Intension

Abstract: This paper discusses the concept of Europeanization in the light of recent research on the impact of the European Union politics and policy. Conceptual analysis is preliminary to empirical analysis. Accordingly, I examine the risk of "concept stretching", discuss extension and intension of Europeanization, and propose a taxonomy to "unpack" the concept and organize empirical research. The explanation of Europeanization is based on mechanisms and variables that need further exploration, but some preliminary results are presented here. Further research should concentrate on the policy level (and its interaction with macro-structures) and seek cross-fertilization with theoretical policy analysis and international relations, thus avoiding the risk of intellectual segregation.

Abstract: Summary The semantic field associated with the term ‘classification’, three main intellectual and/or practical operations, and three different products, can be identified — there being no one-to-one correspondence between operations and products. Through intensional classification, the extension of a concept at a given level of generality is subdivided into two or more narrower extensions corresponding to as many concepts at lower level of generality; this subdivision is obtained by stating that an aspect of the intension of each of the latter concepts is a different partial articulation of the corresponding aspect of the intension of the higher concept. Through extensional classification, the objects or events of a given set are grouped into two or more subsets according to the perceived similarities of their states on one or (more frequently) several properties; subsets may be successively grouped into subsets of wider extension and higher hierarchical level. Through classing, objects or events are assigned to classes or types which have been previously defined, usually by an intensional classification, but possibly by an extensional one operating on a different set. When only one fundamentum divisionis is considered, a classification scheme is produced — usually by an intensional classification. The extensions of each class must be mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive. Classes need not be at the same level of generality, and may be ordered. When several fundamenta are jointly considered, a typology is produced. This may be done through either intensional or extensional classification. The underlying category space may be “reduced” or reconstructed through “substruction”. When several fundamenta are considered in succession through a series of intensional classifications, a taxonomy is produced. Specific concepts/terms (such as taxon, rank, clade) are needed to deal with taxonomies. In the final chapter it is argued that the role of classification has been improperly assessed by several different quarters: in particular by those who credit it with ontological capacities and tasks; by those who see classificatory procedures as an old-fashioned activity to be abandoned in favour of more “scientific” measurement; and by those who blame the retarded development of an “explanatory” social science on the undue attention paid to classification by many of the founding fathers of sociology and cognate disciplines. 1. CLASSIFICATION AS AN OPERATION The term ‘classification’ (hereafter simply ‘cl.’) is indifferently used for several different operations and for several different products of such operations. It is also used for those sectors of botany and zoology where classification (as an operation) is most frequently resorted to. By analyzing the formal definitions and implicit acceptations of the term ‘cl.’as an operation, three main families of meanings of that term may be clearly recognized: (a) cl. as an intellectual operation whereby the extension of a concept at a given level of generality is subdivided into several (two or more) narrower extensions corresponding to as

Abstract: Analytical Table of Contents.- I/Intentionality and Intensionality.- 1. The Intentionality of Acts of Consciousness.- 1.1. Intentionality.- 1.2. "Acts" of Consciousness.- 1.3. The Objects of Acts.- 1.4. Direct-Object Acts versus Propositional Acts.- 1.5. Propositional Acts and Intending "About" Something.- 2. Some Main Characteristics of "Intentional Relations".- 2.1. "Intentional Relations".- 2.2. The Existence-Independence of Intentional Relations.- 2.3. The Conception-Dependence of Intentional Relations.- 2.4. Conception-Dependence and the Individuation of Intentions.- 2.5. The "Indeterminacy" in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.- 2.6. Definite and Indefinite Intentions.- 3. The Intensionality of Act-Contexts.- 3.1. Intensionality.- 3.2. The Failure of Substitutivity of Identity for Act-Contexts.- 3.3. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 1: Failure of Existence.- 3.4. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 2: Indefiniteness.- 3.5. "De Dicto" and "De Re" Modalities.- 4. Intensionality vis-a-vis Intentionality.- II/Some Classical Approaches to the Problems of Intentionality and Intensionality.- 1. Theories of Intentionality as Theories About the Objects of Intention.- 1.1. The Object-Approach to Intentionality.- 1.2. "Intentional Objects".- 1.3. Ambiguities in the Notion of "Intentional Object".- 2. Object-Theories of Intentionality.- 2.1. Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention: An Interpretation of Brentano's Early Theory.- 2.2. Problems with Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention.- 2.3. Intentional Objects as "Objects Beyond Being": Meinong's Theory of Objects.- 2.4. Intentional Objects as "Fictions": Brentano's Later Theory.- 3. Frege's Approach to Meaning, Reference, and the Problems of Intensionality.- 3.1. Parallels Between Frege's Semantics of Act-Sentences and the Object- Approach to Intentionality.- 3.2. Frege's Theory of Meaning and Reference.- 3.3. Meanings as Abstract "Intensional Entities".- 3.4. Frege's Semantics for Sentences of Propositional Attitude.- 3.5. Intensional Entities in Intentionality: Objects or Mediators of Intention?.- III/Fundamentals of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.- 1. Husserl's Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality.- 1.1. Husserl's Conception of Intentionality.- 1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology and Phenomenological Method.- 1.3. Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Intentionality.- 2. "Phenomenological Content".- 2.1. Act, Content, and Object: Twardowski's Formulation of the Distinction.- 2.2. Husserl's Conception of Content in Logical Investigations.- 2.3. Husserl's Mature Conception of Content: Noesis and Noema.- 2.4. The Structure of an Act's Noema: its "Sinn" and "Thetic" components.- 2.5. Content, Noesis, and Noema in Review.- 2.6. The Content of Perception: its Sensory (or Hyletic) and Noetic Phases.- 3. Husserl's Basic Theory: Intention via Sinn.- 3.1. Noematic Sinne as Mediators.- 3.2. The Theory and Its Account of the Peculiarities of Intention.- IV/Husserl's Theory of Noematic Sinn.- 1. Interpreting Noematic Sinn.- 1.1. Noema as Content and as Meaning.- 1.2. What is the "Intended as Such"?.- 1.3. Sinne versus Meinongian "Incomplete" Objects.- 1.4. Noema versus Essence.- 2. Husserl's Identification of Linguistic Meaning and Noematic Sinn.- 2.1. Husserl's Conception of Linguistic Meaning.- 2.2. Husserl on Meaning and Reference.- 2.3. Every Linguistic Meaning is a Noematic Sinn.- 2.4. Every Noematic Sinn is Expressible as a Linguistic Meaning.- 2.5. Qualifications and Extensions of the Expressibility Thesis.- 2.6. Noematic Description.- 2.7. Noemata as a Kind of Propositions (Satze).- 3. How Is Intention Achieved via Sinn?.- 3.1. Husserl's Account of the Structure of a Noematic Sinn: the "X" and the "Predicate-Senses".- 3.2. Some Problems for a "Definite-Description" Model of Intentionality.- 3.3. The Problem of Definite, or De Re, Intentions.- 3.4. The Sinn of Perception as "Demonstrative".- 3.5. Intentionality and Pragmatics: Contextual Influences on Intention.- V/Husserl's Notion of Horizon.- 1. Meaning and Possible Experience: The Turn to Husserl's Notion of Horizon.- 1.1. The "Indeterminacy" in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.- 1.2. Husserl's Notions of Object-Horizon, Act-Horizon, and Manifold.- 1.3. Horizon-Analysis as a New Method of Phenomenological Analysis.- 2. Husserl's Conception of Horizon.- 2.1. Early Notions of Object-Horizon: Ideas (1913).- 2.2. The Horizon of Possible Experiences Associated with an Act: Cartesian Meditations (1931).- 2.3. Act-Horizon and Object-Horizon.- 2.4. The Central Role of Perception in Horizon.- 2.5. The Maximal Horizon of an Act: An Act's Manifold of Associated Possible Acts.- 3. Horizon and Background Beliefs.- 3.1. The "Predelineation" of an Act's Horizon.- 3.2. Horizon and Fundamental Background Beliefs.- 3.3. Horizon and Concrete Background Beliefs Background Meaning.- 3.4. Counter-Evidence within an Act's Horizon.- 4. The Structure of an Act's Horizon 25.- 4.1. Internal and External Horizon.- 4.2. Temporal Structure in the Horizon.- 4.3. The Horizon's Breakdown into Verification Chains.- 4.4. Synthesis of Identification Within the Horizon.- 4.5. Summary of Husserl's Account of Horizon-Structure.- 5. Toward a Generalized Theory of Horizon.- VI/Horizon-Analysis and the Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning.- 1. Horizon-Analysis as Explication of Sinn and Intention.- 1.1. Horizon-Analysis and the Verification Theory of Meaning.- 1.2. Horizon-Analysis and the Carnapian, or Possible-Worlds, Theory of Meaning.- 1.3. Sorting Husserl with the Carnapian.- 1.4. Horizon-Analysis as "Pragmatic" Explication of Intention.- 1.5. Husserl's Appraisal of Horizon-Analysis Revisited.- 1.6. The Significance of Horizon-Analysis: Beyond Frege to New Horizons.- 2. The Explication of Meaning in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 2.1. Intension and Extension.- 2.2. Intension and Comprehension.- 2.3. Intensions as Functions on Possible Worlds.- 2.4. Intensions as Functions: Explication versus Definition.- 2.5. Two Kinds of Intensional Entities and Their Explication.- 2.6. "Individual Concepts", or Individual Meanings.- 2.7. Rigid and Individuating Meanings.- 2.8. The Explication of Noematic Sinn in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 2.9. "Pragmatic" Explication of Intention in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 3. The Basis in Husserl for a Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning and Intention.- 3.1. Possible Objects and Possible Worlds in Husserl.- 3.2. The Equivalence of Horizon-Analysis and Possible-Worlds Explication of Sinn and Intention.- 3.3. The Eliminability of Possible Entities from Husserl's Theory of Horizon.- VII/Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics.- 1. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Theory.- 1.1. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality With and Without Possible Worlds.- 1.2. The "Husserlian" Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.- 1.3. The Pure Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.- 1.4. The Possible-Worlds Approach to Intentionality.- 2. Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.1. Fregean, Tarskian, and Possible-Worlds Semantics.- 2.2. Hintikka's Possible-Worlds Approach to Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.3. The Account of Intensionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.4. Meaning Entities in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.5. Background Beliefs in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 3. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 3.1. Object and Content of Belief.- 3.2. The Aboutness of Indefinite, or De Dicto, Belief.- 3.3. The Aboutness of Definite, or De Re, Belief.- 3.4. Existence-Independence and Conception-Dependence of Aboutness.- 3.5. States of Affairs as Objects of Belief.- 4. A Husserlian Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- VIII/Definite, or De Re, Intention in a Husserlian Framework.- 1. The Characterization of Definite, or De Re, Intention.- 1.1. Modes of Definite Intention.- 1.2. Must the Object of a Definite Intention Exist?.- 1.3. Expressing and Describing Definite Intentions: Proper Names, Demonstrative Pronouns, and Quantifying-In.- 1.4. The Explication of Definite Intention in Terms of Horizon and Possible Worlds.- 2. Perceptual Acquaintance.- 2.1. The "Demonstrative" Acquainting Sense in Perception.- 2.2. The Explication of Perceptual Acquaintance in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 3. Identity, Individuation, and Individuation in Consciousness.- 3.1. Concerning Identity and Individuation.- 3.2. The Identity of a Natural Individual and Its "Transcendence".- 3.3. Husserl on Individuation Through Time.- 3.4. Husserl on Trans-World Individuation.- 4. Toward a Phenomenological Account of Individuative Consciousness.- 4.1. The Phenomenological Structure of Individuative Intention: Toward a "Pragmatic" Analysis of Individuative Definiteness.- 4.2. Knowing-Who and Individuative Consciousness.- 4.3. A Closer Look at the Structure of Individuative Intention.