Inferential role semantics

Abstract: Selon l'A, la seule version possible d'une semantique a role inferentiel est une version non holistique Il evalue la force de l'argument de Fodore et Lepore (1991, 1992) qui va a l'encontre de ce point de vue

Abstract: The Language of Thought Hypothesis,which follows from proposals of Fodor[15]and Fodor and Pylyshyn [12],proposes that thinking takes place in a mental language,which has a representational format consisting both of a logical syntax and a logical semantics. Thinking thus can be conceived of as a set of syntactic operations on such representations. We argue that the semantics of such a system is best provided by an inference role semantics and that the mental logic theory of Braine and O'Brien [3]can provide a paradigmatic case study in how the empirical inves- tigation of the language of thought can proceed.

Abstract: When one says ‘dog’, or ‘yawl’, or ‘junta’, there is the strong impression that discrete ideas correspond to each of those words. Cognitive science, following common sense, calls such ideas ‘concepts’. Typically at least, we reflective common folk think of a word as the expression of a concept, of concepts as the constituents of larger mental units, such as thoughts, and thus of concepts as central to our mental life. The general directions that the study of concepts has taken within cognitive science are clear, and a sweeping critique of those directions is the focus of this most recent book from Jerry Fodor. As the title suggests, Fodor thinks that not all is well in the House of Concepts. In essence, cognitive science has assumed that (a) there is a rich internal structure to concepts that can be used to predict how concepts function in our mental activities and overt behavior; and (b) there are rich external structures in which concepts are embedded, structures often called intuitive theories, that are needed to explain concept acquisition and use. Fodor rejects both (a) and (b), focusing largely on the various ways in which (a) has been articulated in linguistics, philosophy, and psychology (with glancing blows at artificial intelligence along the way). At the core of Fodor’s diagnosis of what has gone wrong is inferential role semantics (IRS), the view that concepts are individuated in part by the inferential relations they participate in. IRS implies that at least part of what makes something in the head, the concept DOG, say, is that it is typically/ideally/always inferred from other mental particulars (e.g. ROVER, MAN’S BEST FRIEND), and typically/ideally/always leads one to infer still other