Master argument

Abstract: Part 1 Words and ideas: two kinds of signs ideas as objects ideas as images representation and signification. Part 2 Abstract ideas: the argument objections and replies abstract ideas as images abstract ideas as objects does Berkeley blunder in reading Locke? Part 3 Simple ideas: the search for a simple idea simplicity and abstraction consequences. Part 4 Necessity: simple and complex ideas demonstration, necessity and certainty an anachronistic hypothesis? Berkeley's response. Part 5 Cause and effect: Berkeley on the causal relation necessary connection the account defended. Part 6 Immaterialism: the argument of "Principles 4" immediate perception a commentary on the first dialogue the argument of "Principles 3" against matter the master argument materialism and abstraction Berkeley's phenomenalism. Part 7 Unperceived objects: two interpretations the denial of blind agency two objections archetypes archetypes in "Siris" Mabbott's objections to divine ideas. Part 8 Corpuscularianism: the corpuscularian background primary and secondary qualities immaterial corpuscles. Part 9 Spirit: the parity objection an alleged incoherence the mind and its acts.

Abstract: The semantic view of computation is the claim that semantic properties play an essential role in the individuation of physical computing systems such as laptops and brains. The main argument for the semantic view (“the master argument”) rests on the fact that some physical systems simultaneously implement different automata at the same time, in the same space, and even in the very same physical properties (“simultaneous implementation”). Recently, several authors have challenged this argument (Piccinini in Philos Stud 137:205–241, 2008, Piccinini in Physical computation: a mechanistic account, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Coelho Mollo in Synthese 195:3477–3497, 2018; Dewhurst in Br J Philos Sci 69:103–116, 2018). They accept the premise of simultaneous implementation but reject the semantic conclusion. In this paper, I aim to explicate the semantic view and to address these objections. I first characterize the semantic view and distinguish it from other, closely related views. Then, I contend that the master argument for the semantic view survives the counter-arguments against it. One counter-argument is that computational individuation is not forced to choose between the implemented automata but rather always picks out a more basic computational structure. My response is that this move might undermine the notion of computational equivalence. Another counter-argument is that while computational individuation is forced to rely on extrinsic features, these features need not be semantic. My reply is that the semantic view better accounts for these extrinsic features than the proposed non-semantic alternatives.