Iron triangle

Abstract: I n this chapter, we provide information on getting services for a child with an autism spectrum diagnosis. This chapter includes a discussion of legal rights and some of the key concepts relative to rights to educational services. It is important that parents and teachers have some basic understanding of these rights and concepts. We also discuss some of the issues involved in seeking insurance reimbursement for services. In the next series of chapters, we'll talk about overall approaches to programming and then more age-specific issues for infants and young children, school-aged children, and adolescents and adults. Keep in mind that, as in other areas, parents and parent support groups may be good sources of information. Also keep in mind that things can change—either through changes in the laws (by Congress) or new judicial decisions (by the courts)—so it is important that everyone involved be aware of current requirements. In thinking about getting services for any child, it is important to know a little bit about the history of educational services for children with autism (and, for that matter, other disabilities). Before 1975 only a small number, maybe around 20%, of children with disabilities received an education within public schools. In many schools, parents would be turned away and were often told to put their children in institutional settings where there was little proactive programming or education. As a result, many individuals with autism were placed in these institutions; probably not surprisingly, the major function of such placements was that it helped them learn to live in (i.e., remain in) institutions, and outcome was often poor. There were, of course, exceptions but these usually were situations where parents wouldn't accept a lack of services and advocated for, or sometimes started, their own private schools or programs. Many of the earliest schools for children with autism in the United States were started this way, and some remain active to the present. All this changed dramatically in 1975.

Abstract: (NDWAC), an advisory committee within the Environmental Protection Agency, to test whether the active interests in the legislative debate over drinking water are represented on the advisory committee, and thus in the EPA's policymaking process. Although agency officials are responsible for appointing the members of NDWAC, we find that public endorsements by interest groups are influential in the agency's selection process. These groups provide reliable information to Congress about applicants' true policy preferences. ne of the persistent power struggles in American national politics is that between Congress and the bureaucracy. Scholars have \ theorized that the outcome of this struggle depends significantly on which institution has superior information about the costs and consequences of policy implementation (Banks and Weingast 1992; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985; Miller and Moe 1984). When agencies have an informational advantage, they can often implement programs at higher costs and with different beneficiaries than intended by Congress. To limit bureaucratic discretion in policy making, Congress must control the information available to agencies. The information available to agencies depends, among other factors, on the number and kind of interested parties that participate in agency proceedings. Through formal comments, ex parte communications, hearings, stakeholder meetings, and other forums, agencies collect information about the costs and consequences of policy options in some of the same ways as Congress collects information. Policy information across the two institutions is likely to correspond when both Congress and agencies collect information from the same parties. If policy decisions depend on available information, then the more closely information corresponds between institutions, the more likely policy decisions will correspond as well. Our question in this article is "To what extent, and by what means, do interests that realize representation in Congress also realize representation in the bureaucracy?" Our explanation parallels the "structure and process" argument of McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989) and the informational theories of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and others. We propose that Congress controls the flow and content of information to the bureaucracy

Abstract: This paper examines three distinct images of the policy process. Iron triangles emphasize stable relations among a limited number of participants in a relatively closed policy area. Issue networks are fragmented, open and extraordinarily complex and are ill-structured for resolving conflicts and reaching authoritative decisions. The neo-corporatist literature posits a mechanistic interpretation of society: hierarchy, discipline, command and stability, though organized through sectors. These three images can be contrasted with an image of cabinet government which stresses the integrative capacities of central government. The United States can be seen to have moved to some degree from a pattern more closely captured by the iron triangle image to a looser, more complex one resembling features of the issue network image. In Britain, it is possible to detect some movement towards the complexity of the issue network approach. Despite some superficial plausibility, the corporatist image does not apply to Britain, which is best described by drawing on elements of the iron triangle and cabinet government images and some of the complexity of the issue network image. Finally, limits to the fragmentation implied by the issue network image are noted.