Intersubjectivity

Abstract: Organizational features of ordinary conversation and other talk-in-interaction provide for the routine display of participants' understanding of one anothers' conduct and of the field of action, thereby building in a routine grounding for intersubjectivity. This same organization provides interactants the resources for recognizing breakdowns of intersubjectivity and for repairing them. This article sets the concern with intersubjectivity in theoretical context, sketches the organization by which it is grounded and defended in ordinary interaction, describes the practices by which trouble in understanding is dealt with, and illustrates what happens when this organization fails to function. Some consequences for contemporary theory and inquiry are suggested.

Abstract: Starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will propose that our capacity to understand others as intentional agents, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, be deeply grounded in the relational nature of our interactions with the world. According to this hypothesis, an implicit, prereflexive form of understanding of other individuals is based on the strong sense of identity binding us to them. We share with our conspecifics a multiplicity of states that include actions, sensations and emotions. A new conceptual tool able to capture the richness of the experiences we share with others will be introduced: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. I will posit that it is through this shared manifold that it is possible for us to recognize other human beings as similar to us. It is just because of this shared manifold that intersubjective communication and ascription of intentionality become possible. It will be argued that the same neural structures that are involved in processing and controlling executed actions, felt sensations and emotions are also active when the same actions, sensations and emotions are to be detected in others. It therefore appears that a whole range of different ‘mirror matching mechanisms’ may be present in our brain. This matching mechanism, constituted by mirror neurons originally discovered and described in the domain of action, could well be a basic organizational feature of our brain, enabling our rich and diversified intersubjective experiences. This perspective is in a position to offer a global approach to the understanding of the vulnerability to major psychoses such as schizophrenia.

Abstract: We are social animals. We share this feature with many other species. A complexity and sophistication that we do not observe among ants, bees or wolves, however, characteristically define the social life of primates. This complexity and sophistication is epitomized at its highest level by the social rules our conduct in everyday life is supposed to comply with. Living in a complex society requires individuals to develop cognitive skills enabling them to cope with other individuals’ actions, by recognizing them, understanding them, and reacting appropriately to them. No one doubts that the extant primate ancestors of ours, monkeys and apes, who indeed also live in complex, hierarchically organized societies, are perfectly able to cope with their own social rules. Nevertheless, it is commonly argued that to achieve that goal non-human primates simply rely on behaviour observation. Animals do not represent rules in their minds, and they do not engage in any inference-based reasoning. Accordingly, what non-human primates are lacking would sharply define what is considered to be uniquely human: truly cognitive states, such as intentions, desires and beliefs. In our daily life we are constantly exposed to the actions of the individuals inhabiting our social world. We are not only able to describe these actions, to understand their content, and predict their consequences, but we can also attribute intentions to the agents of the same actions. We can immediately tell whether a given observed act or behaviour is the result of a purposeful attitude or rather the unpredicted consequence of some accidental event, totally unrelated to the agent’s will. In other words, we are able to understand the behaviour of others in terms of their mental states. I will designate this ability as mind-reading. How do we ‘read’ intentions in the mind of other individuals? A common view maintains that all normal humans develop the capacity to represent mental states in others by means of a conceptual system, commonly designated as ‘Theory of Mind’ (TOM, see Premack and Woodruff, 1978). My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my