Abstract: ADA scores and Nominate scores are used for the first time to examine the influence of spatial voting records on which candidate wins the party’s presidential nomination and on which nominee wins the general election. We find that the most conservative Republican candidate and moderately liberal Democrats were most likely to win their party’s nomination. For general elections we find that the candidate’s spatial record has nearly as much impact on the outcome as economic growth, which has been the focus of most past empirical research. The nominee whose voting record is more moderate is more likely to be elected.

Abstract: For almost 150 years, two facts about American elections seemed incontrovertible. First, campaigns were an integral part of elections. It is the campaign that conveys information to voters who, in turn, use it to reach individual and collective judgments about the relative merits of candidates. The apparent rationality of election outcomes in the United States – candidates presiding over failing economies or unpopular wars lose, while candidates presiding over economic growth and popular wars win – strongly suggested that political information was reaching the public. Furthermore, it validated the perception that campaigns, as the most obvious conduit of this information, were important institutions. Second, the role of parties in democratic processes was no less critical. The parties developed the capacity to contact individual voters, to advertise through partisan newspapers and pamphlets, to publicize and carry out events such as picnics, carnivals, parades, and rallies, and to print and distribute ballots. These capacities cannot be overemphasized. Candidates were recruited and controlled by parties. It is true, of course, that certain popular individuals had a greater say in how the party handled their candidacy and campaign. But it is equally true that parties dominated the relationship. The perceived importance of campaigns and parties was largely unchallenged by practitioners, pundits, and scholars well into the 20th century. Three developments, however, called the conventional wisdom into question. First, as scholars collected data from surveys in the 1940s and 1950s, they began to realize that the American public was not nearly as informed about or interested in politics as they had assumed. This finding shook the broader assumption of voters as attentive observers of the day-to-day events and policy pronouncements of the election campaign. Second, the development of broadcast technologies – especially the emergence and proliferation of television – fundamentally changed the way in which information is disseminated. In particular, by the 1960s television had allowed individuals to communicate and to develop personal connections with an audience without the human resources necessitated by face-toface contact. This, obviously, had the potential to empower candidates at the expense of political parties. Third, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the American parties reformed their internal nomination processes to increase democratic input. The direct result was an almost complete reliance on primary elections to determine candidates. The indirect result was a forfeiture of party control over nominating processes. In the words of Alan Ehrenhalt (1991), candidates were asked to ‘nominate themselves’. Furthermore, as candidates began to contest primary elections, they developed campaign organizations and expertise independent of the political party. These candidates not only were not beholden to the party when they won the nomination, but also often had personal campaign organizations and did not need help from the party as they turned their attention to the general election contest. 13

Abstract: On January 3, 1916, members of the Chicago Bar Association listened attentively as one of the country's best-known attorneys and reformers rose to speak to them. No one in the audience, not even their guest of honor, knew that within a few days the President of the United States would nominate him to become a member of the United States Supreme Court. In his speech that day, Louis Dembitz Brandeis spelled out his views on the problems confronting law in a rapidly changing society, and placed much of the blame for social unrest and popular disrespect for the law on judges who refused to recognize the economic and social developments taking place all around them:

Abstract: This article discusses the implementation of direct elections at provincial and district government in Indonesia. There are two weaknesses of these elections, that is, election system and nomination of candidat. First, candidate who get more than 25 % votes of total votes could win the election, if there is no candidat got more than that. Second, candidate could only be nominated by political parties. It means no ringht for interest groups, busenessmen, or academisions to nominate the candidate to be elected in proviancial dan district government. To solve those problems, election system and nomination of candidate need to be reviewed. Kata kunci : Sistem Pemilihan, Kepala Daerah, pencalonan

Abstract: This article hypothesizes that 28 U.S.C. Section 1, which sets the number of Justices on the United States Supreme Court at nine, is not a constitutionally valid exercise of congressional power because the Constitution does not empower the U.S. House of Representatives to play a role in determining the Court's size. Rather, under the design of the Constitution, the number of Justices on the Supreme Court at any given time will vary depending on the number of Justices the President chooses to nominate and how many of those, if any, members of the Senate opt to confirm.Pursuant to this hypothesis, if a Supreme Court Justice dies or retires, the Senate need not confirm a replacement if it decides that the size of the Supreme Court should be reduced. Similarly, even if the Court has nine active Justices serving on it, the President is free to nominate additional Justices, the Senate can vote to confirm those additional Justices if it deems it appropriate to expand the size of the Supreme Court.The article considers and rejects potential sources of congressional power to enact the statute, including the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I and the Regulations Clause of Article III. It then considers how the constitutionality of the statute would be determined, including who would have standing to bring a challenge. Finally, it examine the consequences of the hypothesis.The article, first published in 2005, is relevant to the current debate between President Obama and some members of the U.S. Senate on the question whether the Senate is obligated to consider a replacement for Justice Scalia during President Obama's term or whether the Senate can instead decide to — at least on a temporary basis — reduce the Court's size to 8 Justices.

Abstract: Abstract In the spring of 1964, and with the prospects for an institute for theoretical astronomy still uncertain, Hoyle ‘s work at Caltech was interrupted by unwelcome news: he heard from his friend and colleague Ray Lyttleton that their Department at Cambridge, Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, looked set to reappoint George Batchelor as Head. Lyttleton had received a circular letter asking him to nominate the next Head of Department, and he reported that Batchelor had ‘himself done so much to have his own name brought forward to the virtual exclusion of all others ‘ and had employed a ‘stratagem of extracting votes prematurely from inexperienced members. ‘