About: Matthew effect is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 189 publications have been published within this topic receiving 11916 citations. The topic is also known as: accumulated advantage & Matthew effect (education).
TL;DR: The psychosocial conditions and mechanisms underlying the Matthew effect are examined and a correlation between the redundancy function of multiple discoveries and the focalizing function of eminent men of science is found—a function which is reinforced by the great value these men place upon finding basic problems and by their self-assurance.
Abstract: This account of the Matthew effect is another small exercise in the psychosociological analysis of the workings of science as a social institution. The initial problem is transformed by a shift in theoretical perspective. As originally identified, the Matthew effect was construed in terms of enhancement of the position of already eminent scientists who are given disproportionate credit in cases of collaboration or of independent multiple discoveries. Its significance was thus confined to its implications for the reward system of science. By shifting the angle of vision, we note other possible kinds of consequences, this time for the communication system of science. The Matthew effect may serve to heighten the visibility of contributions to science by scientists of acknowledged standing and to reduce the visibility of contributions by authors who are less well known. We examine the psychosocial conditions and mechanisms underlying this effect and find a correlation between the redundancy function of multiple discoveries and the focalizing function of eminent men of science—a function which is reinforced by the great value these men place upon finding basic problems and by their self-assurance. This self-assurance, which is partly inherent, partly the result of experiences and associations in creative scientific environments, and partly a result of later social validation of their position, encourages them to search out risky but important problems and to highlight the results of their inquiry. A macrosocial version of the Matthew principle is apparently involved in those processes of social selection that currently lead to the concentration of scientific resources and talent ( 50 ).
TL;DR: Cumulative advantage as discussed by the authors refers to the social processes through which various kinds of opportunities for scientific inquiry as well as the subsequent symbolic and material rewards for the results of that inquiry tend to accumulate for individual practitioners of science, as they do also for organizations engaged in scientific work.
Abstract: HE SUBJECT OF THIS ESSAY is a problem in the sociology of science that has long been of interest to me. That problem, a candid friend tells me, is somewhat obscured by the formidable title assigned to it. Yet, properly deciphered, the title is not nearly as opaque as it might at first seem. Consider first the signal emitted by the Roman numeral II in the main title. It informs us that the paper follows on an earlier one, “The Matthew Effect in Science, ” which I finally put into print a good many years ago.’ The ponderous, not to say lumpy, subtitle goes on to signal the direction of this follow-on. The first concept, cumulative advantage, applied to the domain of science, refers to the social processes through which various kinds of opportunities for scientific inquiry as well as the subsequent symbolic and material rewards for the results of that inquiry tend to accumulate for individual practitioners of science, as they do also for organizations engaged in scientific work. The concept of cumulative advantage directs our attention to the ways in which initial comparative advantages of trained capacity successive increments of 7 s
TL;DR: Based on interviews with Nobel laureates, Merton^ observes that eminent scientists get disproportionately great credit for their contributions to science, while relatively unknown scientists tend to get disproportionately little credit for comparable contributions.
Abstract: Based on interviews with Nobel laureates, Merton^ observes that eminent scientists get disproportionately great credit for their contributions to science, while relatively unknown scientists tend to get disproportionately little credit for comparable contributions. Merton also proposes and supports the related hypothesis that a scientific contribution will have a greater visibility in the community of scientists when it is introduced by a scientist of high rank than when it is introduced by one who has not yet made his mark. This raises interesting implications as to the beneficial effect of having an established scientist put his or her name on a paper to get better visibility for junior coworkers. One side effect of the acclamation and acceptance given to proven and great scientists is the fact that centers of demonstrated scientific excellence are allocated far larger resources for research than centers that have yet to make their mark.
TL;DR: The results show that winners just above the funding threshold accumulate more than twice as much funding during the subsequent eight years as nonwinners with near-identical review scores that fall just below the threshold, suggesting that early funding itself is an asset for acquiring later funding.
Abstract: A classic thesis is that scientific achievement exhibits a “Matthew effect”: Scientists who have previously been successful are more likely to succeed again, producing increasing distinction. We investigate to what extent the Matthew effect drives the allocation of research funds. To this end, we assembled a dataset containing all review scores and funding decisions of grant proposals submitted by recent PhDs in a €2 billion granting program. Analyses of review scores reveal that early funding success introduces a growing rift, with winners just above the funding threshold accumulating more than twice as much research funding (€180,000) during the following eight years as nonwinners just below it. We find no evidence that winners’ improved funding chances in subsequent competitions are due to achievements enabled by the preceding grant, which suggests that early funding itself is an asset for acquiring later funding. Surprisingly, however, the emergent funding gap is partly created by applicants, who, after failing to win one grant, apply for another grant less often.