TL;DR: The determinants of interest group formation: 1. "Fictitious bonds... of wealth and law" Charles S. Maier 2. Class formation, interest articulation and public policy Jurgen Kocka 3. Regime and interest representation Suzanne Berger 4. The functioning of interest groups 5. The attribution of public status to interest groups Claus Offe 6. German interest group alliances in war and inflation, 1914-1923 Gerald D. Feldman 7.
Abstract: Preface Introduction Suzanne Berger Part I. The determinants of interest group formation: 1. 'Fictitious bonds ... of wealth and law' Charles S. Maier 2. Class formation, interest articulation and public policy Jurgen Kocka 3. Regime and interest representation Suzanne Berger 4. Local corporatism Gudmund Hernes and Arne Selvik Part II. The functioning of interest groups 5. The attribution of public status to interest groups Claus Offe 6. German interest group alliances in war and inflation, 1914-1923 Gerald D. Feldman 7. Corporatism and official hegemony John T. S. Keeler 8. The internal politics of trade unions Charles F. Sabel Part III. State, society and representation: the changing relationship 9. Interests and parties in pluralism Alessandro Pizzorno 10. Interest intermediation and regime governability in contemporary Western Europe and North America Philippe C. Schmitter 11. May 1968 and the Hot Autumn of 1969 Michele Salvati 12. A century of politics and interests in Spain Juan J. Linz Index.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce concepts in comparative politics, including system, process, and policy, and discuss the relationship between systems, processes, and polices in the United States.
Abstract: I. INTRODUCTION. 1. Issues in Comparative Politics. 2. Concepts in Comparative Politics. II. SYSTEM, PROCESS, AND POLICY. 3. Political Socialization and Culture. 4. Political Recruitment and Structure. 5. Interest Groups and Interest Articulation. 6. Political Parties and Interest Aggregation. 7. Government and Policy-making. 8. Public Policy.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on collective action theory and the religious economies model to analyze Muslim interest organizations in democratic polities, and apply them to a case study of mosque-state relations in the federal state (land) of Berlin.
Abstract: Presently, Islam in Europe has a weak and divided political voice. This article draws on collective action theory and the religious economies model to analyze Muslim interest organizations in democratic polities. The authors develop general theoretical propositions and apply them to a case study of mosque– state relations in the federal state (land) of Berlin. The study shows that institutional features of the German polity and diaspora Islam make collective action difficult and provide opportunities for factions (“spoilers”) to undermine broad-based collective action if they perceive centralizing organizations as compromising doctrinal and organizational autonomy. In addition, conflicts between organizations representing conservative Muslim interests and secularly oriented ones further complicate collective action. The result is narrow interest articulation by smaller, less diverse groups. Based on our study, the authors consider the general applicability of our propositions and their implications for European polities.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on collective action theory and the religious economies model to analyze Muslim interest organizations in democratic polities, and apply them to a case study of mosque-state relations in the federal state (land) of Berlin.
Abstract: Presently, Islam in Europe has a weak and divided political voice. This article draws on collective action theory and the religious economies model to analyze Muslim interest organizations in democratic polities. The authors develop general theoretical propositions and apply them to a case study of mosque – state relations in the federal state (land) of Berlin. The study shows that institutional features of the German polity and diaspora Islam make collective action difficult and provide opportunities for factions (“spoilers”) to under-mine broad-based collective action if they perceive centralizing organizations as compromising doctrinal and organizational autonomy. In addition, conflicts between organizations representing conservative Muslim interests and secularly oriented ones further complicate collective action. The result is narrow interest articulation by smaller, less diverse groups. Based on our study, the authors consider the general applicability of our propositions and their implications for ...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that forming an organization comes with different collective action problems than voicing a joint policy position, which leads to an important paradox: citizen groups face challenges in establishing themselves as organizations but find it relatively easy to position themselves on policy issues, whereas the reverse is true for business associations.
Abstract: Olson's logic of collective action predicts that business interest associations face fewer collective action problems than citizen action groups. This article challenges this assumption by arguing that forming an organization comes with different collective action problems than voicing a joint policy position. This leads us to examine an important paradox: Citizen groups face challenges in establishing themselves as organizations but find it relatively easy to position themselves on policy issues, whereas the reverse is true for business associations. We study this paradox empirically based on interviews with spokespersons of interest organizations active in the European Union and find support for our hypotheses. Our findings demonstrate that citizen groups position themselves on policy issues more easily than business interests and that this competitive advantage is amplified when policy issues attract the attention of the media.