Infitah

Abstract: Preface. Acknowledgements. Maps. Introduction. Chapter One Hezbollah's Version of Political Islam, Islam in Perspective, The Islamic Resurgence of the 1970s, The Crisis of Secularism and Fundamentalist Reactions, Government Corruption and the Purification of Society, Colonialism and its Discontents Chapter Two Hezbollah and the Outside World, Anti-Imperialism and Common Cause, Syria's Problems with the West, Imperialism and the Iranian Experience, Lebanon: An Arena for Foreign Battles, Iran Enters the Battle for West Beirut, Damascus and Tehran Strike a Deal, Hezbollah: The Only Choice Chapter Three The Mechanics of Hezbollah 's Transformation from Radical Militia to Mainstream Party, Syria Gains the Upper Hand in Lebanon, Guaranteeing Jihad, The State/Resistance Deal, Public Reaction to Hezbollah's New Face Chapter Four Managing the 'True Believers', Islam or the System: The Internal Debate, Rationalizing Compromise from an Islamic Perspective, Convincing the Grassroots, An Eminent Clergyman Lends His Authority Chapter Five Squaring Jihad with the General Public, The Political Effects of Hezbollah's Violent Emergence, The Party of God Tries to Calm the Waters, Islamist Discourse and Integration: Jihad in a National Context, Infitah: Securing Christian Understanding and Support, Political Networking with Christians and Others Chapter Six Serving the Umma - Hezbollah as Employer and Charity Organization, The Effect of Lebanon's Civil War on Public and Social Services, Service Delivery in the Dahiyeh, Rural Services and Programmes, Speaking for the 'Abandoned', Jihad al-Binaa (RC)as a Model Rural Development Agency, Hezbollah's 'Good Works': The Prognosis for Growth Chapter Seven The Grass Roots Speak - The 1998 Municipal Elections, The Struggle over Election 'Rules' Hezbollah Plays the Democracy Card, Beirut Campaigns and Elections, The Dahiyeh Decides, The Electoral Struggle in the South, Hezbollah's Bekaa Coup , Chapter Eight The Mechanics of Military Jihad, Beirut's Priority: Extending Control over the South, Incipient Tensions between the Lebanese Government and Hezbollah, The Imperatives and Rules of Syria 's Two-Track Resistance Policy, 'Grapes of Wrath' and the Dynamics of Syrian Foreign Policy, Policy Pay-offs, Post-'Victory' Frictions Chapter Nine The Collapse of the 'Security Zone', Israel's 'Security Zone' Begins to Shrink, Hi-Tech, Low-Tech Jihad Pays Off, Guerrilla Warfare in the Communications Age, Diplomacy and the Israeli Withdrawal, The End of the 'Security Zone', Resistance Challenges and Their Resolution Chapter Ten Hezbollah's Standing After the Collapse of the 'Security Zone', Parliamentary Election Pay-offs, The South and the Bekaa Reward Hezbollah, Elections in the Capital, The Guns vs. Butter Clash, New Resistance Opportunities, All the Way to Jerusalem? Chapter Eleven The Terrorism vs. Resistance Controversy, Lebanon, Syria and Iran: Willing Partners in the Anti-Terrorism Coalition?, Beirut's Position on Hezbollah

Abstract: An examination of the contemporary Islamic Movement in Egypt shows it to represent a creative alternative to institutional Islam. Alternative Islam serves to bind Egyptian youth on university campuses as Muslim brothers and sisters in one community. Its two fundamental features-egalitarianism and sexual segregation-are analyzed in the context of the cultural correlates of Infitah and the social correlates of development. Within this community a new Egyptian woman is emerging-educated, professional, nonelitist, and veiled. The veil is part of an assertive movement with a powerful message symbolizing the beginning of a synthesis between modernity and authenticity. One recent phenomenon incomprehensible to many observers of the Egyptian scene today is the visible presence of a new Egyptian woman: the young urban college student on her way to or from the university campus-carrying her books, wearing eye glasses, alone or in the chatting company of other college women, and completely "veiled"-face and body. Confused at the thought of a future "veiled" doctor, engineer or pharmacist, such observers, in particular those of the modernist tradition, do not tire of speculation. Is it identity crisis, misguided leisure, a fad, youth protest, ideological vacuum, individual psychic disturbance, life-crisis, social dislocation, or something else? They often resort to some oversimplified theory of causation and try to explain the phenomenon away. Also bewildering to many is the apparent contradiction of being modern, college-educated and career-oriented yet also being "veiled" and apparently fundamentalist and backward. There is irony here, also, if one recalls the many social and cultural obstacles confronting Egyptian feminists until Huda Sha'rawi's dramatic act of public deveiling in 1923. Many saw this as a major Egyptian feminist achievement, marking the end of veiling-until women resumed veiling after the 1973 Ramadan War (known locally as al-'Ubur, the crossing). The new Egyptian woman as yet represents a relatively small although rapidly increasing segment of women college students, and among Egyptian women; however, as a collectivity, she has a qualitatively strong, dominant presence and represents a social entity with a definite cultural message.

Abstract: After a decade of Egypt's experiment in economic liberalization (infitah) it is by no means too early to make an initial assessment of its impact. Indeed, many Egyptians in recent years have already undertaken such an evaluation. By and large, they have found infitah to be wanting in major respects, as have a number of non-Egyptian experts in the international donor community. While close attention will be paid to these evaluations and criticisms, the focus of this essay is not so much upon performance as upon process. It is argued that infitah should be seen as a set of policies, more or less interrelated, designed to address the challenge of capital accumulation and investment. Liberalization policies, however, do not exhaust all such policies, and one of the major shortcomings in criticisms of infitah is that negative effects attributed to liberalization may in fact result from other policies altogether.

Abstract: Egypt is one of a restricted group of developing countries whose politics have assumed a special significance as test cases of opposing models of development. Egypt shares with India, China, Algeria, Yugoslavia and Cuba the analytical interest of partisan and academic observers for the light its experience may shed upon the competing theories of development and for the possibility that its history may reveal a unique and unanticipated model Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm , p. i . Introduction Towards the end of the 1970s, as the opening up ( infitah ) toward the west and the liberalization of the economy were sharply criticized as “betrayal” of the 1952 revolution’s goals, as return of the exploitative bourgeoisie, and as abandonment of the Palestinian cause, certain observers, Egyptian and foreign, began to lay out a new “model” for the reading of contemporary Egyptian history. This model attempted to view Egypt’s various “experiments,” before and after the revolution, from a common perspective; it also made it possible to explain the “cycles” through which Egypt has ultimately failed to “modernize” and regain the place among nations that its millenia of history allows it to demand. Muhammad ‘Ali and Nasir, breaking with a past of national humiliation, both incarnated Egypt’s “will to power” by basing restoration of its regional and international role on a state economy heavily reliant on industry and the construction of a national armed force: the failure of both projects was brought about by conjunction of the “perverse” consequences of their own options and methods, and by the hostility from coalitions of external interests, alarmed by the regional role to which Egypt aspired. The successors of Muhammad ‘Ali and Nasir, Isma’il and Sadat, both betrayed or distorted their predecessors’ “developmentalist” aims and sacrificed the public good and Egypt’s independence to the mercantile interests of a class of speculators and unscrupulous businessmen that served as a wedge for foreign penetration. The crucial point here is the repetition itself and the way these successive “cycles” may be articulated: Nasir “repeats” Muhammad ‘Ali, precisely because, under Isma’il, the work of his grandfather had been swayed from its objectives; in the same way, if Sadat “repeats” Isma’il, it is because the conditions that had led to Muhammad ‘Ali’s failure were still in force, producing the same effects, and enabling the articulation of something that may appear as a “law” pertaining to the specific history of Egypt.