About: Logical truth is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1494 publications have been published within this topic receiving 32937 citations. The topic is also known as: Logical truth & necessarily true.
TL;DR: The authors argue that reductionism and analytic reductionism are ill-founded and that abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science.
Abstract: Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which aresynthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill-founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism.
TL;DR: In this article, the notion of material adequacy of a definition of truth is defined as follows: if all these equivalences follow from it, then the definition is true if, and only if, p.X is true.
Abstract: X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which was outlined above [...] implies all equivalences of the form (T). In this connnection it is important to notice that the conditions for the material adequacy of the definition determine uniquely the extension of the term “true.” Therefore, every definition of truth which is materially adequate would necessarily be equivalent to that actually constructed. The semantic conception of truth gives us, so to speak, no possibility of choice between variaous non-equivalent definitions of this notion..
TL;DR: Ken Spitze's 'superfleas' are discussed, which are considered to be what the author considers to be the strongest empirical challenge to the universality of costs, then offered a possible explanation for their existence.
Abstract: The assumption of costs of reproduction were a logical necessity for much of the early development of life history theory. An unfortunate property of 'logical necessities' is that it is easy to also assume that they must be true. What if this does not turn out to be the case? The existence and universality of costs of reproduction were initially challenged with empirical data of questionable value, but later with increasingly strong theoretical and empirical results. Here, we discuss Ken Spitze's 'superfleas', which represent what we consider to be the strongest empirical challenge to the universality of costs, then offer a possible explanation for their existence.