Logical reasoning

Abstract: It has become a commonplace belief that learning is the result of the interaction between what the student is taught and his current ideas or concepts.’ This is by no means a new view of learning. Its roots can be traced back to early Gestalt psychologists. However, Piaget’s (1929, 1930) early studies of children’s explanations of natural phenomena and his more recent studies of causality (Piaget, 1974) have perhaps had the greatest impact on the study of the interpretive frameworks students bring to learning situations. This research has led to the widespread study of students’ scientific misconceptions.2 From these studies and, particularly, from recent work by researchers such as Viennot ( 1979) and Driver (1 973), we have developed a more detailed understanding of some of these misconceptions and, more importantly, why they are so “highly robust” and typically outlive teaching which contradicts them (Viennot, 1979, p. 205). But identifying misconceptions or, more broadly speaking, “alternative frameworks” (Driver & Easley, 1978), and understanding some reasons for their persistence, falls short of developing a reasonable view of how a student’s current ideas interact with new, incompatible ideas. Although Piaget (1974) developed one such theory, there appears to be a need for work which focuses “more on the actual content of the pupil’s ideas and less on the supposed underlying logical structures” (Driver & Easley, 1978, p. 76). Several research studies have been performed (Nussbaum, 1979; Nussbaum & Novak, 1976; Driver, 1973; Erickson, 1979) which have investigated “the substance of the actual beliefs and concepts held by children” (Erickson, 1979, p. 221). However, there has been no well-articulated theory explaining or describing the substantive dimensions of the process by which people’s central, organizing concepts change from one set of concepts to another set, incompatible with the first. We believe that a major source of hypotheses concerning this issue is contemporary philosophy of science, since a central question of recent philosophy of science is how concepts change under the impact of new ideas or new information. In this article we first sketch a general model of conceptual change which is largely derived from current philosophy of science, but which we believe can illuminate * This article is partly based on a paper entitled “Learning Special Relativity: A Study of Intellectual Problems Faced by College Students,” presented at the International Conference Celebrating the 100th Anniversary of Albert Einstein, November 8-10, 1979 at Hofstra University.