Topic
Majority judgment
About: Majority judgment is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 66 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1016 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
Book•
1 Jan 2010
TL;DR: Balinski and Laraki as discussed by the authors argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank, and propose a more realistic model that is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice.
Abstract: In Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model—transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method--majority judgment—proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's. They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support their arguments. Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm—to compare—is replaced by a new paradigm—to evaluate.
231 citations
TL;DR: In this article, simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms (the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness) over a larger class of preference domains than any other voting rule.
Abstract: We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms—the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness—over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952). (JEL: D71)
212 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: Balinski and Laraki as discussed by the authors argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank, and propose a more realistic model based on majority judgment.
Abstract: In Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank They find that the traditional model--transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society--is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model It leads to an entirely new theory and method--majority judgment--proven superior to all known methods It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence--from national elections to figure skating competitions--to support their arguments Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm--to compare--is replaced by a new paradigm--to evaluate
200 citations
TL;DR: For the 3-person case, this article derived necessary and sufficient conditions for local stability in the finite-population case, where every individual's preferences can be represented by a differentiable point in a convex policy space.
Abstract: Ever since Condorcet described the famous "paradox of voting" some 200 years ago, 1 political scientists have been aware that the process of direct majority-rule decision-making wilt not in general produce a stable outcome when the choice to be made is between more than two alternatives. Since majority-rule voting is a fundamental part of our decision-making apparatus, it is natural to ask what conditions are needed in Order to guarantee the existence of a stable decision. This question has intrigued both political scientists and mathematicians for some time. Some of the most interesting stability conditions have been derived using the so-called "spatial" model, in which alternative social states are viewed as points in a convex policy space, such as E n. Black and Newing [3] present a very complete and general analysis in geometrical terms for the 3-person case, where alternatives can be represented as points in E2; they extend some of their results to the N-person case. Plott [9] has found necessary and sufficient conditions for local stability in the finite-population case, where every individual's preferences can be represented by a differentiable
71 citations
TL;DR: The majority judgement is a method of election as discussed by the authors, where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them, and it is the consequence of a new theory of social choice where voters decide candidates based on the majority judgement.
Abstract: The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them. The theory is developed elsewhere (Balinski and Laraki 2007, 2010). This article describes and analyzes electoral experiments conducted in parallel with the last two French presidential elections to: (1) show that the majority judgement is a practical method, (2) describe it and establish its salient properties, and (3) illustrate how in practice the well known electoral mechanisms all fail to meet important criteria.
66 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 3 |
| 2020 | 5 |
| 2019 | 6 |
| 2018 | 6 |
| 2017 | 7 |
| 2016 | 2 |