Indirect speech

Abstract: Acknowledgements Introduction Origins of the essays 1. A taxonomy of illocutionary acts 2. Indirect speech acts 3. The logical status of fictional discourse 4. Metaphor 5. Literal meaning 6. Referential and attributive 7. Speech acts and recent linguistics Bibliography Index.

Abstract: Part 1 Basic notions: introduction why pragmatics defining pragmatics pragmatic principles. Part 2 Micropragmatics: reference and implicature speech acts speech act verbs and indirect speech acts speech acts and their classification. Part 3 Macropragmatics: introduction to macropragmatics conversational analysis - basic notions conversational analysis - part one conversational analysis - part two metapragmatics societal pragmatics.

Abstract: 1. Living grammar 2. Systematic grammar 3. Systematic grammar (continued) 4. Parts of speech 5. Substantive and adjectives 6. Parts of speech (concluded) 7. The three ranks 8. Junction and nexus 9. Various kinds of nexus 10. Nexus-substantives. Final words on nexus 11. Subject and predicate 12. Object. Active and passive 13. Case 14. Number 15. Number (concluded) 16. Person 17. Sex and Gender 18. Comparison 19. Time and tense 20. Time and tense (concluded 21. Direct and indirect speech 22. Classification of utterances 23. Moods 24. Negation 25. Conclusion

Abstract: In this paper, we address several puzzles concerning speech acts,particularly indirect speech acts. We show how a formal semantictheory of discourse interpretation can be used to define speech actsand to avoid murky issues concerning the metaphysics of action. Weprovide a formally precise definition of indirect speech acts, includingthe subclass of so-called conventionalized indirect speech acts. Thisanalysis draws heavily on parallels between phenomena at the speechact level and the lexical level. First, we argue that, just as co-predicationshows that some words can behave linguistically as if they're `simultaneously'of incompatible semantic types, certain speech acts behave this way too.Secondly, as Horn and Bayer (1984) and others have suggested, both thelexicon and speech acts are subject to a principle of blocking or ``preemptionby synonymy'': Conventionalized indirect speech acts can block their`paraphrases' from being interpreted as indirect speech acts, even ifthis interpretation is calculable from Gricean-style principles. Weprovide a formal model of this blocking, and compare it withexisting accounts of lexical blocking.