Supreme Court appointments over the past century.

Abstract: The results from the 2002 general election in Ireland provide a helpful startinj point for an analysis of the potential causes of the low level of female represen tation in D?il ?ireann. Many observers have focused on political culture as th< critical variable that explains women's historic low level of representation. Bu Ireland's electoral system, which allows for the single-transferable vote (STV) also has numerous effects on the outcomes of elections. Recent research ii other national settings, especially Australia, leads one to expect that STV woulc result in a relatively high number of women elected to Ireland's lower house; bu the number of women TDs elected since the founding of the Free State is sur prisingly small. This finding does not necessarily contradict the results o research in other states that use a similar electoral system. Instead, it indicate; that something beyond the mechanics of the electoral system accounts for th< relatively low number of women elected to the D?il. In examining the selection of new candidates, the perception that there ha; been no inherent need or advantage for a party to nominate more women can didates appears to be a crucial factor in accounting for the low number o women who have been elected. The recent decision by Fianna Fail at their 200^ Ard Fheis, or annual party convention, to nominate women to at least a third o their candidacies by 2014 is a significant move to increase female representatior in the long term, and it may well begin a process that will undermine histori? low levels of women's representation in Ireland. This decision represents < recognition that the Irish political system has been slow to change to incorpo rate more women into legislative positions. Fianna Fail's commitment no doub also reflects a response to the increased success of women candidates in othe: parties.

Abstract: In this article, I study Article 130 of the Ottoman Family Law, which is still applied in Israel, with special attention to developments within the Sharia Court of Appeals between the years 1992 and 2003. I argue that this Court has encouraged reform regarding the issue of niza wa-shiqāq (quarrel and disagreement). This reform has four main components. First, it entails a weakening of the patriarchal concept that limits a woman's role within Muslim society, her authority over her body, and her movements. Second, it eases the burden of proof by lowering evidentiary requirements. Third, it improves the procedure of arbitration by better defining the suitability of the arbitrators and supervising the methods of their work. Fourth, it enables the Sharia Court to nominate arbitrators and control their decisions. This reform has improved women's rights to divorce and has made divorce a relatively easy option. The reform also makes it easier for both men and women to obtain divorce, particularly as compared to other religious minorities in Israel.

Abstract: In this paper we argue that organizational practices within parties, more than national electoral rules, shape legislators' incentives to initiate particularistic (narrow in scope and distributive in nature) legislation. We test this argument using a new dataset which comprises 1,906 bills initiated by the lower chamber in Paraguay (1992-2003) and 5,175 bills initiated by congress in Ecuador (1979-2002). We estimate the propensity of legislators to initiate particularistic bills as a function of district magnitude, the existence of closed lists, seniority, the size of the party, reelection rules, and the internal procedures employed by the party to nominate candidates. Our hypothesis is supported by the analysis. Ecuador, a highly fragmented party system with "amateur" legislators, is usually cited as a case where we should expect most bills to be distributive. However, once we control for strong party leaders, we see that their presence offsets the impact of candidate-centered electoral rules. Paraguay, on the other hand, has a relatively weak president and a closed-list PR system. Thus, it is usually seen as a case where strong parties and few particularistic bills should prevail. However, in practice, the fragmentation of parties into competitive factions has encouraged the proliferation of particularistic bills.

Abstract: On May 23, 2005, a bipartisan group of fourteen senators (known as the Gang of Fourteen) (1) signed an agreement that ended an escalating battle between the Republican and Democratic parties in the Senate. Still in operation, the compromise ensured the votes of three stalled nominations (2) while preserving the right of all senators to filibuster judicial candidates. (3) The Gang of Fourteen also sought to minimize future conflict by sanctioning filibusters only in "extraordinary circumstances" (U.S. Senate 2005). With the immediate controversy resolved, the Senate proceeded to vote on, and confirm, three of the filibustered nominations (Hulse 2005, A14). Recent debate centering on what type of extraordinary circumstances would trigger a filibuster (Babington 2006, A5) has raised concerns over how the two branches can better work together in the appointment process. The Gang of Fourteen contends that the advice and consent clause is the source of the solution. They say the advice component requires a president to consult with the Senate, which "may well serve to reduce the rancor that unfortunately accompanies the advice and consent process in the Senate" (U.S. Senate 2005). In a previous article, I looked at the requirements of the Senate in taking up-or-down votes on a president's judicial nominees (Sollenberger 2004). Finding no constitutional or historical rational for mandatory votes, I now turn my attention to the period before a nomination is formally submitted to the Senate. This stage, which I call the prenomination process, has been a source of continued friction between the two branches. In recent years, the conflict over filibusters has produced calls for greater congressional involvement in the consideration of appointments. This article looks at how much interaction between the branches is warranted at this stage. It seeks to understand how the prenomination process should and does operate. My intent is to demonstrate that there are theoretical, historical, and institutional justifications for a president consulting members of Congress. It is important to understand that the prenomination process is not, and probably never will be, the subject of litigation and thus can never receive declarative judgment from the courts. This problem reveals the difficulty of trying to interpret this aspect of the advice and consent clause. Unfortunately, much of the general study of the Constitution focuses on case law, particularly Supreme Court opinions, to determine how constitutional clauses function. Many scholars regard the Supreme Court as the determinative and final decision-making authority on constitutional questions. The source of this attitude is the 1803 statement by Chief Justice John Marshall: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." (4) This was and still is a faulty point of view. The president and Congress have a substantial impact on how various constitutional provisions are exercised. In fact, when determining the proper practice of making a nomination, the executive and legislative branches have the only say. Interpreting the Advice and Consent Clause As neither the president nor Congress can rely on the Supreme Court to tell them how the prenomination process functions, they must turn to other sources. Looking at the strict letter of the Constitution, there is no clear evidence that the advice and consent clause is meant to include or exclude lawmakers in nomination decisions. Article II, section 2, provides that the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law." The text clearly points to an executive-centered role in nominating, but does it permit congressional involvement? …

Abstract: Most people would acknowledge that religious orientation often influences an individual' s political values or preferences. Members of evangelical Protestant denominations, for example, are more likely to be conservative Republicans than liberal Democrats. Empirical studies in political science reinforce this common sense view.1 But what about judicial decision-making? Do judges' religious orientations influence their votes or decisions when resolving judicial disputes? To me, the answer to this question is obvious: yes. To me, this is common sense. But for many, this assertion is controversial. It challenges basic assumptions about the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.2 Many lawyers, judges, and law professors would insist that neither a judge's political preferences, in general, nor a judge's religious affiliation, more specifically, should affect decision-making. Any such influence would corrupt the judicial process. Judging should be neutral and apolitical. In other words, judges, including United States Supreme Court Justices, should decide cases in accordance with judicial precedents and legal doctrines, not because of political or religious values. Most political scientists, of course, scoff at this internal view of adjudication. They subscribe instead to an external view: at least at the Supreme Court, Justices vote their political preferences. In the words of Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, the leading proponents ofthe so-called attitudinal model: "Simply put, [William] Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal."3 Recently, an incongruous clash between the legal (internal) and the political science (external) views of judicial decision-making shadowed the ill-fated Supreme Court nomination of Harriet Miers. On the one hand, the Bush administration trumpeted Miers' s commitment to judicial restraint, to interpreting the Constitution faithfully, and to following the rule of law. Of course, every Supreme Court nominee must be depicted similarly. When would any administration nominate an individual and then declare, "She will ignore the law and impose her personal preferences on the rest of the country!"? Yet, President Bush also emphasized Miers' s religious affiliation, as if it were a credential qualifying her to be a Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, many conservatives applauded Miers' s religiosity - and her more specific religious commitments-while many liberals worried about the same.4 But why would Miers' s religious orientation matter at all if Supreme Court decision-making were neutral and apolitical? Didn't conservatives and liberals both stress Miers's religiosity exactly because they hoped, or feared, that her religious views would influence her interpretations of legal texts, particularly the Constitution? In this Essay, I will prioritize neither the external nor internal understandings of judicial decision-making. Indeed, I have elsewhere argued that, particularly at the Supreme Court level, both approaches are valid and can be harmonized. They are not necessarily antithetical.5 Nonetheless, I will argue that law professors should pay more attention to empirical studies showing that a judge's religious orientation influences decision-making. To be sure, then, I argue from one side of the law-political-sciencedivide in this particular Essay, but not because the other side is wrong. Rather, I argue from the political science side exactly because law professors so often seem to disregard it. Of course, this disregard can be partly explained by disciplinary boundaries: law professors primarily read legal scholarship, while political scientists primarily read political science scholarship. Even so, each side - the law professors and the political scientists - would profit from listening to what the other is saying. Given the context of this Essay - addressed to an authence mostly of law professors - I do not need to advocate for the acceptance of the internal or legal view of judicial decision-making. …

Abstract: In July 2005, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor retired, but her retirement was expressly effective only upon the nomination and confirmation of her successor. As such, Justice O'Connor served on the Court for more than six additional months while the President nominated three different individuals to her seat and secured the confirmation of Justice Samuel A. Alito. This Note addresses a simple, but unaddressed question: what triggers the President's constitutional power to nominate under the Appropriations Clause? The Note argues that there is a vacancy prerequisite to the operation of the Appointments Clause that requires either an actual vacancy in the office to be filled, or a sufficiently definite and irrevocable anticipated vacancy in such an office. After briefly discussing the relatively recent development of the judicial retirement option, this Note turns to unique issues presented when life-tenured, Article III justices and judges retire. When an irremovable federal judge announces the intention to retire on some future date, that mere announcement does not create a sufficiently definite and irrevocable vacancy to trigger the operation of the Appointments Clause. Instead, the nomination and confirmation of successors upon anticipated judicial vacancies generate tension with the intended operation of the appointments process as well as underlying constitutional norms of judicial independence. Triggering the appointments process on a justice or judge's intention to retire in the future may allow an "incumbent's veto" over nominated successors, skew the advice and consent role of the Senate, delegate a removal-like power to the political branches, and establish a kind of "holdover judge" where vacancies would otherwise allow for the operation of the Recess Appointments Clause. This Note concludes that due to the considerable constitutional difficulties that are presented, the Executive should not assume the power to nominate is constitutionally triggered by anticipated judicial vacancies.

Abstract: This article explores the original understanding of the Constitution's division of power between the President and the Senate with respect to judicial appointments. The President is given the sole power to nominate, and the primary role in appointment, while the Senate was understood as having a much more limited role, serving as a check on the President to prevent appointments for political favor, family connection, etc. What the founders did not envision was a co-equal role for the Senate--that would have undermined the kind of accountability that comes from assigning the principal role to a single individual: the President. And they particularly did not envision a minority of the Senate, using the filibuster, to impose an ideological litmus test on the President's nominees even for nominees who enjoyed the support by a majority of Senators.

Abstract: Previous studies have shown that ecological habitats are the driving force that lead to genetic and morphological divergence in Cynopterus brachyotis populations in Malaysia. In this study, we have shown that the type specimen is clustered with a large-sized C. brachyotis which is normally found in open habitats. Further clustering analysis is necessary to include the five species of Cynopterus in order to verify if there is a new species within the C. brachyotis populations.