Abstract: There is disagreement over whether or not representatives shirk.Previous studies, however, have used raw interest group scores thatdo not allow for accurate comparisons over time. I take advantageof recently published indexed ADA scores by Groseclose, Levitt, andSnyder (1999) that adjust for temporal differences to test forshirking. I compare results from adjusted ADA scores to Poole andRosenthal's Nominate scores. With a simple, straightforward test ofdyadic representation, I provide additional evidence that shirkingexists among voluntarily retiring members of Congress.

Abstract: In this article, I examine whether divided government has any meaningful impact on the type of judges appointed to the lower federal courts. Specifically, I compare the voting behavior of Clinton judges confirmed before and after the Republicans took majority control of the Senate as well as the voting behavior of judges appointed by President Reagan before and after the Democrats took control of the Senate in the 1980s in order to detect whether judges appointed under divided government are more moderate than those under unified government. Believing that the Senate lacks the resources to have a meaningful impact in shaping judicial ideology on the lower federal courts-as hundreds of judges must be confirmed during the course of a presidential administration-I hypothesize that there is no difference in voting behavior between judges appointed under united and divided government. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that there is no difference in voting behavior between judges appointed during united and divided government in three critical issue areas: search and seizure cases, race discrimination cases, and federalism cases. This was true of judges appointed during the Clinton and Reagan presidencies, and was true in all three issue areas tested. Introduction In this article I look at a discrete issue raised in the context of a larger project on the changing relationship between party politics and the lower federal courts in the modern political era (1964-2000): the effect of a divided government on judicial selection. During the Clinton presidency, the Republican Senate waged a much-publicized battle to block President Clinton's nominees to the lower federal courts, allegedly on ideological grounds: that Clinton's nominees were "judicial activists" and thus unfit to serve on the federal bench. This interparty conflict over judicial ideology on the lower federal courts raises two important research questions. Narrowly, did the Senate's confirmation strategy force Clinton to nominate more-moderate judges? More broadly, does a divided government ever have a moderating effect on the President's nominees to the lower federal courts? I challenge the common wisdom among judicial scholars that divided government always has a moderating effect on the ideological makeup of the federal bench because the President of one party must compromise with an opposing Senate to secure final confirmation of judicial nominees. Background After taking control of the Senate in 1995, the Republican majority used its "advice and consent" power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution (Sec. 2) as a weapon to force Clinton to cede unprecedented power over lower federal court appointments. Beginning in 1995, the Republican majority embarked on a campaign to stall confirmation of all Clinton judicial nominees to the lower federal courts on the ground that Clinton, under a Democratic-controlled Senate, had been appointing "judicial activists" (Lewis 1995). Though delay tactics are not uncommon during a presidential election year, as the Senate majority hopes its presidential candidate will prevail at the polls (Goldman 1997), this particular strategy began immediately upon the Republicans capturing the Senate and continued well past Clinton's reelection to office in 1996 (A. Lewis 1997). Moreover, although past Senate majorities under divided governments have confirmed fewer nominees in election years, this Senate shut down most confirmation proceedings for more than two years.1 Some Republican leaders pressed for further concessions from the Clinton administration. E.g., at a Republican leadership conference, Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) offered a resolution that would have given a small number of Republican senators a veto power over nominees to the Federal Appeals Courts, a privilege that had previously been confined to District Court nominations (N. Lewis 1997). Trying another tactic, some Republican senators sought to lower the number of judgeships on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, rather than give Clinton the opportunity to fill two vacancies on this pivotal Federal Appeals Court. …

Abstract: Anyone having Internet access can contact a scholarship award web site and nominate a student for a scholarship. Scholarships are awarded on the basis of a voting criterion, such as the number of votes cast at the web site, thereby motivating large numbers of supports of nominees to visit the web site.

Abstract: This book presents to English-speaking readers a concept for assuring group representation—one based on gender, however, not race or ethnicity—advocated by many in Europe, but generally rejected out of hand in the United States. Contributors discuss the theory and experience of mandating quotas for the presence of women candidates for national office, whether by compelling electoral procedures that will return a fixed number to elective office or by requiring parties to nominate a minimal percentage. The rough analogue in the United States has been “affirmative action,” which has been applied prevailingly to educational admissions, employment opportunity, job contracts, and only indirectly to voting. Quotas for guaranteed representation provide one among several possible measures available to boost the presence of underrepresented groups in public office. Even before the courts began to dismantle affirmative action as constitutionally suspect, advocates of affirmative action in the United States often separated the procedures they supported from the imposition of fixed quotas.

Abstract: In Gilbert & Sullivan's undeservedly obscure operetta, Utopia Ltd ., English invaders seek to colonize the impressionable citizens of this tropical island paradise by employing “a marvelous philologist who'll undertake to show, that ‘yes’ is but another and a neater form of ‘no.’” In our two-party form of government, citizens are colonized the same way, proving that truth can be just as goofy as fiction. We can say No to one candidate only by saying Yes to the other. That is American democracy, reinforced by laws and courts. In many of our states there are more laws concerned with the institution of political parties than there are laws concerned with the institution of marriage. This legal safety net for the two-party system was reinforced in 2000 by a decisive 7–2 Supreme Court opinion invalidating as unconstitutional a California “blanket primary” law giving voters the power to pick anyone they want—from any political party or any independent—to nominate as their candidate to run in the general election for a particular elective office. The Court called the blanket primary “a stark repudiation of freedom of association” that stripped the political parties of the ability to control their own nominating process.

Abstract: It is now easier for you to nominate outstanding science journalists for AGU's Sullivan and Perlman Awards. These annual awards recognize outstanding articles or broadcasts that effectively explain new research in the Earth and space sciences to lay audiences through the mass media.

Abstract: cultural and developmental 'container,' changes in its levels of women's parliamentary representation must be attributed to some other factors. The conclusion of this study is that the immense increase in the proportion of female representatives in Croatia cannot be attributed to the changes in its electoral system. Rather, it can be ascribed partly to the ideology of the party in power and partly to the ability of women to, with the help of non-governmental organizations, form inter- and intra-party unions which have put significant pressures on all party leaderships to nominate more women to office.

Abstract: Oaths are out of fashion these days. This is an era in which it is widely considered unreasonable to expect the President of the United States to obey basic principles of law and justice, much less to honor something as abstract as an oath. Perjury -- the violation of a legally binding oath -- is publicly defended as proof of the offender's humanity rather than his criminality. And one should not even mention in polite company something as gauche as honoring an oath of marriage. Those pesky vows of marital fidelity were, after all, just words. The next President of the United States will have to speak some ,words before he can assume the office of the presidency. Indeed, the precise words to be spoken are inscribed in the text of the Constitution (as they are not for any other office)(1): "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."(2) Of course, the oath clauses of the Constitution have all but disappeared from the modern scene.(3) Nonetheless, there was a time when keeping promises was something important rather than an occasionally useful device for acquiring and retaining power.(4) As anyone who is familiar with the story of a certain faithful elephant can attest, the older view was right. Keeping your word is good.(5) Breaking your word is bad.(6) This is especially true when your word is formalized through a mechanism, such as an oath, that is specifically designed to emphasize the promise with "I really mean it!" Moreover, if a person acquires property by making a promise that he has no intention of honoring, he commits fraud -- in the eyes of reason and justice if not always in the eyes of the law. The Constitution requires anyone who takes the office of the presidency to swear a very specific oath as a condition of receiving the benefits of that office. Taking those benefits (including the substantial salary and pension that goes with the office) while disregarding the oath is fraud by any plausible understanding of the term. Thus, my advice to the new President is the same advice that I would give to any candidate or officeholder, any witness, or any party to a marriage: Do not take an oath that you are not prepared to keep. The President therefore must have a very clear picture of what the presidential oath of office requires. What does it mean to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution"? Against what threats must the Constitution be preserved, protected, and defended? Assuming that the President conscientiously follows his oath and therefore poses no threat himself, there are three principal threats to the Constitution that the President must address: Congress, the federal courts, and the States.(7) Because the President has no unilateral power directly to control state officials, I will discuss only the President's obligations with respect to Congress and the federal courts. In both cases the President's constitutional duty is clear.(8) I. DEALING WITH CONGRESS Congress's primary function is to make laws.(9) The Constitution assigns the President four principal responsibilities in connection with this lawmaking function: He must recommend to Congress "such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient";(10) he must sign or veto congressional enactments;(11) he must employ "[t]he executive Power"(12) to carry laws into effect;(13) and he must nominate or appoint officers to aid him in these tasks.(14) The President has other responsibilities as well, such as the power to convene or adjourn Congress on occasion(15) and the duty to commission officers,(16) but the initial four are the most important contexts in which the President faces constitutional issues when dealing with Congress. The President's responsibilities under the Recommendation Clause are clear: recommend to Congress the enactment of measures that are constitutional, and recommend the repeal of existing laws that are unconstitutional. …

Abstract: The paper examines the impact exerted upon women's legislative representation by political parties and electoral systems under the specific conditions of the early phase of party system formation. Using the data from the 1995-8 regional legislative elections in Russia, the paper demonstrates that party nomination tends to replace independent candidacy as the major tool of the legislative recruitment of women. By assuming party labels, women enhance their electoral chances to a larger extent than men do. However, incentives to nominate women are most visible among strong organizations that often monopolize the local arenas of party politics. Under electoral systems with large district magnitudes, the overall importance of political parties increases. At the same time, such electoral systems support political fragmentation that makes ticket-balancing strategies less feasible. This explains why gains in party system development generated by electoral systems are not conductive to increased women's representa...