TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that important inequalities of power remain unanalysed by traditional social theories, and that the concept of social closure, suggested by Max Weber, provides a means of capturing the common and essential features of types of subordination that appear quite different on the surface.
Abstract: The development and inequalities of society have traditionally been analysed in terms of stratification and class. Raymond Murphy argues that important inequalities of power remain unanalysed by traditional social theories, and that the concept of social closure, suggested by Max Weber, provides a means of capturing the common and essential features of types of subordination that appear quite different on the surface. Seemingly unrelated forms of domination based on private property, the bureaucratic Communist Party, credentials, status, race, language, and gender, are tied together by Weber's notion of social closure as the underlying principle of all systems of inequality in power. The book suggests improvements to the conceptions of closure, power, and social class, and turns closure theory back on itself to analyse the scholarly field. It develops a conceptualization of the rules of social closure and their transformation, and compares the Weberian concept of closure with the Marxian concept of exploitation. Raymond Murphy examines the way in which Western society, in the elusive pursuit of mastery and control, has transformed its codes of social closure by the process of formal rationalization. He shows how this formal rationalization of monopolization and exclusion has led to substantively irrational results. Professor Murphy's conclusion - that Weber's theories of social closure and rationalization provide a conceptual basis for going beyond a narrow focus on one particular means of monopolization to an analysis of monopolization and exclusion per se - marks an important and original advance in the development of the ideas of Weber and in social theory generally.
TL;DR: In this article, the basic economics of antitrust and the history and ideology in Antitrust Policy are discussed, as well as the substance of anti-trust policies towards collusion and oligopoly.
Abstract: Policy and Measurement: Basic Economics of Antitrust; History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy; Market Power and Market Definition; The Substance of Antitrust: Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly; Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and Rule of Reason; Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt; Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases; Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution; Mergers of Competitors; Conglomerate Mergers; Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act; Antitrust as a Regulatory Institution: Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws; Private Enforcement; Damages; Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government; Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy; Antitrust Federalism and the State Action Doctrine; Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws.
TL;DR: The early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable-goods theory as discussed by the authors : Swan, Coase, and Akerlof on optimal durability, time inconsistency, and adverse selection.
Abstract: The early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable-goods theory--Swan (1970, 1971) and Sieper and Swan (1973) on optimal durability, Coase (1972) on time inconsistency, and Akerlof (1970) on adverse selection. This paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions, where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real-world phenomena. In addition to the ideas found in the contributions of Swan, Coase, and Akerlof, topics covered include why producers sometimes practice "planned obsolescence," the role of adverse selection in new-car leasing, and reasons for aftermarket monopolization.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the political economy of regulation, and propose a model for economic and social regulation of business in the United States, including rate level (Profit Level) and rate structure regulation.
Abstract: I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REGULATION OF BUSINESS. 1. The Political Economy of Regulation. 2. Economics and Regulation. II. REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION. 3. Public Utility Regulation. 4. Rate Level (Profit Level) Regulation. 5. Rate-Structure Regulation. 6. Telecommunications and Natural Gas: Regulation of Monopoly. 7. Transportation: Regulation of Competition. III. REGULATION OF COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY VIA ANTITRUST. 8. Antitrust Regulation. 9. Horizontal Restraints of Trade. 10. Monopolization: Monopoly Plus Predation. 11. Horizontal Mergers. 12. Vertical Restraints. IV. REGULATION TO PROTECT PERSONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT. 13. Social Regulation. 14. Environmental Protection. 15. Worker and Consumer Protection.