Logical quality

Abstract: A core activity in information systems development involves building a conceptual model of the domain that an information system is intended to support. Such models are created using a conceptual-modeling (CM) grammar. Just as high-quality conceptual models facilitate high-quality systems development, high-quality CM grammars facilitate high-quality CM. This paper provides a new perspective on ways to improve the quality of the semantics of CM grammars. For many years, the leading approach to this topic has relied on ontological theory. We show, however, that the ontological approach captures only half the story; it needs to be coupled with a logical approach. We explain how the ontological and logical qualities of CM grammars interrelate. Furthermore, we outline three contributions of a logical approach to evaluating the quality of CM grammars: a means of seeing some familiar CM problems in simpler ways, illumination of new problems, and proving the benefit of modifying existing CM grammars in particular...

Abstract: Acknowledgements Reference scheme and abbreviations MEMO TO READERS: Overview and Synopsis PART I: TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY PSYCHOLOGIZED Chapter 1: The Psychological a priori Chapter 2: Kant's debt to British Empiricism A. Kant's debt to Locke: sensibilism and subjectivism B. The psychological nature of the Kantian synthetic a priori C. Kant's debt to Berkeley: the separability principle D. Kant's first debt to Hume: the problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments E. Kant's second debt to Hume: the psychologistic key to solving " F. Postscript on knowing Hume so as to be able to know Kant PART II: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF SENSIBILITY Chapter 3: Unity of sensibility (1): sensation, intuition, and appearance A. The place of sensations in transcendental philosophy: a priori synopsis B. The matter of appearances C. The metaphysical exposition of pure intuition D. The problem of unity of sensibility and its general solution E. Appearances and the imagination's synthesis of apprehension in intuition Chapter 4: Unity of sensibility (2): space and time A. Why unity of sensibility requires space and time rather than space alone B. Space as the ground of unity of sensibility with respect to sensations (the manifold of the outer senses) C. Time out of mind: completing the unity of sensibility D. The psychology of appearance and the appearance of the psychological Chapter 5: A new understanding of understanding A. Apperception without the categories B. The individuality of space and time as a prediscursive expression of original apperception C. Formal intuition and the need for prediscursive understanding D. The objective unity of space and time E. Formal intuitions and forms of intuition F. Conceptualist construals of formal intuition G. Synoptic overview of the evidence for prediscursive, precategorial apperception Chapter 6: Mathematics and the unity of sensibility A. Isolating pure intuition from sensation and understanding B. The role of pure intuition in geometry C. The role of pure intuition in arithmetic D. The role of pure intuition in algebra E. Is mathematical logic mathematics or logic? Chapter 7: Idealism and realism A. Outline of the development of idealism up to Kant B. Appearance vs. illusion C. Appearance and reality Chapter 8: Things in themselves: a Kantian refutation of Berkeley's idealism A. Berkeley's esse is percipi idealism B. Perception as product of imagination: the thin edge of the wedge of a Kantian refutation of esse is percipi idealism C. Kant's ground for denying the second component of esse is percipi idealism D. Kant's ground for denying the first component of esse is percipi idealism E. Does Kant's affirmation of things in themselves pass critical muster? F. The representing subject G. Representation vs. thing and in itself: Kant's fundamental ontological divide PART III: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF THOUGHT Chapter 9: Concepts in mind A. Language and mind: pre-Kantian perspectives B. The synthetic and analytic unity of apperception C. How the analytic unity of the I think converts ordinary representations into universals D. The logical underpinnings of Kant's response to Hume's skeptical challenge Chapter 10: A defense of Kant's table of judgments A. Kant's psychological approach to the logic of judgment B. The logical quality and quantity of the logical relation of categorical judgment C. Is the truth-functional propositional calculus logic or mathematics? D. The logical forms of modality and relation E. Kant's psychologization of logical form Chapter 11: The Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories A. Logical functions utilized as concepts: the derivation of the categories of substance and accident, quantity, and quality B. Logical functions utilized as concepts: the derivation of the categories of cause and effect, community, and modality C. The categories as pure concepts of objects PART IV: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF COGNIZABLE OBJECTS Chapter 12: Interpreting the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories A. How the Transcendental Deduction of the categories constitutes a quid juris B. The subjective and objective transcendental deductions of the categories C. The MFPNS Preface footnote D. Why a subjective transcendental deduction is necessary Chapter 13: The A edition transcendental deduction: objects as concepts of the necessary synthetic unity of the manifold A. Synthesis before analysis B. The three-fold synthesis: Kant's psychology of experience C. Synthesis of recognition in a concept D. The objectivity problem: why association presupposes affinity E. How the subject of intuition becomes the subject of experience F. The objectivity of the categories and Kant's self-created problem G. Objects explicated as concepts H. The objective unity of apperception I. Summary recapitulation of Kant's reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction Chapter 14: The B edition transcendental deduction: objective unity of apperception and transcendental synthesis A. Judgment and the objective unity of apperception B. Synthesis intellectualis as ground of the objective unity of apperception C. Categorial necessity and its limits D. The relation of transcendental synthesis speciosa to formal intuition E. Appendix: General logic revisited Chapter 15: A category by category elucidation of the transcendental synthesis speciosa of pure formal intuition A. The reasons a category-by-category elucidation is needed B. Space as permanent substratum of temporal succession: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of substance-accident and actuality C. From causal nexus to spatio-temporal nexus: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of cause and effect and possibility D. All conditions met: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of community and necessity E. Number and the synthesis speciosa of the categories of quantity F. Limited and unlimited pure space and time: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of quality G. Results PART V: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF NATURE Chapter 16: Subsuming reality: schematism and transcendental judgment A. Transcendental judgment B. Why a transcendental schematism is necessary C. The transcendental schemata D. From transcendental schemata to principles of pure understanding Chapter 17: Time out of mind: Kant's system of principles of pure understanding A. Constitutive mathematical and regulative dynamical principles B. The unity of experience in Kant and Hume C. Hume's quandary revisited: the problem of existence in time D. Permanent substances E. Causality and the time series F. How the Second Analogy overcomes the limits of induction: Kant's refutation of Hume's empiricist account of causation G. Causality and the possibility of continuants H. The causal nexus of continuants and permanents I. Kant's principle of community: translating pure space and time into the field of appearance Chapter 18: Our place in nature and its place in us A. The embodied empirical subject B. Community of substances, community of apperception C. Ontology as immanent thinking D. Objectivity and subjectivity: the Postulates of Empirical Thought CONCLUSION: Reversing the frame A. Kant and the philosophy of mind B. Kant and the sciences of mind Bibliography Index