Topic
Multiunit auction
About: Multiunit auction is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 637 publications have been published within this topic receiving 21760 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: Hayek as mentioned in this paper argued that the problem of rational economic order is determined by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
Abstract: ONE PARTY TO AN EXCHANGE often knows something relevant to the transaction that the other party does not know. Such asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic activity: for example, in the relationship between employer and employee when the employee's effort cannot be monitored perfectly; between the stockholders and the manager of a firm; between insurer and insured; between a regulated firm and the regulatory agency; between the supplier and the consumers of a public good; between a socialist firm and the central planner; or (as is the subject of this paper) between buyer and seller when the value of the item is uncertain. Forty years ago, F. A. Hayek criticized theories that purport to describe the price system but start from the assumption that individuals have symmetric information: The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek 1945, p. 519)
2,615 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles, and discuss the current 3G spectrum auctions in Germany and the Netherlands.
Abstract: The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction – a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the recent UK mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. We also discuss the current 3G spectrum auctions in Germany and the Netherlands. Auction design is a matter of ‘horses for courses’, not ‘one size fits all’.
813 citations
TL;DR: The authors performed an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible United States one-cent coins at the eBay Web site and found that negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do.
Abstract: This paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible United States one-cent coins at the eBay Web site. Starting with an initial data set of 20,000 auctions, we perform regression analysis on a restricted sample of 461 coins for which we obtained estimates of book value. We have three major findings. First, a seller’s feedback ratings, reported by other eBay users, have a measurable effect on her auction prices. Negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do. Second, minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on the final auction price. In particular, minimum bids appear only to have a significant effect when they are binding on a single bidder, as predicted by theory. Third, when a seller chooses to have her auction last for a longer period of days, this significantly increases the auction price on average.
775 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the first price all-pay auction is used to model rent seeking, where asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium, and the high bidder receives the item.
Abstract: In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widelly used in economics to model rent seeking, RD asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric Equilibrium.
738 citations
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TL;DR: The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series as mentioned in this paper reports on research and policy analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute of International Trade and Public Policy (I2P), which supports research bearing on economic and public policy issues.
Abstract: supports research bearing on economic and public policy issues. The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute. Working papers in this series reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of
684 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 1 |
| 2023 | 3 |
| 2022 | 6 |
| 2020 | 2 |
| 2019 | 2 |
| 2018 | 5 |