Showing papers on "NOMINATE published in 1986"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the problem lies not with the direct primary itself, but rather with the rules that govern presidential primaries, and that if parties would allocate delegates proportionally to candidates, adopt a preference ballot, and allow independents and "swing" voters to participate, the direct-primary would offer an excellent opportunty to nominate candidates with broad support.
Abstract: Many observers of American politics have been highly critical of the proliferation of primaries that occurred in the 1970s. One of the reasons given for this unfavorable assessment is that the direct primary cannot consistently yield candidates who have broad electoral support--something that is thought necessary to win general elections. And since the major goal of parties is to win elections, this perceived shortcoming is cause for concern. In this article I show, however, that the problem lies not with the direct primary itself, but rather with the rules that govern presidential primaries. In fact, if parties would allocate delegates proportionally to candidates, adopt a preference ballot, and allow independents and "swing" voters to participate, the direct primary would offer an excellent opportunty to nominate candidates with broad support.
36 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: A review of Senate responses to Court nominations reveals considerable variation in pattern and criteria as mentioned in this paper, indicating that the Senate has deferred to presidential judgment even if not necessarily comfortable with the political philosophy or policy values of the nominee.
Abstract: Appointment of a United States Supreme Court Justice is the product of a constitutional power sharing scheme between the executive and legislative branches. The president is empowered to nominate "Judges of the [S]upreme Court." Confirmation, however, is subject to "the Advice and Consent of the Senate." Given the role of seeking out and designating a candidate, the executive branch is an active force in the selection process. The Senate, given largely a veto function, exercises influence to the extent that it may reject a nomination. Disapproval of a nominee, therefore, only occurs if a majority of the Senate becomes sufficiently aroused to mobilize in opposition.Standards for rejecting a nominee are not constitutionally defined. A review of Senate responses to Court nominations reveals considerable variation in pattern and criteria. In its most combative movements, the Senate has spurned multiple nominees for the same seat. At other times, it has deferred to presidential judgment even if not necessarily comfortable with the political philosophy or policy values of the nominee.
14 citations
TL;DR: In view of the advanced age of a number of the current Justices, many commentators speculated that the winner of the election would make several appointments in the upcoming terms An uneven distribution of appointment opportunities among Presidents is a natural consequence of the existing governmental structure as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The 1984 presidential election campaign resounded with references to the future of the Supreme Court.1 In view of the advanced age of a number of the current Justices,2 many commentators speculated that the winner of the election would make several appointments in the upcoming terms An uneven distribution of appointment opportunities among Presidents is a natural consequence of the existing governmental structure. Under the Constitution, the President has the power to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [to] appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court."4 Once appointed, these judges "hold their Offices during good Behaviour"' and receive compensation that may not be "diminished during their Continuance in Office."" Thus, in the absence of changes in the size or structure of the Court, appointments arise simply as Justices resign, retire, or pass away.7 Under this
1 citations