Abstract: This report develops a new set of criteria for evaluating computer architectures that are to support systems with security requirements. Central to these criteria is the concept of a domain, here interpreted as a set of information and authorizations for the manipulation of that information in a comput system. Architectural requirements are grouped in three categories: logical structure, the physical structure. These criteria were developed in order to assess the utility of Navy standard computers as bases for secure embedded systems, but they are not specific to those computers.

Abstract: The value of information depends upon its effective use. This in turn depends upon management’s confidence in the information received. Their confidence is based on the reliability and accuracy of the information. This is particularly true when this information is produced by computer systems. No system, however good, can be left for too long before it is checked to see that it is performing efficiently as there are many ways in which a system can be damaged, both deliberately and accidentally. It is essential, therefore, that all computer systems are regularly audited.

Abstract: Database management systems (DBMS's) today are usually built as subsystems on top of an operating system (OS). This design approach can lead to problems of unreliability and inefficient performance as well as forcing a duplication of functions between the DBMS and OS. A new design approach is proposed which eliminates much of this duplication by integrating the duplicated functions into independent subsystems used by both the DBMS and OS. Specifically, an I/O and file support subsystem and a security subsystem are defined. Both subsystems make use of a logical information model which models the stored information in secondary storage. The new database operating system organization and the logical information model are presented in detail. Design of the security subsystem is based on the access control model, and is extended with Boolean predicates to produce an access control model capable of enforcing content-dependent security policies. The access matrix is implemented using a combination of access lists and capabilities. Authorization models and multiple user processes are discussed in relation to the new system organization. The outline of a formal specification and proof of correctness of the security subsystem is also discussed.

Abstract: What do you do to start reading scientific communication and national security? Searching the book that you love to read first or find an interesting book that will make you want to read? Everybody has difference with their reason of reading a book. Actuary, reading habit must be from earlier. Many people may be love to read, but not a book. It's not fault. Someone will be bored to open the thick book with small words to read. In more, this is the real condition. So do happen probably with this scientific communication and national security.

Abstract: This document, the second in a series, focuses on telecommunications technology and related areas in computer organizations. It contains four primary parts: the telecommunications forecast through 1999, three perspectives on the divestitute of AT and T, a discussion of the general impacts of technology on computer security, and the management implications of the trends in information technology. Additionally, it contains the summary of an industry workshop on this forecast, a brief update of the 1983 forecast, and a glossary of terms. This forecast is a companion to Future Information Processing Technology - 1983 which contains fifteen year projections of computer hardware and software.

Abstract: Note: The remarks and opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author, and in no way reflect the official position of the Bank of America.This paper presents three important—and likely to soon to be available—facilities that will help increase the security associated with computer systems of the 1990s. They are, in the order of their presentation, (1) enhanced logging and monitoring facilities, (2) an on-line database of information security experts, and (3) generalized encryption key management packages. These facilities are described from a functional rather than an implementation standpoint. The basis for stating that these facilities will soon be available is simply the author's last six years of research and consulting experience in the computer security field at SRI International and the Bank of America.

Abstract: (1984). Role of Signal Intelligence in National Security. Strategic Analysis: Vol. 7, No. 10, pp. 844-852.

Abstract: The telecommunications industry working in consonance with the U.S. government under the direction of the National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee has been assessing the vulnerabilities of national commercial telecommunications systems in an effort to identify and recommend survivability enhancements. Encryption of the command links on future commercial communications satellites has been identified as one of the highest priority initiatives. At the present, several design choices are available to the commercial satellite operators for enhancing security of the command links. These choices range from the military K boxes, proven on DoD spacecraft, to a command intrusion detection system which capitalizes on the uplink command carrier characteristics to detect intruders. The designs vary in terms of the weight and power penalties and the degree of security afforded. This paper presents concepts for enhancing security of the command links on commercial satellites and specifically describes the command authentication system being incorporated by American Satellite Company.

Abstract: The very nature of the traditional office environment makes the task of securing information in the automated office a difficult one. But automation provides a great opportunity to implement controls and to bring order to an often chaotic office working situation.

Abstract: : Partial contents: Policy - - Increased emphasis on counter-intelligence and human reliability within the Defense Industrial Security Program, Priority emphasis on security of sensitive contracts, Revising the Industrial Security Manual, Defense Investigative Service (DIS) inspection of special access programs, Strengthening the adjudication process and centralizing the adjudication function within DOD, Revising the frequency of industrial security inspections, and Reporting of all foreign travel by contractor personnel; Administration/Operations Legislation/Regulation; Personnel security - - Revised scope of personnel security investigation, Enhancement of personnel security investigative standards and reduction of industrial clearances; and Documentation in standard practice procedures relating to disciplinary Action for Security Violations; Physical security - - System of controls over after-hours access and reproduction equipment at cleared facilities; Information Security - - Access to DTIC, Proactive efforts by the DIS to prevent unauthorized disclosures, Increased emphasis on classification management, and Prevention of 'Bootlegging' of classified material.

Abstract: This paper will describe various methods to secure an APL database application. Primary foci will be in the areas of “physical” protection, and in cryptographic techniques. To that end, distinctions will be made between “data,” and “information.” Because of those differences, specific methods will be offered which are appropriate for each modality of security. A brief set of examples will be included for the use of IBM's1 RACF2 (Resource Access Control Facility). Also, a description of a Public Key Cryptographic function, implemented in APL, will be offered. Finally, these will be combined into a database scenario, applicable to products like APLDI23 (APL Data Interface).

Abstract: : The Army Secure Operating System (ASOS) project, under the management of the U.S. Army CECOM organization, will provide real time systems software necessary for fielding modern Battlefield Automation Systems. The ASOS objective is to develop a family of operating systems for tactical data system applications. ASOS will support real time applications software coded in Ada. In addition, ASOS will incorporate information security technology to protect classified data processed by Army tactical systems. The security technology is based on the National Computer Security Center's Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). Current plans include two members of the ASOS family: a Dedicated Secure Operating System at the TCSEC C2 level and a Multilevel Secure Operating; System at the TCSEC A1 level. In the paper we present an overview of the ASOS concept and TRW's solution to the ASOS design and analysis problem.