Internal monologue

Abstract: RECENT PHENOMENON IN AMERICAN ORAL narrative is the use of like in conjunction with the stative verb be, as a quotative or introducer of speech in discourse (henceforth referred to as be like).' Most quotatives are associated with either direct speech or inner monologue but rarely with both. For example, say and go function as introducers of direct speech; a quote following say or go implies that something was actually uttered no matter how approximative. On the other hand, the quotative think may only introduce inner monologue. Whereas most quotatives introduce either inner monologue or direct speech, the new quotative be like can introduce both kinds of reported speech, thus allowing the speaker to express an attitude, reaction, or thought, as well as something actually said. Note the uses of the quotatives in the following example:2

Abstract: When a request is preceded by a casual dialogue, the approached person is more likely to comply than when the same request follows a monologue. This effect appeared to be strong and replicable in a series of field studies. Across experiments, the issues discussed in conversations between the confederates and the participants and the nature of the critical request varied, suggesting that the effect is generalized. In social situations, the two basic modes of communication (dialogue and monologue) are characteristic of different types of interactions. Dialogue is characteristic of encounters with one’s friends and acquaintances, whereas monologue is more prevalent in contacts with strangers. As a result of social learning, a dialogue makes us prone to treat a stranger as someone we know and thus become more eager to comply with her or his requests. Although the results obtained in the studies are consisted with this model, alternative explanations and limitations of the research also are discussed.

Abstract: Using theory and data from emotional neurobiology, I suggest a neurally realistic model of Hermans' dialogical self. The model is premised on Hermans' idea of voicing and its implications for motivation, action and subjectivity. Because states of motivated attention unify brain activity, coexisting I-positions are as problematic for neuroscience as they are for psychology. To overcome this problem, I postulate an internal monologue in which the familiar I-position is subserved by an attentional system in the orbitofrontal cortex, linked with nearby affective and premotor areas. This internal monologue is fueled by gist-like perceptual expectancies of an- other's response, and it perpetuates and adjusts itself by updating these expectancies. A second I-position may be underpinned by an attentional system in the anterior cingulate cortex and its connections. These two attentional systems are partly independent, and they compete for control based on changes in emotional content and intensity. Thus, switching activation between them may account for semi-autonomous, but not coexisting, I-positions.