TL;DR: MUGI as discussed by the authors is a variant of PANAMA proposed at FSE '98 and has a 128-bit secret key and an initial vector as parameters and generates a 64-bit string per round.
Abstract: We present a new keystream generator (KSG) MUGI, which is a variant of PANAMA proposed at FSE '98 MUGI has a 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit initial vector as parameters and generates a 64-bit string per round The design is particularly suited for efficient hardware implementations, but the software performance of MUGI is excellent as well A speed optimized implementation in hardware achieves about 3 Gbps with 26 Kgates, which is several times faster than AES On the other hand the security was evaluated according to re-synchronization attack, related-key attack, and linear correlation of an output sequence Our analysis confirms that MUGI is a secure KSG
TL;DR: The main results of testing the rate of formation of a key stream with cross-platform implementation of encryption algorithms in the Java programming language on operating systems Windows 10 (x 64), Debian (Kali) and Android (x64) are presented.
Abstract: In this paper, the modern symmetric stream ciphers Enocoro, Decim, Grain, HC, MUGI, Mickey, Rabbit, RC-4, Salsa20, SNOW20, Sosemanuk, Strumok, Trivium, and a block cipher AES, which can be used in streaming encryption modes, are being researched The main results of testing the rate of formation of a key stream with cross-platform implementation of encryption algorithms in the Java programming language on operating systems Windows 10 (x64), Debian (Kali) and Android (x64) are presented Testing was conducted on a portable personal computer (Intel Pentium 3550m 23ГГц, RAM 4Гб (1600MГц)) and on a mobile device, in particular, on a smartphone (Samsung galaxy S7)
TL;DR: The analysis confirms that MUGI is a secure KSG, which is a variant of Panama proposed at FSE '98 and particularly suited for efficient hardware implementations, but the software performance is excellent as well.
Abstract: We present a new keystream generator (KSG) MUGI, which is a variant of PANAMA proposed at FSE '98. MUGI has a 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit initial vector as parameters and generates a 64-bit string per round. The design is particularly suited for efficient hardware implementations, but the software performance of MUGI is excellent as well. A speed optimized implementation in hardware achieves about 3 Gbps with 26 Kgates, which is several times faster than AES. On the other hand the security was evaluated according to re-synchronization attack, related-key attack, and linear correlation of an output sequence. Our analysis confirms that MUGI is a secure KSG.
TL;DR: In this paper, the linearly updated component of the stream cipher MUGI, called the buffer, was analyzed theoretically by using the generating function method and it was proven that the intrinsic response of the buffer without the feedback from the nonlinearly updated components, consists of binary linear recurring sequences with small linear complexity 32 and with extremely small period 48.
Abstract: The linearly updated component of the stream cipher MUGI, called the buffer, is analyzed theoretically by using the generating function method. In particular, it is proven that the intrinsic response of the buffer, without the feedback from the nonlinearly updated component, consists of binary linear recurring sequences with small linear complexity 32 and with extremely small period 48. It is then shown how this weakness can in principle be used to facilitate the linear cryptanalysis of MUGI with two main objectives: to reconstruct the secret key and to find linear statistical distinguishers.
TL;DR: It is proven that the intrinsic response of the buffer, without the feedback from the nonlinearly updated component, consists of binary linear recurring sequences with small linear complexity 32 and with extremely small period 48.
Abstract: The linearly updated component of the stream cipher MUGI, called the buffer, is analyzed theoretically by using the generating function method. In particular, it is proven that the intrinsic response of the buffer, without the feedback from the nonlinearly updated component, consists of binary linear recurring sequences with small linear complexity 32 and with extremely small period 48. It is then shown how this weakness can in principle be used to facilitate the linear cryptanalysis of MUGI with two main objectives: to reconstruct the secret key and to find linear statistical distinguishers.