Topic
Mohring effect
About: Mohring effect is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 23 publications have been published within this topic receiving 924 citations. The topic is also known as: Mohring economies.
Papers
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that DECLINING MASS TRANSIT QUALITY is an example of what happens when DEMAND DECLINES for a COMMODITY whose production process involves increasing returns to scale.
Abstract: THIS PAPER SHOWS THAT DECLINING MASS TRANSIT QUALITY IS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT HAPPENS WHEN DEMAND DECLINES FOR A COMMODITY WHOSE PRODUCTION INVOLVES INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE, AND SUGGESTS THE MAGNITUDE OF MASS TRANSIT SCALE ECONOMIES AND HENCE THE LOWER BOUND FOR AN OPTIMAL TRANSIT SUBSIDY POLICY. THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG SHORT- AND LONG-RUN COST SCHEDULES, THE NATURE OF THE SUBSIDY REQUIRED IF SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST PRICING IS TO BE PRACTICED BY AN INCREASING RETURNS ACTIVITY, AND THE NATURE OF INCREASING RETURNS IN BUS OPERATIONS ARE DISCUSSED. THIS DEVELOPMENT IS USED AS A BASE TO PRESENT COST MODELS FOR "STEADY STATE" AND "FEEDER" BUS ROUTES. A SUBSIDY TO URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS REFLECTING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AVERAGE AND MARGINAL COSTS WOULD PROBABLY NOT ELIMINATE THE DECLINE IN MASS TRANSIT USAGE THAT HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED IN VIRTUALLY ALL URBAN AREAS. STILL, A WELFARE MAXIMIZING SUBSIDY POLICY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SLOW THIS MOVEMENT AND MIGHT EVEN HASTEN THE ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES THAT PROMISE VASTLY IMPROVED SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS.
787 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the dynamics of the line service and show how the emergence of a vicious or virtuous cycle depends on the total number of potential passengers, the share of captive riders, and bus capacity.
Abstract: It has been frequently noted that in a non-regulated environment the development of public transport service is self-adjusting: Faced with decreasing demand, operators will tend to reduce service to cut costs, resulting in a decrease in the level-of-service, which then triggers a further drop in demand. The opposite may also occur: high demand will induce the operator to increase supply, e.g. through an increase in frequency, which results in a higher level-of-service and a subsequent increase in passenger numbers, triggering another round of service improvements. This paper adds to the literature by presenting an analytic model for analyzing these phenomena that we call vicious and virtuous cycles. Based on field data regarding passengers’ variation in willingness-to-wait for a public transport service, we investigate the dynamics of the line service and show how the emergence of a vicious or virtuous cycle depends on the total number of potential passengers, the share of captive riders, and bus capacity. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the findings for the planning of public transport services.
55 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, a modification to van Reeven's model is proposed to make the model more realistic, and the argument is made that the Mohring effect is, in fact, a valid argument for subsidization.
Abstract: In 2008, Peran van Reeven suggested that the existence of economies of scale on public transport users’ time costs does not justify subsidies, a reversal of findings according to Mohring-Jansson. This article is one of two in this issue refuting van Reeven’s conclusions. The results obtained by van Reeven’s model are shown to be dependent on a strong assumption of demand. The article examines demand properties in the original model and presents a slightly more realistic model. By introducing a modification to make the model more realistic, the argument is made that the Mohring effect is, in fact, a valid argument for subsidization.
44 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of public transit service under monopoly when potential users differ in their willingness to pay and value of time is presented, and four types of regulatory policies are considered: fare regulation, frequency regulation, goal or objective function regulation, and fiscal regulation whereby the operator receives a subsidy based on consumers surplus or demand.
Abstract: We present a model of public transit service under monopoly when potential users differ in their willingness to pay and value of time. The transit operator chooses service frequency and the fare to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers’ surplus. Profit-maximizing and social-surplus-maximizing frequency decisions are compared using a unified framework that includes results of previous studies as special cases. The prevalence of the Mohring Effect and the need for subsidization are investigated. Four types of regulatory policies are then considered: fare regulation, frequency regulation, goal or objective function regulation, and fiscal regulation whereby the operator receives a subsidy based on consumers’ surplus or demand. A numerical example is used to assess the relative efficiency of the regulatory regimes, and illustrate how the solutions depend on the joint distribution of willingness to pay and value of time.
37 citations
TL;DR: It is shown that directness increases whenever lines structure changes as a response to larger demand volumes - increasing DSE at the particular value of flow where this change occurs - because systems with more direct lines for each OD pair diminish in-vehicle times while increasing waiting times mildly, such that users are benefiting by lower travel times and operators are benefited by lower idle capacity.
35 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 1 |
| 2020 | 1 |
| 2019 | 2 |
| 2018 | 2 |
| 2017 | 2 |
| 2016 | 1 |