Showing papers on "NOMINATE published in 1973"
TL;DR: Nixon's emphasis on the strict constructionist who avoids law-making is clearly contingent on the assumption that a strict constructioiiist will take a less "friendly" stance toward those accused of crime than was evidenced by the Justices of the Warren Court as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In making his televised announcement on the nominations of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist for seats on the Supreme Court, Richard Nixon observed that he was merely fulfilling a campaign promise. For, he said: ". .. during my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to nominate to the Supreme Court individuals who shared my judicial philosophy which is basically a conservative philosophy. ... As a judicial conservative, I believe some Court decisions have gone too far in the past in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in our society"' (New York Times, 1971: 24C). In 1968, Mr. Nixon said: "We need more strict constructionists on the highest court of the United States. In my view, the duty of a Justice of the Supreme Court is to interpret the law, not to make the law, and the men I support will share that view" (U.S. News & World Report, 1968: 42). These two statements are, to some extent, in conflict-at least by implication. Nixon's emphasis on the strict constructionist who avoids law-making is clearly, however, contingent on the assumption that a strict constructioiiist will take a less "friendly" stance toward those accused of crime than was evidenced by the Justices of the Warren Court. His approach to each of his Supreme Court nominations suggests a belief that judges make policy and that the way to change policy is to change judges. Justices Burger and Blackmun have now been on the Court sufficiently long to provide a preliminary test of Mr. Nixon's ability to choose the appropriate "policy changer." In 37 criminal law cases in which Burger participated in the 1969-70 term, he took a position favorable to government in 26 or 70.1%. In 38 such cases in the 1970-71 term, Burger was favorable to government in 31 or 81.6%. In the same term, Harry Blackmun favored government over the individual in 30 of 38 cases, a rate of 78.9%. And Burger and Blackmun were in agreement in 37 of these 38 cases.' Earl Warren was able to find for government in only 19% of the criminal law cases
12 citations
1 Jan 1973
TL;DR: In the case of the by-elections of 1939-45, there were no contests between the three main parties as mentioned in this paper, and all three parties agreed to preserve national unity by confining party differences to the House of Commons.
Abstract: The by-elections of 1939–45 were so unlike normal by-elections that at first it is hard to make sense of them. There were no contests between the three main parties. At the outbreak of the war, under the Chamberlain government, the Chief Whips of the Liberal, Labour and Conservative parties concluded an electoral truce whereby, when a seat fell vacant, the party which had held it previously would nominate a candidate, while the other two parties agreed not to do so. The agreement was to last for the duration of the war, or until one of the signatories withdrew. The purpose of the arrangement was to preserve a measure of national unity by confining party differences to the House of Commons. When all three parties joined the Churchill Coalition in May 1940, the truce acquired a deeper significance, as an essential precondition of unity within the government. Hence, although the rank and file of the Labour Party at times grew very restless with an arrangement which protected a Conservative majority of over 200, the truce was never seriously in question. Of the 141 seats which fell vacant during the war, 66 were filled unopposed, by the nominee of the incumbent party.
7 citations