About: Innatism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 71 publications have been published within this topic receiving 369 citations. The topic is also known as: innatism (philosophy) & innateness (philosophy).
TL;DR: The authors argue that Fodor's arguments are a reductio of one of his essential presuppositions, but it happens to be a presupposition that he shares with virtually all of psychology and philosophy.
Abstract: Fodor argues that the construction of genuinely novel concepts is impossible and, therefore, that all basic concepts available to human beings are already present as an innate endowment (1975, 1981). This radical innatism - along with related conclusions such as an innate modularity of available representations and a corresponding innate limitation in the potential knowledge that human beings might be capable of (1983) - has been seen by many as a reductio ad absurdum of Fodor’s position, and his arguments have consequently been dismissed I will argue that Fodor’s arguments deserve much more careful attention than that: in particular, his arguments are a reductio of one of his essential presuppositions, but it happens to be a presupposition that he shares with virtually all of psychology and philosophy. Fodor’s conclusions, then, are reductios of the major portion of contemporary studies of cognition and epistemology (Campbell and Bickhard, 1987). Furthermore, even when the critical presupposition is isolated, it is difficult to construct a genuine alternative. Most attempts at correcting any part of the logical difficulties involved have inadvertently presupposed the pernicious premise elsewhere in the system (Bickhard, 1980a, 1982, 1987).
TL;DR: The authors revisited the key questions in current thinking in evolutionary linguistics, reviewed the alleged stages during language evolution, and evaluates the mainstream hypotheses on language emergence, namely innatism and emergentism.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Kant's views on the origin of the intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz's, and that the notions of innateness are innate for Kant no less than for Leibhniz.
Abstract: In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of the intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz.
TL;DR: It is argued that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought.
Abstract: The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought.
TL;DR: In this paper, it is suggested that neurobiological findings can give important contributions to the philosophical debate on innatism by putting forward possible explanatory models and heuristic hypotheses. But they do not consider the possibility of the presence of innate ideas in the human brain.