About: Institutional model theory is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 228 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6936 citations.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors build a bridge between two distinct models of social actor that underlie most organizational analyses, which they refer to as a rational actor model and an institutional model, and suggest that these two general models should be treated not as oppositional but rather as representing two ends of a continuum of decisionmaking processes and behaviors.
Abstract: Excerpt] Our primary aims in this effort are twofold: to clarify the independent theoretical contributions of institutional theory to analyses of organizations, and to develop this theoretical perspective further in order to enhance its use in empirical research. There is also a more general, more ambitious objective here, and that is to build a bridge between two distinct models of social actor that underlie most organizational analyses, which we refer to as a rational actor model and an institutional model. The former is premised on the assumption that individuals are constantly engaged in calculations of the costs and benefits of different action choices, and that behavior reflects such utility-maximizing calculations. In the latter model, by contrast, 'oversocialized' individuals are assumed to accept and follow social norms unquestioningly, without any real reflection or behavioral resistance based on their own particular, personal interests. We suggest that these two general models should be treated not as oppositional but rather as representing two ends of a continuum of decisionmaking processes and behaviors. Thus, a key problem for theory and research is to specify the conditions under which behavior is more likely to resemble one end of this continuum or the other. In short, what is needed are theories of when rationality is likely to be more or less bounded. A developed conception of institutionalization processes provides a useful point of departure for exploring this issue.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine practice diffusion in an environment where competing logics exist, specifically investigating how trustee and performance logics that were rooted in different locations (Boston and New York) led to variation in how mutual funds established contracts with independent professional money management firms.
Abstract: This article examines practice diffusion in an environment where competing logics exist, specifically investigating how trustee and performance logics that were rooted in different locations (Boston and New York) led to variation in how mutual funds established contracts with independent professional money management firms. This focus on competing logics redirects institutional research away from isomorphism and the segregation of institutional and technical forces and toward an appreciation of how multiple forms of rationality underlie change in organizational fields. Implications for the dominant two-stage institutional model of diffusion and for research on institutions, organizations, and professions are discussed.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine practice diffusion in an environment where competing logics exist, focusing on how organizational and practice variations are institutionally shaped, and how trustee and performance logics in the mutual fund industry that were rooted in different geographic locations (Boston and New York) led to variation in how mutual funds established contracts with independent professional money management firms.
Abstract: This paper examines practice diffusion in an environment where competing logics exist, focusing on how organizational and practice variations are institutionally shaped. Empirically, I study how trustee and performance logics in the mutual fund industry that were rooted in different geographic locations (Boston and New York) led to variation in how mutual funds established contracts with independent professional money management firms. This focus on competing logics redirects institutional research away from isomorphism and the segregation of institutional and technical forces, and towards an appreciation of how multiple forms of rationality provide a foundation for ongoing struggle and change in organizational fields. Implications for the dominant two-stage institutional model of diffusion as well as research on institutions, organizations, and professions are discussed.
TL;DR: The professions in modern society have assumed leading roles in the creation and tending of institutions as discussed by the authors, and they are the preeminent institutional agents of our time, but this model has undergone important changes over time.
Abstract: More so than other types of social actors, the professions in modern society have assumed leading roles in the creation and tending of institutions. They are the preeminent institutional agents of our time. Different professions work in various ways: some attempt to create general cultural-cognitive frameworks; others to devise normative prescriptions to guide behavior; and still others to exercise coercive authority. Also, individual professionals assume varying roles within their professional community: some concentrate on devising and testing general principles, others transport these ideas to varying communities; and still others work to apply the principles to individual cases. Professions themselves adhere to an institutional model, but this model has undergone important changes over time.
TL;DR: In this article, a simple preferences model, an institutional model, and an additive preferences-institutional model were used to evaluate the influence of institutional rules and structures on judicial behavior.
Abstract: In this study, we perform a basic exercise to illustrate the vital influence of institutional rules and structures on judicial behavior, and the impor tance of recognizing this influence in models of judicial choice. Specifically, we estimate several models of state supreme court justices' voting on the death penalty. Beginning with a simple preferences model, an institutional model, and an additive preferences-institutional model, we explore the extent to which our understanding of judicial behavior is enhanced or changed through models that include the interactive effects of institutional features with other sources of influence on judicial choice. Our most fundamental point, clearly supported by the results, is that the effects of case facts, per sonal attributes, and environmental features are conditioned by institutional arrangements. Any explanation of judicial choice must consider carefully the impact of institutional context on the exercise of judicial discretion. Through this approach, the incons...