TL;DR: In 2001, the US Military Academy at West Point issued a challenge to the five United States service academies to participate in an inter-academy Cyber Defense Exercise (CDE) with funding and direction provided by the National Security Agency as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The US Military Academy at West Point issued a challenge to the five United States service academies to participate in an inter-academy Cyber Defense Exercise (CDE). This exercise was initiated and implemented by faculty and cadets assigned to the US Military Academy, West Point, with funding and direction provided by the National Security Agency. The concept of defending the network was derived to evaluate cadet skills and the effectiveness of the Information Assurance (IA) education invoked at West Point. The Cyber Defense Exercise served as the final project for senior-level Computer Science majors enrolled in the Information Assurance (IA) course. The IA - Service Academy Group for Education Superiority (IA-SAGES), a group formed to plan, develop and share IA curriculum, proposed that all US service academies teaching an IA course participate in the exercise. The US Air Force Academy and US Military Academy accepted the challenge to compete in 2001. The distributed facility in which this exercise will be conducted is known as the Cyber Defense Network (CDN). It was designed and developed by a West Point cadet (student) team, and is an extension of the Information Warfare Analysis and Research (IWAR) Laboratory. To understand the function of the CDN, it is necessary to understand all the resources at the disposal of USMA for IA education. The IWAR Laboratory is an isolated laboratory used by undergraduate students and faculty researchers at the US Military Academy. It is a production-like, heterogeneous environment and has become a vital part of the IA curriculum at West Point. The military range analogy is used to teach the students in the class that the exploits and other tools used in the laboratory are weapons and should be treated with the same care as rifles and grenades. This paper describes the structure of the laboratory and how it is used in classroom instruction. It describes the process used to create the IWAR and the Cyber Defense Exercise (CDE). Finally, this paper describes the concept of the 2001 Cyber Defense Exercise and expectations for future participation.
TL;DR: The military range analogy is used to teach the students in the class that the exploits and other tools used in the laboratory are weapons and should be treated with the same care as rifles and grenades.
Abstract: This paper describes a unique resource at West Point, the Information Analysis and Research Laboratory, referred to as the IWAR range. The IWAR range is an isolated laboratory used by undergraduate students and faculty researchers. The IWAR is a production-system-like, heterogeneous environment. The IWAR has become a vital part of the Information Assurance curriculum at West Point. We use the military range analogy to teach the students in the class that the exploits and other tools used in the laboratory are weapons and should be treated with the same care as rifles and grenades. This paper describes the structure of the laboratory and how it is used in classroom instruction. It also describes the process used to create the IWAR and how an IWAR might be built using limited resources. Finally, this paper describes the future directions of the IWAR project.
TL;DR: By the end of 2007 all federal grant applications must be submitted through grants.gov, so NSF no longer will use Fastlane for grant applications, and NSF most likely will continue to use Fast lane for other grant functions, including award management and reporting.
Abstract: Introduction to grants.gov The recent implementation of grants.gov marks a profound and permanent change in the federal grant system. Grants.gov, a secure Internet source, has two distinct operations, announcing funding opportunities and receiving electronic applications. All 26 federal grant-making agencies, including the National Science Foundation, are already using grants.gov. By the end of 2007 all federal grant applications must be submitted through grants.gov, so NSF no longer will use Fastlane for grant applications. NSF most likely will continue to use Fastlane for other grant functions, including award management and reporting.
TL;DR: Voelz et al. as discussed by the authors discussed the central pillars of individualized warfare, including the rise of identity-based targeting and the key role of information technology in conducting these operations.
Abstract: : During a recent address to the National Defense University on U.S. counterterrorism strategy, President Barack Obama cautioned that we must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. His comments hinted at the dramatic transformations of the U.S. military and national security apparatus since September 11, 2001 (9/11). Notable among these have been a new operational emphasis on the threats posed by nonstate actors and individual combatants. This trend represents a major shift from the Cold War era paradigm focused primarily on conventional threats from state-based adversaries. This strategic reprioritization has evolved into new military doctrines focused on the task of defeating networks rather than formations and technical innovations designed for identifying, screening, and targeting individual combatants on the battlefield. This operational focus has also made the issue of identity central to U.S. national security strategy whether screening individual threats at the borders, segregating them on the battlefield, or targeting them across the spaces in between. In this monograph, Colonel Glenn Voelz examines this defining feature of recent conflicts, specifically the doctrinal and technical innovations giving rise to this new operational paradigm. He describes the central pillars of individualized warfare, including the rise of identity-based targeting and the key role of information technology in conducting these operations. This work contributes to an important dialogue concerning lessons learned from a decade of global counterterrorism operations and two extended counterinsurgency campaigns. It provides a useful case study on wartime military innovation by considering the policies and strategies that evolved in response to a new and unexpected adversary. He concludes this monograph with an in-depth discussion covering a range of emerging technologies likely to define how this kind of war will be waged in the future.
TL;DR: The reasons why information warfare laboratories are necessary are justified, the phenomenon that is occurring as a result of the IWAR lab is described, the current configuration is explained, and lessons learned that others might use in designing an Information Warfare laboratory are presented.
Abstract: With the increased potential of a bona fide cyber terrorist attack and the possibility of a future "war in the wires", we must continue to improve the education and training of individuals responsible for defending our national borders--whether those borders are physical or electronic The Information Analysis and Research (IWAR) laboratory at the United States Military Academy (USMA) has proven to be an exceptional resource for such an education for our cadets and faculty studying information warfare and information assurance The laboratory has also been successful in motivating the need for continued education and training in this area on a much larger scope This paper justifies why information warfare laboratories are necessary, describes the phenomenon that is occurring as a result of the IWAR lab, explains the current configuration, and presents lessons learned that others might use in designing an Information Warfare laboratory While this paper has a military context, the results apply to any university, corporation, or non-profit organization desiring to increase awareness and improve education in the area of information warfare