About: Liar paradox is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 440 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6835 citations. The topic is also known as: liar's paradox.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the notion of the universe of hypersets and the Liar, and model the truth of Russellian propositions and the consequences of the Russellian account.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION: The Liar Sentences, statements, and Propositions The universe of hypersets RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS AND THE LIAR: Modeling Russellian propositions Truth of Russellian propositions Consequences of the Russellian account Sentences and Russellian propositions AUSTINIAN PROPOSITIONS AND THE LIAR: Modeling Austinian propositions Austinian propositions and the world An Austinian semantics Relating the Russellian and Austinian accounts Negation and denial Conclusions Bibliography Index.
TL;DR: A survey of supervaluational and revision-theoretic conditionals can be found in this paper, with a focus on the relation between the two types of theories. But it is also worth noting that the latter is not the only theory that is vulnerable to contradiction.
Abstract: Preface Introduction PART ONE: A SELECTIVE BACKGROUND 1. Chapter 1: Self-Reference and Tarski>'s Theorem 2. Validity and the Unprovability of Soundness 3. Kripke>'s Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version) 4. Adding a Conditional? Curry and Lukasiewicz 5. Interlude on Vagueness, and the Paradoxes of Konig and Berry PART TWO: BROADLY CLASSICAL APPROACHES 6. Introduction to the broadly classical options 7. Truth-Value Gaps in Classical Theories 8. Truth-value Gluts in Classical Theories 9. A Second Interlude on Vagueness 10. Introduction to Supervaluational Approaches to Paradox 11. A Survey of Supervaluational and Revision-Rule Theories 12. Are Supervaluational and Revision Theories Self-Undermining? 13. Intersubstitutivity and the Purpose of Truth 14. Stratified and Contextual Theories STRATIFIED AND CONTEXTUAL THEORIES 15. What Is To Be Done? 16. Fixed Points and Revision Rules for Conditionals 17. More on Revision-theoretic Conditionals 18. What Has Been Done PART FOUR: MORE ON PARACOMPLETE SOLUTIONS 19. Validity, Truth-Preservation and the Second Incompleteness Theorem 20. Other Paradoxes 21. Do Paracomplete Solutions Depend on Expressive Limitations? 22. Determinateness, Hyper-determinateness, Super-Determinateness and Revenge PART FIVE: PARACONSISTENT DIALETHEISM 23. An Introduction to Paraconsistent Dialetheism 24. Some Dialetheic Theories 25. Paraconsistent Dialetheism and Soundness 26. Hyper-determinacy and revenge Bibliography
TL;DR: The revision theory of truth as mentioned in this paper is a general theory of circular concepts that makes sense of arbitrary systems of mutually interdependent concepts, of which circular concepts such as truth are but a special case.
Abstract: In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological contexts. The latter include, for instance, contexts that generate Liar Paradox. Their central claim is that truth is a circular concept. In support of this claim they provide a widely applicable theory (the "revision theory") of circular concepts. Under the revision theory, when truth is seen as circular both its ordinary features and its pathological features fall into a simple understandable pattern. The Revision Theory of Truth is unique in placing truth in the context of a general theory of definitions. This theory makes sense of arbitrary systems of mutually interdependent concepts, of which circular concepts, such as truth, are but a special case.