Abstract: The time has come to part. We part as friends--but we part. George P. Shultz Manila, July 1986 WITH THE WORDS, "we part," the Secretary of State for the United States of America informed the Prime Minister of New Zealand that time and American patience had run out. The administration he represented was no longer prepared to tolerate its errant partner's slow, erratic, and inconclusive show of effort to find a mutually acceptable accommodation on which to base return to a full alliance relationship. A firm line was drawn across the ledger of New Zealand's account as a fully paid up and accepted member of the Western alliance. George Shultz' simple words marked an historic turning point in United States/New Zealand relations and, perhaps even more significantly to many New Zealanders, in their nation's unqualified acceptance as a partner engaged in the most vital affairs of the Western world. The Origins of the Dispute In July 1984 a new Labour government came to power in Wellington. The parliamentary elections which brought that about had been called early by Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon (leader of the ruling National Party) when he found his meagre majority in Parliament seriously challenged by two of his members "crossing the floor of the House" to vote in support of a private anti-nuclear bill proposed by a member of the Opposition. Although the bill was defeated (because two disgruntled members of the Opposition countered by crossing the other way) there was a clear possibility that a vote of no confidence in the government would be called on the issue at the first opportunity--that is, when the two dissident Labour members were absent from the House. In that case the government would have fallen. Prime Minister Muldoon decided that effective government was impossible under those circumstances. He, therefore, called an early election. Inevitably, in the circumstances under which the election had been called, the nuclear issue became an important, but not the decisive factor. The National Party candidates did not handle the debate well, preferring to ignore the nuclear issue as much as possible rather than explain its importance to relations with the United States and in preserving peace between the superpowers. It could fairly be said the Labour won that round in the overall bout without a hand being laid on it. National lay down. The greatest concern among voters was that the adoption of an anti-nuclear position would be incompatible with continued membership of ANZUS, on which a substantial majority of voters placed great value. Labour assured the electorate they could have both. In terms of the cliche which became hackneyed during the next year, "they could have their cake and eat it." On the eve of assuming office the Prime Minister designate, David Lange, got from Secretary of State Shultz agreement that the port visit issue should not be put to the test until time had been given to prepare the way. It was agreed that there would be no application for a port visit made within the first six months of his government. As the months rolled by with Lange's public efforts apparently directed at increasing rather than moderating the anti-nuclear fervour--making future US Navy port visits more difficult to arrange--the US government became increasingly suspicious it was being strung along. It, therefore, insisted the issue be put to the test as soon as the agreed six months' pause was up. Recognizing the crunch could be delayed no longer, Lange agreed the United States should nominate a vessel for a port visit in March 1985, following its participation in "Exercise Sea Eagle," to be held off the east coast of Australia. After consultation in Hawaii the destroyer USS Buchanan was selected for nomination and preliminary notice sent to Wellington. In late January 1985, a formal application to make a port visit was lodged through standard diplomatic channels. …