TL;DR: In this article, Tisak et al. discuss the development of moral behavior and conscience from a socialization perspective, and discuss the social domain theory and social justice in children's moral development.
Abstract: Contents: Preface. Part I: Introduction. Part II: Structuralism and Moral Development Stages. E. Turiel, Thought, Emotions, and Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development. D.K. Lapsley, Moral Stage Theory. S.J. Thoma, Research on the Defining Issues Test. L.J. Walker, Gender and Morality. Part III: Social Domain Theory and Social Justice. J.G. Smetana, Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistencies and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgments. M. Killen, N.G. Margie, S. Sinno, Morality in the Context of Intergroup Relationships. C. Helwig, Rights, Civil Liberties, and Democracy Across Cultures. C. Wainryb, Moral Development in Culture: Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice. Part IV: Conscience and Internalization. J.E. Grusec, The Development of Moral Behavior and Conscience From a Socialization Perspective. R.A. Thompson, S. Meyer, M. McGinley, Understanding Values in Relationships: The Development of Conscience. L. Kuczynski, G.S. Navara, Sources of Innovation and Change in Socialization, Internalization, and Acculturation. Part V: Social Interactional, Sociocultural, and Comparative Approaches. J. Dunn, Moral Development in Early Childhood and Social Interaction in the Family. M.B. Tappan, Mediated Moralities: Sociocultural Approaches to Moral Development. J.G. Miller, Insights Into Moral Development From Cultural Psychology. D.P. Fry, Reciprocity: The Foundation Stone of Morality. P. Verbeek, Everyone's Monkey: Primate Moral Roots. P.H. Kahn, Jr., Nature and Moral Development. Part VI: Empathy, Emotions, and Aggression. P.D. Hastings, C. Zahn-Waxler, K. McShane, We Are, by Nature, Moral Creatures: Biological Bases of Concern for Others. N. Eisenberg, T. Spinrad, A. Sadovsky, Empathy-Related Responding in Children. G. Carlo, Care-Based and Altruistically Based Morality. W.F. Arsenio, J. Gold, E. Adams, Children's Conceptions and Displays of Moral Emotions. M.S. Tisak, J. Tisak, S.E. Goldstein, Aggression, Delinquency, and Morality: A Social-Cognitive Perspective. Part VII: Moral Education, Character Development, and Community Service. D. Hart, R. Atkins, T.M. Donnelly, Community Service and Moral Development. L. Nucci, Education for Moral Development. M.W. Berkowitz, S. Sherblom, M. Bier, V. Battistich, Educating for Positive Youth Development. D. Narvaez, Integrative Ethical Education.
TL;DR: It is concluded that the relationship between age and crime in adolescence and early adulthood is largely explainable, though not entirely, attributable to multiple co-occurring developmental changes.
Abstract: Age is one of the most robust correlates of criminal behavior. Yet, explanations for this relationship are varied and conflicting. Developmental theories point to a multitude of sociological, psychological, and biological changes that occur during adolescence and adulthood. One prominent criminological perspective outlined by Gottfredson and Hirschi claims that age has a direct effect on crime, inexplicable from sociological and psychological variables. Despite the attention this claim has received, few direct empirical tests of it have been conducted. We use data from Pathways to Desistance, a longitudinal study of over 1,300 serious youthful offenders (85.8% male, 40.1% African-American, 34.3% Hispanic, 21.0% White), to test this claim. On average, youths were 16.5 years old at the initial interview and were followed for 7 years. We use multilevel longitudinal models to assess the extent to which the direct effects of age are reduced to statistical and substantive non-significance when constructs from a wide range of developmental and criminological theories are controlled. Unlike previous studies, we are able to control for changes across numerous realms emphasized within differing theoretical perspectives including social control (e.g., employment and marriage), procedural justice (e.g., perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of the legal system), learning (e.g., gang membership and exposure to antisocial peers), strain (e.g., victimization and relationship breakup), psychosocial maturity (e.g., impulse control, self-regulation and moral disengagement), and rational choice (e.g., costs and rewards of crime). Assessed separately, these perspectives explain anywhere from 3% (procedural justice) to 49% (social learning) of the age-crime relationship. Together, changes in these constructs explain 69% of the drop in crime from ages 15 to 25. We conclude that the relationship between age and crime in adolescence and early adulthood is largely explainable, though not entirely, attributable to multiple co-occurring developmental changes.
TL;DR: This article reviewed a recent body of research with infants and toddlers, demonstrating surprisingly sophisticated and flexible moral behavior and evaluation in a preverbal population whose opportunity for moral learning is limited at best.
Abstract: Although developmental psychologists traditionally explore morality from a learning and development perspective, some aspects of the human moral sense may be built-in, having evolved to sustain collective action and cooperation as required for successful group living. In this article, I review a recent body of research with infants and toddlers, demonstrating surprisingly sophisticated and flexible moral behavior and evaluation in a preverbal population whose opportunity for moral learning is limited at best. Although this work itself is in its infancy, it supports theoretical claims that human morality is a core aspect of human nature.
TL;DR: Investigation of pathways that linked students' basicmoral sensitivity, moral disengagement, and defender self-efficacy to different bystander behaviors in bullying situations indicated that compared with boys, girls expressed higher basic moral sensitivity in bullying, lower defender self -efficacy and moral diseng engagement in bullying.
TL;DR: Evidence is reviewed that moral transgressions do genuinely evoke disgust, even when they do not reference physical disgust stimuli such as unusual sexual behaviors or the violation of purity norms, and 3 models of moral disgust are described, each of which aims to provide an account of the relationship between moral and physical disgust.
Abstract: Much like unpalatable foods, filthy restrooms, and bloody wounds, moral transgressions are often described as "disgusting." This linguistic similarity suggests that there is a link between moral disgust and more rudimentary forms of disgust associated with toxicity and disease. Critics have argued, however, that such references are purely metaphorical, or that moral disgust may be limited to transgressions that remind us of more basic disgust stimuli. Here we review the evidence that moral transgressions do genuinely evoke disgust, even when they do not reference physical disgust stimuli such as unusual sexual behaviors or the violation of purity norms. Moral transgressions presented verbally or visually and those presented as social transactions reliably elicit disgust, as assessed by implicit measures, explicit self-report, and facial behavior. Evoking physical disgust experimentally renders moral judgments more severe, and physical cleansing renders them more permissive or more stringent, depending on the object of the cleansing. Last, individual differences in the tendency to experience disgust toward physical stimuli are associated with variation in moral judgments and morally relevant sociopolitical attitudes. Taken together, these findings converge to support the conclusion that moral transgressions can in fact elicit disgust, suggesting that moral cognition may draw upon a primitive rejection response. We highlight a number of outstanding issues and conclude by describing 3 models of moral disgust, each of which aims to provide an account of the relationship between moral and physical disgust.
TL;DR: The current studies provide evidence that 8-month-old infants incorporate, and even privilege, intentions in their social evaluations, and suggest that one requirement for mature moral judgments, the ability to distinguish between intentions and outcomes in morally relevant events, is present by 8months of age.
TL;DR: This model challenges the conclusions of Haidt and colleagues that only conservatives (not liberals) are group oriented and embrace a binding morality and explores the implications of this new model for politics in particular and for the self-regulation versus social regulation of morality more generally.
Abstract: We present a new six-cell Model of Moral Motives that applies a fundamental motivational distinction in psychology to the moral domain. In addition to moral motives focused on the self or another, we propose two group-based moralities, both communal in orientation, but reflecting distinct moral motives (Social Order/Communal Solidarity vs. Social Justice/Communal Responsibility) as well as differences in construals of group entitativity. The two group-based moralities have implications for intragroup homogeneity as well as intergroup conflict. Our model challenges the conclusions of Haidt and colleagues that only conservatives (not liberals) are group oriented and embrace a binding morality. We explore the implications of this new model for politics in particular and for the self-regulation versus social regulation of morality more generally.
TL;DR: Some managers and entrepreneurs decide to act in ways that result in harm to the natural environment, despite the fact that such actions violate their own values as discussed by the authors. But they do not consider the consequences of their actions.
Abstract: Some managers and entrepreneurs decide to act in ways that result in harm to the natural environment, despite the fact that such actions violate their own values. Building on moral self-regulation ...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors reviewed the relevant pedagogical and psychological literature in order to shed light on these questions and found that role modelling is rarely used as an explicit teaching method and that only a very small percentage of adolescents recognize teachers as role models.
Abstract: Character education considers teachers to be role models, but it is unclear what this means in practice. Do teachers model admirable character traits? And do they do so effectively? In this article the relevant pedagogical and psychological literature is reviewed in order to shed light on these questions. First, the use of role modelling as a teaching method in secondary education is assessed. Second, adolescents’ role models and their moral qualities are identified. Third, the psychology of moral learners is critically examined, using Bandura’s social learning theory as point of departure. It turns out that role modelling is rarely used as an explicit teaching method and that only a very small percentage of adolescents recognises teachers as role models. If role modelling is to contribute to children’s moral education, teachers are recommended to explain why the modelled traits are morally significant and how students can acquire these qualities for themselves.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of moral response to moral responsibility, which they call the theory of "building blocks" and "morality of moral responsibility", based on the idea of building blocks.
Abstract: PART I. BUILDING BLOCKS PART II. A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY APPENDIX: ACTIVITY AND ORIGINATION
TL;DR: The authors argue that putting a price on every human activity erodes certain moral and civic goods worth caring about, and therefore need a public debate about where markets serve the public good and where they don't belong.
Abstract: In my book What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012), I try to show that market values and market reasoning increasingly reach into spheres of life previously governed by nonmarket norms. I argue that this tendency is troubling; putting a price on every human activity erodes certain moral and civic goods worth caring about. We therefore need a public debate about where markets serve the public good and where they don't belong. In this article, I would like to develop a related theme: When it comes to deciding whether this or that good should be allocated by the market or by nonmarket principles, economics is a poor guide. Deciding which social practices should be governed by market mechanisms requires a form of economic reasoning that is bound up with moral reasoning. But mainstream economic thinking currently asserts its independence from the contested terrain of moral and political philosophy. If economics is to help us decide where markets serve the public good and where they do...
TL;DR: This paper investigated the causes and consequences of elite moral rhetoric in the debate over stem cell research and found that moral rhetoric has had a substantial effect on public attitudes regarding the fundamental considerations underpinning the debate.
Abstract: Moral considerations underlie partisan and ideological identification along with a variety of political attitudes, yet we know little about how elites strategically appeal to the public’s moral intuitions. Building on Moral Foundations Theory, we investigate the causes and consequences of elite moral rhetoric in the debate over stem cell research. Through content analysis of 12 years of coverage in the New York Times, we find that proponents and opponents of stem cell research engage in distinctive patterns of moral rhetoric and place different weight on the foundations. We also demonstrate that the prevalence of moral rhetoric increases during periods of legislative activity, and we find some evidence that moral rhetoric increases in response to the opposing side’s use of moral language. Merging our content analysis with seven national surveys, the analysis shows that moral rhetoric has had a substantial effect on public attitudes regarding the fundamental considerations underpinning the debate.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the process that leads people to offer or omit help in response to an explicit request for assistance, taking into account both emotional and cognitive factors, and highlight the significance of this factor in the avoidance of moral responsibility towards others in need.
TL;DR: The authors examined how moral standards and moral judgements play a role in the regulation of individual behaviour within groups and social systems, taking into account processes of social identification and self-categorisation, as these help to understand how adherence to moral standards may be functional as a way to improve group-level conceptions of self.
Abstract: In recent years social psychologists have displayed a growing interest in examining morality—what people consider right and wrong. The majority of work in this area has addressed this either in terms of individual-level processes (relating to moral decision making or interpersonal impression formation) or as a way to explain intergroup relations (perceived fairness of status differences, responses to group-level moral transgressions). We complement this work by examining how moral standards and moral judgements play a role in the regulation of individual behaviour within groups and social systems. In doing this we take into account processes of social identification and self-categorisation, as these help us to understand how adherence to moral standards may be functional as a way to improve group-level conceptions of self. We review a recent research programme in which we have investigated the importance of morality for group-based identities and intra-group behavioural regulation. This reveals convergent...
TL;DR: The association between social class and utilitarian judgment was reduced in a condition in which empathy was induced, but not in a control condition, suggesting that reduced empathy helps account for the utilitarianism of upper-class individuals.
Abstract: Though scholars have speculated for centuries on links between individuals' social class standing and approach to moral reasoning, little systematic research exists on how class and morality are associated. Here, we investigate whether the tendency of upper-class individuals to exhibit reduced empathy makes them more likely to resist intuitionist options in moral dilemmas, instead favoring utilitarian choices that maximize the greatest good for the greatest number. In Study 1, upper-class participants were more likely than lower-class participants to choose the utilitarian option in the footbridge dilemma, which evokes relatively strong moral intuitions, but not in the standard trolley dilemma, which evokes relatively weak moral intuitions. In Study 2, upper-class participants were more likely to take resources from one person to benefit several others in an allocation task, and this association was explained by their lower empathy for the person whose resources were taken. Finally, in Study 3, the association between social class and utilitarian judgment was reduced in a condition in which empathy was induced, but not in a control condition, suggesting that reduced empathy helps account for the utilitarianism of upper-class individuals.
TL;DR: In this paper, moral decoupling, a previously unstudied moral reasoning process by which judgments of performance are separated from judgments of morality, is proposed to allow consumers to support a transgressor's performance while simultaneously condemning his or her transgressions.
Abstract: What reasoning processes do consumers use to support public figures who act immorally? Existing research emphasizes moral rationalization, whereby people reconstrue improper behavior in order to maintain support for a transgressor. In contrast, the current research proposes that people also engage in moral decoupling, a previously unstudied moral reasoning process by which judgments of performance are separated from judgments of morality. By separating these judgments, moral decoupling allows consumers to support a transgressor’s performance while simultaneously condemning his or her transgressions. Five laboratory studies demonstrate that moral decoupling exists and is psychologically distinct from moral rationalization. Moreover, because moral decoupling does not involve condoning immoral behavior, it is easier to justify than moral rationalization. Finally, a field study suggests that in discussions involving public figures’ transgressions, moral decoupling may be more predictive of consumer support (a...
TL;DR: This paper found that actors who make an immoral decision quickly (vs. slowly) are evaluated more negatively than those who arrive at a moral decision slowly, while those who make a decision quickly receive particularly positive moral character evaluations.
Abstract: It has been suggested that people attend to others’ actions in the service of forming impressions of their underlying dispositions. If so, it follows that in considering others’ morally relevant actions, social perceivers should be responsive to accompanying cues that help illuminate actors’ underlying moral character. This article examines one relevant cue that can characterize any decision process: the speed with which the decision is made. Two experiments show that actors who make an immoral decision quickly (vs. slowly) are evaluated more negatively. In contrast, actors who arrive at a moral decision quickly (vs. slowly) receive particularly positive moral character evaluations. Quick decisions carry this signal value because they are assumed to reflect certainty in the decision (Experiments 1 and 2), which in turn signals that more unambiguous motives drove the behavior (Experiment 2), which in turn explains the more polarized moral character evaluations. Implications for moral psychology and the law are discussed.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors trace the history of moral psychology within broader intellectual trends of psychology and explain why I came to believe that moral psychology had to change with the times, and offer three principles that should characterize moral psychology in the twenty-first century: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second, there's more to morality than harm and fairness and (3) morality binds and blinds.
Abstract: Lawrence Kohlberg slayed the two dragons of twentieth-century psychology—behaviorism and psychoanalysis. His victory was a part of the larger cognitive revolution that shaped the world in which all of us study psychology and education today. But the cognitive revolution itself was modified by later waves of change, particularly an ‘affective revolution’ that began in the 1980s and an ‘automaticity revolution’ in the 1990s. In this essay I trace the history of moral psychology within the broader intellectual trends of psychology and I explain why I came to believe that moral psychology had to change with the times. I explain the origins of my own social intuitionist model and of moral foundations theory. I offer three principles that I think should characterize moral psychology in the twenty-first century: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second, (2) There’s more to morality than harm and fairness and (3) Morality binds and blinds.
TL;DR: This article found that prior CSR is positively associated with subsequent CSIR because the moral credits achieved through CSR enable leaders to engage in less ethical stakeholder treatment, and that leaders' moral identity symbolization, or the degree to which being moral is expressed outwardly to the public through actions and behavior, will moderate the CSR-CSIR relationship.
Abstract: Although managers and researchers have invested considerable effort into understanding corporate social responsibility (CSR), less is known about corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). Drawing on strategic leadership and moral licensing research, we address this gap by considering the relationship between CSR and CSiR. We predict that prior CSR is positively associated with subsequent CSiR because the moral credits achieved through CSR enable leaders to engage in less ethical stakeholder treatment. Further, we hypothesize that leaders� moral identity symbolization, or the degree to which being moral is expressed outwardly to the public through actions and behavior, will moderate the CSR�CSiR relationship, such that the relationship will be stronger when CEOs are high on moral identity symbolization rather than low on moral identity symbolization. Through an archival study of 49 Fortune 500 firms, we find support for our hypotheses.
TL;DR: This article found that high moral identifiers are more likely to show a compensatory reaction rather than a consistency reaction to their previous dishonesty, which is consistent with the concept of moral identity.
TL;DR: A review of research findings that are in line with three increasingly strong claims about the role of emotion in moral judgment, highlighting recurring themes across these three categories of evidence, and identifying some open questions and areas for future research.
Abstract: Research in psychology and cognitive science has consistently demonstrated the importance of emotion in a wide range of everyday judgments, including moral judgment. Most current accounts of moral judgment hold that emotion plays an important role, but the nature and extent of this role are still debated. We outline three increasingly strong claims about the role of emotion in moral judgment and assess the evidence for each. According to the first and least controversial claim, emotions follow from moral judgments, such that witnessing immorality can lead to negative emotions and witnessing moral virtue can lead to positive ones. According to the second claim, emotions amplify moral judgments, for instance, by making immoral acts seem even more immoral. Finally, on the last claim, emotions can actually moralize nonmoral behaviors-that is, they give nonmoral acts a moral status. Although this claim seems to be the most intriguing one theoretically, empirical support for it is still very limited. In this review, we discuss research findings that are in line with each of these views, we highlight recurring themes across these three categories of evidence, and we identify some open questions and areas for future research. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:169-178. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1216 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
TL;DR: Moshman as mentioned in this paper discusses the right and the good in the moral domain and the importance of social perspective taking, reversibility, and Morality in early childhood and adult moral development.
Abstract: Foreword by David Moshman Preface and Acknowledgments About the Author 1. Introduction Social Perspective Taking, Reversibility, and Morality The Right and the Good: The Moral Domain Introducing Chapters 3 through 10 2. Beyond Haidt's New Synthesis Three themes Conclusion and Critique 3. "The Right" and Moral Development: Fundamental Themes of Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Approach Early Childhood Superficiality Beyond Early Childhood Superficiality Stages of Moral Judgment Development Evaluating Haidt's Challenge 4. Kohlberg's Theory: A Critique and New View Background Kohlberg's Overhaul of Piaget's Phases Adult Moral Development in Kohlberg's Theory A Critique and New View Conclusion 5. "The Good" and Moral Development: Hoffman's Theory The Empathic Predisposition Modes and Stages of Empathy Empathy and Prosocial Behavior: Cognitive Complications and Empathy's Limitations Empathy, Its Cognitive Regulation, and Affective Primacy The Empathic Predisposition, Socialization, and Moral Internalization Conclusion and Critique 6. Moral Development, Moral Identity, and Prosocial Behavior Prosocial Behavior: The Rescue Individual Differences in Prosocial Behavior Conclusion: A Spurious "Moral Exemplar" 7. Understanding Antisocial Behavior Limitations of Antisocial Youths A Case Study 8. Treating Antisocial Behavior The Mutual Help Approach Remedying the Limitations and Generating Synergy: The Cognitive Behavioral Approach Social Perspective-Taking for Severe Offenders 9. Beyond the Theories: A Deeper Reality? Two Case Studies A Deeper Reality? Moral Insight, Inspiration, and Transformation Conclusion 10. Conclusion Revisiting the Issue of Moral Motivation and Knowledge Moral Perception and Reality Appendix References Author Index Subject Index
TL;DR: This paper studied how different moral dispositions shape low-income, working-class residents' consumption practices and status negotiations in a trailer-park neighborhood and revealed five moral identities that shape the residents' social construction of status within the microcultural context of a trailer park.
Abstract: Examinations of the moral and ethical dimensions in identity construction are scant in consumer research. This ethnography of a trailer-park neighborhood investigates how different moral dispositions shape low-income, working-class residents' consumption practices and status negotiations. Drawing from Bourdieu's conceptualization of habitus and cultural capital, the authors extend this theory by foregrounding the moral aspects of habitus and demonstrate how morally oriented worldviews are enacted through consumption practices and social evaluations within everyday communities. The study reveals five moral identities that shape the residents' social construction of status within the microcultural context of a trailer park. These findings point to the multiplicity and richness of social-class-based dispositions as well as the importance of studying micro-level contexts to better understand macrodynamics.
TL;DR: The authors investigated moral disengagement, morally based self-esteem, age, and gender as predictors of traditional bullying and cyberbullying, and found that age predicted cyberbulliness, with a greater tendency for older students to bully than younger students, while gender predicted involvement in traditional bullying.
Abstract: The current study investigated moral disengagement, morally based self-esteem, age, and gender as predictors of traditional bullying and cyberbullying. The participants were 210 Australian school students aged 12 to 15, evenly split between males and females. Salient predictors of traditional bullying were overall moral disengagement, and the specific practices of moral justification and diffusion of responsibility. Furthermore, overall moral disengagement and the specific practices of diffusion of responsibility and attribution of blame predicted cyberbullying. Morally based self-esteem did not influence either form of bullying. Age predicted cyberbullying, with a greater tendency for older students to bully than younger students, while gender predicted involvement in traditional bullying, with boys more likely to bully than girls. Implications for antibullying interventions in schools are suggested.
TL;DR: In this paper, a moral economy approach is proposed that is informed by Karl Polanyi and E. P. Thompson, who capture the ubiquitous tension between a stable, moral and human society and the econom...
Abstract: In this article a moral economy approach is proposed that is informed by Karl Polanyi and E. P. Thompson, who capture the ubiquitous tension between a stable, moral and human society and the econom...
TL;DR: Self-determination theory constructs, namely, autonomy-supportive and controlling motivational climates and autonomous and controlled motivation, were related to attitudes toward performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sport and drug-taking susceptibility and moral disengagement was a strong predictor of positive attitudes toward PEDs.
Abstract: We examined whether constructs outlined in self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2002), namely, autonomy-supportive and controlling motivational climates and autonomous and controlled motivation, were related to attitudes toward performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sport and drug-taking susceptibility. We also investigated moral disengagement as a potential mediator. We surveyed a sample of 224 competitive athletes (59% female; M age = 20.3 years; M = 10.2 years of experience participating in their sport), including 81 elite athletes. Using structural equation modeling analyses, our hypothesis proposing positive relationships with controlling climates, controlled motivation, and PEDs attitudes and susceptibility was largely supported, whereas our hypothesis proposing negative relationships among autonomous climate, autonomous motivation, and PEDs attitudes and susceptibility was not supported. Moral disengagement was a strong predictor of positive attitudes toward PEDs, which, in turn, was a strong predictor of PEDs susceptibility. These findings are discussed from both motivational and moral disengagement viewpoints.
TL;DR: This paper found that the story of engagement with moral beauty may be considered a story of love and connectedness; it is uniquely predictive of caring for, being empathic of, loving, and valuing benevolence toward others.
Abstract: Aristotle considered moral beauty to be the telos of the human virtues. Displays of moral beauty have been shown to elicit the moral emotion of elevation and cause a desire to become a better person and to engage in prosocial behavior. Study 1 (N = 5380) shows engagement with moral beauty is related to several psychological constructs relevant to moral education, and structural models reveal that the story of engagement with moral beauty may be considered a story of love and connectedness; it is uniquely predictive of caring for, being empathic of, loving, and valuing benevolence toward others. Study 2 (N = 542) demonstrates that the personality trait of engaging with moral beauty moderates susceptibility to elevation. These studies suggest that encouraging students to engage with moral beauty might increase their desire to become better persons and to do good. Convergent with other research showing that moral emotions motivate moral behavior, we suggest that moral education programs increase their focus ...
TL;DR: It is recommended that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and communicating their values and responsibilities in situations of moral distress and that efforts toward shifting the goal of health care away from the prolongation of life at all costs to the relief of suffering to diminish the moral distress that is a common response to aggressive care at end of life.
Abstract: Moral distress has been written about extensively in nursing and other fields. Often, however, it has not been used with much theoretical depth. This paper focuses on theorizing moral distress using feminist ethics, particularly the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann. Incorporating empirical findings, we argue that moral distress is the response to constraints experienced by nurses to their moral identities, responsibilities, and relationships. We recommend that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and communicating their values and responsibilities in situations of moral distress. We also discuss the importance of nurses creating “counterstories” of their work as knowledgeable and trustworthy professionals to repair their damaged moral identities, and, finally, we recommend that efforts toward shifting the goal of health care away from the prolongation of life at all costs to the relief of suffering to diminish the moral distress that is a common response to aggressive care at end-of-life.