TL;DR: In her paper to the Aristotelian Society in 1958, entitled ‘Moral Beliefs’, Mrs Foot says that she agrees with the assumption found in the Republic, that if justice is not a good to the just man, moralists who recommend it as a virtue are perpetrating a fraud as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In her paper to the Aristotelian Society in 1958, entitled ‘Moral Beliefs’,1 Mrs Foot says that she agrees with the assumption found in the Republic, ‘that if justice is not a good to the just man, moralists who recommend it as a virtue are perpetrating a fraud’ (p. 100). The example of justice is incidental to the main contention, namely, that virtues can only be recommended if they constitute a good to the virtuous man. If virtues do not constitute such a good, they are frauds. It becomes essential, therefore, given the above assumption, to decide in general whether virtues do constitute a good to the virtuous man; in other words, to decide whether it pays to be good.
TL;DR: The main contention of Cliff Hooker's new book as discussed by the authors is that a realistic theory of science, a theory which gives a good account of what actually goes on in science, should be based on realism.
Abstract: It is the main contention of Cliff Hooker's new book that a realistic theory of science, a theory which gives a good account of what actually goes on in science, should be based on realism. Many readers of this journal may disagree. They may be inclined to the view that a realistic theory of science must attribute a significant social component to scientific knowledge, and would see such a theory as incompatible with realism. I do not, however, believe that these positions are necessarily opposed, for some types of realism are compatible with some sociologies of scientific knowledge. I hope to show that Hooker's brand of realism could be acceptable to some who hold that scientific knowledge has a social component, although it will evidently not be congenial to those who go all the way with Woolgar and Latour and deny that the world 'out there' has anything to do with scientific facts. I A Realistic Theory of Science comprises six chapters reprinted with some minor changes from journals and collections dating from 1974, together with a short introduction and a substantial concluding chapter. For the most part the book is about realism. Five of the six reprinted chapters are more or less directly concerned with realism, while the concluding chapter describes the state of play in 1985 for the evolutionary naturalistic realist this being the sort of realist Hooker is. While Hooker's book is the main subject of this Review, I have also been asked to comment on two other books: John Wisdom's Challengeability in Modern Science and Scientific Controversies, edited by H. Tristram Engelhardt and
TL;DR: From the persepective of the transcendental realist account of science and critical realist elaboration of the relationship between human agency and social structure, the authors examines the methodological approach Marx adopts in his analysis of the labour process.
Abstract: From the persepective of the transcendental realist account of science and critical realist elaboration of the relationship between human agency and social structure, this paper examines the methodological approach Marx adopts in his analysis of the labour process. The agency-structure relation as detailed by critical realism is set out and placed in the context of wider debates surrounding the notion of structure. In particular the transcendental realist position, which has emerged in recent controversies in the philosophy of science and which underpins critical realism, is considered. The links between Marx's method and critical realism are then explored as a preliminary to the discussion of his analysis of the labour process. The main contention of the paper is that Marx's analysis of the labour process is in line with critical realism and that it can be viewed as a useful example of what a substantive analysis consisitent with this perspective can look like.
TL;DR: In this article, a critical reappraisal of the part played by "trust" in management education is presented. But the main contention is that trust is being perceptibly eroded by a range of factors that find their genesis in a wider set of social relations within contemporary capitalism, and they set about trying to account for the diminution of trust in social theoretical terms.
Abstract: This article attempts a critical reappraisal of the part played by 'trust' in management education. Our main contention is that trust is being perceptibly eroded by a range of factors that find their genesis in a wider set of social relations within contemporary capitalism. Accordingly, we set about trying to account for the diminution of trust in social theoretical terms. Having constructed an analytical matrix we then apply our reasoning to specific instances of mistrust in an educational context. Drawing on documented student reflections and other qualitative data we seek to demonstrate how broader social trends are being 'holographically' rehearsed and reproduced in the micro-politics of the university classroom. Our 'representative anecdotes' give the lie to the increasing regulation and legalization of educational relationships. The concluding section adopts a deliberately polemical tone and we end by asking some searching questions concerning the future of management education in universities.
TL;DR: In the last decade, influential voices within and on the periphery of the record keeping community have succeeded in establishing the preservation of "evidence" as the governing purpose of contemporary archival theory and methods development.
Abstract: In the last ten years, influential voices within and on the periphery of the record keeping community have succeeded in establishing the preservation of “evidence” as the governing purpose of contemporary archival theory and methods development. Afterglow offers a critique of the concept of evidence in archival discourse. Its main contention is that one can put records into evidence; one cannot set out to put evidence into records. The argument rests on the following assertions: (1) current discussions of evidence rest on a blindness to certain contradictions embedded in claims that record keeping principally involves evidence keeping, or “evidence management”; (2) a politics of temporality, under which an interplay of disciplinary knowledge claims and professional interest is discernible, helps to account for the contemporary rhetoric describing the relationship between “record” and “evidence”, and (3) the late-twentieth century legal, political, and cultural climate, along with the technological environment, explain the increasing prominence of “evidence” in these knowledge claims and professional ambitions. The essay concludes with recommendations for addressing these issues.