About: Material conditional is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 77 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6077 citations. The topic is also known as: material consequence & implication.
TL;DR: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is truth function of those propositions as mentioned in this paper, which has given rise to a number of philosophical problems.
Abstract: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those propositions I may know the truth values of “Willie Mays played in the American League” and “Willie Mays hit four hundred” without knowing whether or not Mays, would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that P.C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.
Abstract: The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.’) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ‘safely’ used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.
TL;DR: The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods, wherefore he is willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably true as discussed by the authors, where assertability goes by subjective probability.
Abstract: The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods, wherefore he is willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably true. He deems it permissible to assert that A only if P(A) is sufficiently close to 1, where P is the probability function that represents his system of degrees of belief at the time. Assertability goes by subjective probability.
TL;DR: The authors argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in logic, and proposes that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset.
Abstract: Book synopsis: Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus of certain reasoning.
TL;DR: In a celebrated trial, Harr as discussed by the authors elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE): If the TCE in the wells had been drawn from out of the river, then there would be TCE on the riverbed. But there was no TCE at all.
Abstract: You reason about conditional relations because much of your knowledge is conditional. If you get caught speeding, then you pay a fine. If you have an operation, then you need time to recuperate. If you have money in the bank, then you can cash a check. Conditional reasoning is a central part of thinking, yet people do not always reason correctly. The lawyer Jan Schlictmann in a celebrated trial (see Harr, 1995, pp. 361–362) elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE): If the TCE in the wells had been drawn from out of the river, then there’d be TCE in the riverbed. But there isn’t any TCE in the riverbed.